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Commits
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2bd42e8fc4 |
fix(actions): allow adding raw metadata values via appendMetadataRaw (#12567)
# Which Problems Are Solved Since #10666 (v4.1+, backported to v4.x), metadata values set through actions v1 (`api.metadata.push` and `api.v1.user.appendMetadata`) are always JSON-encoded via `json.Marshal`. This made the write path consistent with the JSON-based read path, but removed the ability to store raw (unencoded) metadata values: - A scalar string is now always stored quoted (`"de"` instead of `de`). - The previous byte-array convention (mapping a string to an integer array in the script, handled by `mapBytesToByteArray` introduced in #5526) now stores the literal integer-array text (e.g. `[100,101]`) instead of the raw bytes. Customers migrating from v3.x whose downstream systems base64-decode metadata values from tokens and expect raw bytes have no way to produce them anymore — changing the consuming system is not always possible. Reverting the default is not an option either, as clients that adopted actions v1 on v4.x now rely on the JSON encoding. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a new, opt-in function `api.v1.user.appendMetadataRaw(key, value)` to the actions v1 login flows (external / internal authentication post authentication and pre creation), next to the existing `appendMetadata`. - The value is stored as raw bytes without JSON encoding: - a string is stored as its plain UTF-8 bytes (`de`, not `"de"`) - byte arrays (`Uint8Array` or a plain array of integers 0-255, the old convention) are stored as-is, so existing v3 scripts using a string-to-byte-array helper only need to switch the function name - other types (and empty values) throw an error - The existing `appendMetadata` and `api.metadata.push` behavior remains byte-for-byte unchanged. # Additional Changes - Documented `appendMetadataRaw` (and the JSON encoding behavior of `appendMetadata`) in the external and internal authentication actions docs. - Added unit tests for the new function (through a real goja runtime) and a test locking in the existing `appendMetadata` JSON-encoding behavior. # Additional Context - Regression introduced as a side effect of #10666 (which fixed #10470); the raw byte handling was originally introduced in #5526. - Reported by a customer upgrading from v3.4.x to v4.16.x, whose PostAuthentication action maps token payload claims into user metadata. - Requires backport to v4.x. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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 Max PeintnerandGitHub
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ba3a45bee4 |
fix(login): treat user-verified passkey as fulfilling MFA in session validity check (#12575)
# Which Problems Are Solved
Users with a passkey plus an additional configured second factor (TOTP /
OTP Email / OTP SMS) get stuck on the passkey verification page: the
WebAuthn ceremony succeeds, but the continue button just spins and the
user is redirected back to `/passkey` indefinitely. Re-registering the
passkey or switching to a private window does not help.
Since the MFA hardening of `isSessionValid` (
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30434d176c |
feat(login): Sign in with Zitadel (#12530)
Closes #11824 # Which Problems Are Solved The backend supports the dedicated ZITADEL identity provider template (`AddZitadelProvider`, `IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL`), but the new login (login v2) cannot yet handle providers of this type: A configured and activated ZITADEL IdP is not rendered as a sign-in option, because the provider type is missing from the login's component mapping. # How the Problems Are Solved - Regenerated `@zitadel/proto` (`settings/v2/login_settings_pb` in `types`, `es` and `cjs`) so `IdentityProviderType.ZITADEL = 13` is available (`idp/v2` was already up to date). - `apps/login/src/lib/idp.ts`: - `idpTypeToSlug` maps `ZITADEL` to the `zitadel` slug, used by the generic `/idp/[provider]/process|failure` routes (no route changes needed). - `idpTypeToIdentityProviderType` maps `IDPType.IDP_TYPE_ZITADEL` to `IdentityProviderType.ZITADEL`. - Added `SignInWithZitadel` button (`apps/login/src/components/idps/sign-in-with-zitadel.tsx`) with the Zitadel logo as inline SVG: the brand gradient is theme-independent, accents use `currentColor` to adapt to light/dark, consistent with the other provider buttons. - Registered the Zitadel type in the provider-to-component mapping in `sign-in-with-idp.tsx`. No changes to the IdP intent handling are required: user auto-creation/auto-update consume the pre-mapped `user_action.create_user` / `update_user` from `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent`, which the backend fills for the Zitadel provider like for any generic OIDC provider. # Additional Changes - Added the `signInWithZitadel` i18n key ("Sign in with Zitadel") to all 15 locale files. - Extended `idp.test.ts` with the new slug and type mappings and added the Zitadel type to the exhaustive enum-coverage tests (45 tests passing). # Additional Context - Part of the "Zitadel as an Identity Provider" epic: #5127 - Enables the customer-portal "support access" flow, where support staff sign in to a customer instance via a pre-configured Zitadel Support IdP --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> |
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83854e80e0 |
fix(telemetry): record route patterns instead of request paths on HTTP metrics (#12557)
# Which Problems Are Solved - The `uri` label of `http.server.request_count` and `http.server.return_code_counter` holds the concrete request path, so every object ID served over a REST path becomes its own metric series. On our v4.16.2 instance `/debug/metrics` exposes 8,000 series, 4,467 of which (56%) belong to `http_server_return_code_counter_total` alone, spread over 4,390 distinct `uri` values such as `/v2/sessions/385063742120926058`. The set only grows with the number of objects the installation has served. - Paths matching no route are recorded verbatim, so unauthenticated scanner traffic (`/wp-json/`, `/login.php`, …) keeps adding series. - The grpc-gateway answers `405 Method Not Allowed` without going through the configured `errorHandler`, so those responses never reported a route pattern, not even before the regression. This is a regression, first shipped in v4.11.0; v4.10.1 is unaffected. #9286 introduced the mechanism, #9523 extended it to unknown paths, and #11435 removed it while reorganising the middleware packages: > Removed setting of URI to context in metric middleware. There were only setters and no getters. (Unused value) The getter was `*recorder.RequestURI` in `RegisterRequestCounter` / `RegisterRequestCodeCounter`, which the same PR replaced with `baseURI(r)`. Both ends went at once, so nothing failed. # How the Problems Are Solved - `metrics.WithRequestURIPattern` / `metrics.SetRequestURIPattern` are back, and `metrics.RequestURI` is now the single place deciding what to label with: the pattern a router reported, or the requested path if none did. `UnknownPath` moved to the metrics package so every surface shares one constant. - The HTTP metrics middleware prepares the context before passing the request on, which is the half that got dropped. - `setRequestURIPattern` in the grpc-gateway reports the pattern to metrics again, not only to tracing, and is now also called on the `405` branch. - Requests routed by chi (the OIDC endpoints) fall back to the pattern chi matched. That covers the RFC 7592 client configuration routes added in #12315 (`/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`), which are templated on the client ID, and collapses unknown paths below the OIDC prefixes to `UNKNOWN_PATH` as well. Against the metrics dump from our instance, `http_server_return_code_counter_total` drops from 4,467 series to roughly 35, and the endpoint as a whole from 8,000 to about 3,570. # Additional Changes - Regression tests, which were missing and are the reason the revert went unnoticed: - `metrics`: resolution of the `uri` label, including that a pattern set on a derived context reaches the middleware. - `gateway`: every way the gateway can answer — success, error, unroutable path, wrong method. - `middleware`: both routing styles, i.e. a router reporting its own pattern and a chi routed request. - A doc comment on `SetRequestURIPattern` explaining that it is written by routers and read back by the middleware through the context, so it does not read as an unused setter again. # Additional Context - Closes #12556 - Restores #9286 and #9523 - Regressed in #11435 Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]> |
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 MaximilianandGitHub
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9fa0cad9d9 | docs: Update production guidelines (#12552) | ||
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be5b278069 |
test(login): avoid assert.Never race in forged registration check (#12548)
# Which Problems Are Solved - `TestExternalNotFoundOption_ForgedRegistration_IsRejected` flakes across unrelated PRs: the test reaches PASS, then panics with `Log in goroutine after Test... has completed` and `rpc error: code = Canceled desc = context canceled`. # How the Problems Are Solved - Replaces `assert.Never` with a synchronous poll helper (`requireNeverUserByEmail`) so `ListUsers` and `require` run on the test goroutine and finish before `TestMain` cancels `CTX`. - Keeps the same “must stay absent for a window” polarity (not `Eventually`), so a late-projected forged user still fails the test. # Additional Changes - None. # Additional Context - CI examples: [run 30980062306](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/actions/runs/30980062306), [run 30837302974](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/actions/runs/30837302974) Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]> |
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0a18aba91c |
fix(database): skip CREATE USER when role exists to avoid password in Postgres logs (#12538)
<!-- CURSOR_AGENT_PR_BODY_BEGIN --> ## Summary When `zitadel init` runs on every Helm upgrade/re-deploy, `VerifyUser` always executed `CREATE USER ... WITH PASSWORD '...'`. If the role already existed, PostgreSQL returned `42710` and logged the full statement—including the plaintext password—even though ZITADEL swallowed that error. This mirrors the existing `VerifyDatabase` catalog check: query `pg_roles` first and skip creation when the role exists. Also stops mutating the package-level `createUserStmt` when appending `WITH PASSWORD`. Fixes #12178 ## Changes - `cmd/initialise/verify_user.go`: check `SELECT EXISTS(... FROM pg_roles ...)` before `CREATE USER`; build password clause on a local statement copy - `cmd/initialise/verify_user_test.go`: cover catalog skip, catalog-check failure, and create paths with the new query ## Test plan - [x] `go test ./cmd/initialise/...` (passed) - [ ] Re-run init against an existing role and confirm Postgres logs no longer contain `CREATE USER ... WITH PASSWORD` <!-- CURSOR_AGENT_PR_BODY_END --> <div><a href="https://cursor.com/agents/bc-bc514793-d275-4d91-a71b-1b7566668b65?cursor_ref=pr_footer&cursor_cta=open_in_web"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-dark.png"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-light.png"><img alt="Open in Web" width="114" height="28" src="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-dark.png"></picture></a> <a href="https://cursor.com/background-agent?bcId=bc-bc514793-d275-4d91-a71b-1b7566668b65&cursor_ref=pr_footer&cursor_cta=open_in_cursor"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-dark.png"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-light.png"><img alt="Open in Cursor" width="131" height="28" src="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-dark.png"></picture></a> </div> Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]> |
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464d1cb655 |
fix(login): resolve unknownContext error on password page caused by inconsistent ignoreUnknownUsernames handling (#12512)
# Which Problems Are Solved The `/password` page (and related password pages) can show the `unknownContext` error even though the user was resolved correctly and login completes fine. Two causes: 1. `sendLoginname` used two different `ignoreUnknownUsernames` sources: session creation was gated on the **user's org** login settings, while the redirect's `loginName` masking and enumeration guards were gated on a **caller-supplied flag** reflecting the request context (instance or org scope). Whenever the two diverge — e.g. `ignoreUnknownUsernames` enabled on the instance but not on the user's org, or the reverse — the redirect carries a `loginName` that doesn't match the session cookie (or no session is created at all), so the `/password` page can't load the session and renders `unknownContext`, while password submission still succeeds via its user-search fallback. This affects every caller of `sendLoginname` — the manual `/loginname` form as well as the server-side `login_hint` resolution; it was most reproducible with `login_hint`, since that path resolves context settings at the instance level, maximizing the chance of divergence with an org-level policy. 2. The password pages tried to re-derive "was enumeration protection applied?" from login settings to suppress the error — but they resolve settings from a different context than `sendLoginname` (falling back to the default organization instead of the instance), so any org-level custom policy made the suppression misfire. More fundamentally, the alert was keyed on a failed session lookup, which is not an error state: under enumeration protection no session exists by design, and the forms recover without one (`sendPassword` falls back to user search; `/password/set` works via code + userId). # How the Problems Are Solved `sendLoginname` no longer accepts `ignoreUnknownUsernames` from the caller. It derives a single constant server-side from the request-context login settings it already fetches and uses it for every decision in the flow: session creation, `preventUserEnumeration`, the multiple-users branch, the INITIAL-user check, the organization reset, the auth-method guards, and the IdP redirect after domain discovery. Redirect params use `session?.factors?.user?.loginName ?? command.loginName`: when a session exists, its loginName goes in the URL so the next page always finds the session cookie; when protection applies, no session (and no session cookie) is created and the raw input is echoed, keeping known and unknown users fully indistinguishable — including the previously observable `Set-Cookie` difference. `UsernameForm` and `resolveLoginHint` stop forwarding the flag, which also removes the redundant `getLoginSettings` call in `resolveLoginHint`. The password pages no longer consult login settings or the session lookup for the `unknownContext` error and instead warn only when required input is actually missing (matching the existing pattern on the passkey/mfa/u2f pages): `/password` and `/password/change` when no `loginName` searchParam is present, `/password/set` when neither `loginName` nor `userId` is present. A missing session alone no longer triggers the error. Verified against a live instance in all four settings combinations (uniform on/off, both divergence directions) including a known-vs-unknown `login_hint` comparison producing byte-identical responses under protection; full unit suite passes. --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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 jmaretteandGitHub
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9070b537d2 |
feat(oidc): add RFC 7592 dynamic client management (#12315)
# Which Problems Are Solved #12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591), but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself afterwards: - The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration. - There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask a human. # How the Problems Are Solved Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol (RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT` and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint. ## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch The management endpoints are gated on the `DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`, exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does. `allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints in both modes. ## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token it was handed: | | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) | | --- | --- | --- | | Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access token | | Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None | Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create* clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints. One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two, and there is no user identity to check against in the first place. Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot obtain a client's registration access token, by design. Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another client is rejected without touching the database. ## The token itself - **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted, through a new `project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues it. - **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens. The opaque token handed to the client encrypts `client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before checking the secret against the stored hash. - **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted before it is projected. - **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates, including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable token back. ## Reusing the existing persistence A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and `oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`), so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a registered client is never left unmanageable. # Additional Changes - Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the `apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep in sync. - The registration response (`POST`) now also carries `registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`. - Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page. - Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update, delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read, update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token, which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of their own. # Additional Context - Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313 (RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main` and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there. - **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above (registration access token only, no operator path through these endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write` also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`. - Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the guide and asserted as such in the integration test. - A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No proto change and no new feature flag. - Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`, `golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI remains the check on it. |
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a8861336f4 |
fix(api): accept SetSecuritySettings on /v2/settings/security (#12518)
# Which Problems Are Solved `GetSecuritySettings` is served at `GET /v2/settings/security`, but `SetSecuritySettings` was only bound to `PUT /v2/policies/security`. That split made the natural copy-paste path (`PUT /v2/settings/security`) return `405`, including the enable curl in the Dynamic Client Registration guide. # How the Problems Are Solved Make `PUT /v2/settings/security` the primary HTTP binding for `SetSecuritySettings`, and keep `PUT /v2/policies/security` as an `additional_bindings` entry so existing callers keep working. # Additional Changes None. # Additional Context - Noticed during review of the Dynamic Client Registration PR (#12313): the guide's enable curl used `PUT /v2/settings/security` and hit `405` against a live instance. - Only `settings/v2` is changed; `v2beta` is left as-is (deprecated). - Generated gateway/OpenAPI artifacts are gitignored and rebuilt from the proto on generate. Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]> |
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d35da1764d |
chore: Backlog cleanup/tag stale issues daily (#12522)
# Which Problems Are Solved Adds a daily scheduled workflow that tags issues stale at 12 months (no comment, reaction, or cross-reference in that window) with `To-be-closed` and posts the standard cleanup comment — same rule as the one-time sweep already run. Skips issues already labeled `To-be-closed` or `to-be-reviewed`. Tagging and commenting only — no auto-close. --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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8bbf0ad4e0 |
chore: move commented To-be-closed issues to to-be-reviewed (#12515)
# Which Problems Are Solved Adds a workflow that moves an issue from `To-be-closed` to `to-be-reviewed` once it gets a genuine reply (not counting our own auto-generated cleanup comments or bot comments). Runs two ways: - Instantly, when a comment is posted on an issue. - Daily, as a safety-net sweep of all `To-be-closed` issues, in case the instant check ever misses one. This is just the label-swap automation. The 30-day auto-close workflow is separate and not part of this PR. --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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dc1c8620bc |
fix(login): provide hidden username on password set/change forms (#12490)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved The set-password, change-password and set-register-password forms render only password fields — there is no username field inside the `<form>`. Password managers look for a username field adjacent to the password field in order to associate and save the credential. Without one, on these screens they either skip offering to save, or save a password entry with no username attached — so the saved record can't later be matched to the account. The existing sign-in form (`password-form.tsx`) already carries a username field for this reason; the password *creation/change* flows were missing the equivalent. # How the Problems Are Solved Add a username field to each of the three forms so the newly set password is saved against the correct account: - `set-password-form.tsx` and `change-password-form.tsx` use the `loginName`. - `set-register-password-form.tsx` uses the `email`. The field is a real, focusable-excluded `type="text"` input rather than `type="hidden"` — password managers ignore `type="hidden"` fields when looking for a username, so a visually-hidden text input is required. It is: - `readOnly` (avoids a controlled-input warning and user edits), - `tabIndex={-1}` and `aria-hidden="true"` (kept out of the tab order and the accessibility tree), - `className="sr-only"` (visually hidden but present in the DOM), - `autoComplete="username"` (tells the password manager what it is). The value comes from props already passed to each form, so no signatures change. # Additional Changes None. # Additional Context - The username values (`loginName` / `email`) are already available in each component, so this is a purely presentational change with no server-side or API impact. Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> |
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d725b9a0ed |
fix(console): change username abort dialog and set email as verified #10803 #12146 (#12155)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved Cancelling the username change dialog in the console leads to an error toast #10803. Setting a users email as verified only worked if the email was also changed #12146. # How the Problems Are Solved Correctly destructure the abort response of the edit dialog. Use the update user endpoint instead of the set email endpoint to change the email of the user. # Additional Changes - Moved repetitive dialog code from rxjs to async await - Removed useless tests - Improved imports - Simplified phone number parsing and replaced deprecated function call # Additional Context Both changes were done in the same pr because the changes are in the same set of files. - Closes #10803 - Closes #12146 --------- Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> |
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jmaretteandGitHub
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f34cc45eac |
feat(oidc): add RFC 7591 dynamic client registration (#12313)
# Which Problems Are Solved ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by clients that need to register themselves at runtime: - There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no `registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document. - This blocks [Model Context Protocol (MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only then start the authorization code + PKCE flow. # How the Problems Are Solved ## Control plane: instance security settings No feature flag and no runtime config. A `DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance `SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and `enable_impersonation`: | `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour | | --- | --- | --- | | `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`, `registration_endpoint` absent from discovery | | `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in the token's organization | | `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the instance default organization | Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query. `allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a single setting closes the endpoint. Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to `projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation setting did for `security_policies2`. ## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write` - New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both `InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write` already lives. - New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without gaining write access to the organization's existing applications. - Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no permission: that is the MCP self-register path. - A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403 insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`, so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the two apart. The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the command layer next to the others (`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the impersonating actor. ## Registration itself - **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint reuses the existing application-creation events (`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged. They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the `IAMProject` or other projects. - Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules; `private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with `invalid_client_metadata`. - **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls `op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered; `op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged. # Additional Changes - **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC 7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs, which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of `web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an `http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR. - **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a `registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page, and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in the Console translations). # Additional Context - Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and #12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this lands. - Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997. - **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` / `jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types. - Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and `zitadel/oidc`). |
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 gayathriandGitHub
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adb2974662 |
fix: add the dropped idpTemplate argument (#12511)
# Which Problems Are Solved This PR fixes a Go compilation error in the Login V1 caused by a previously dropped `idpTemplate` argument when calling `registerExternalUser`. # How the Problems Are Solved - Pass `idpTemplate` into `registerExternalUser` from `handleExternalNotFoundOptionCheck` to match the function signature. # Additional Changes N/A # Additional Context introduced in https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/a17af0fe934ff94fcbf6c38d56aee308e1694962#diff-ec5370dd3f47f190c01e8dee4fd027b334a523cf31e5557422dd14c6e6c90339R859 |
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10a66b786b |
fix(login): honour login_hint and skip the auto-submit loop in OIDC flow (#12431)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved An OIDC authorize request that carries a `login_hint` (and no `prompt`) is meant to land the user on a **prefilled** login screen and let them proceed straight to authentication. Two problems prevented that: **1. The hint was dropped when an unrelated session existed.** When the browser held a `sessions` cookie for a *different* account: - The user was redirected to the **account picker** (`/accounts`) instead of the prefilled login-name screen. - The picker listed the already-logged-in, unrelated account(s) — never the user identified by `login_hint`. - The `login_hint` was **silently dropped** (the `/accounts` URL carries no hint), so the typed email was lost and the flow dead-ended on the wrong accounts. In a clean session (no `sessions` cookie) the same request prefilled correctly, which made the bug depend on unrelated pre-existing sessions. **2. The prefilled path was jarring and looped on "back".** Even when the hint *was* honoured, the flow redirected to `/loginname?loginName=…&submit=true`. That page renders the username screen and then **client-side auto-submits** it, so the user sees the username flash on screen, watches "Continue" click itself, and only then lands on the password step. Worse, `/loginname?submit=true` stays in browser history, so pressing **Back** from the password screen re-triggers the auto-submit and bounces the user straight forward again — an inescapable loop with no way to edit the username. # How the Problems Are Solved **Honour the hint (problem 1).** In `handleOIDCFlowInitiation`, the default branch (no `prompt`) already calls `findValidSession`, which filters the browser's sessions by `login_hint` and treats the hint as *selecting the user*. When the hint matches none of the sessions it returns `undefined`, and the remaining `eligibleSessions` (filtered by organization only) are therefore never the hinted user. The fallback previously chose between the loginname screen and the account picker based solely on `eligibleSessions.length === 0`, so a present-but-unrelated session sent the user to `gotoAccounts`, discarding the email. The loginname branch is now also gated on `authRequest.loginHint`, mirroring the existing empty-eligible-sessions branch. **Skip the flash and the loop (problem 2).** Instead of bouncing through `/loginname?submit=true` and relying on client-side auto-submit, the hint is now resolved **server-side** via `sendLoginname` (the same approach the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch already used) and the user is redirected **straight to the next step** (e.g. `/password`), skipping the `/loginname` screen entirely. This is factored into a shared `resolveLoginHint` helper and applied to all `login_hint` branches (default-prompt, no-session, and the existing `Prompt.LOGIN` path, now deduplicated). When the hint can't be resolved (unknown/ambiguous user, transient error), the flow falls back to a prefilled `/loginname` **without** `submit=true` — a clean screen where the user clicks once — so there is no auto-submit and no back-button loop in any path. ```ts if (!selectedSession || !selectedSession.id) { // login_hint matches no session: resolve it straight to the next step. if (authRequest.loginHint) { const hintResponse = await resolveLoginHint({ request, requestId, loginHint: authRequest.loginHint, organization }); if (hintResponse) { return hintResponse; } } // Prefill loginname (not the account picker) for an unresolved hint or when no session is eligible. if (authRequest.loginHint || eligibleSessions.length === 0) { return gotoLoginname({ request, requestId, loginHint: authRequest.loginHint, organization, orgDomain }); } return gotoAccounts({ request, requestId, organization, orgDomain }); } ``` Resulting behaviour: - `login_hint` set, a session **matches** it → silent auth (**unchanged**). - `login_hint` set, **no** session matches, hint **resolves** → straight to the next step (e.g. `/password`), no `/loginname` flash (**was**: account picker with the hint dropped / a jarring auto-submit screen). - `login_hint` set, hint **can't** be resolved → prefilled `/loginname`, no auto-submit, Back stays editable. - **No** `login_hint` → account picker / loginname exactly as before (**unchanged**). # Additional Changes - `resolveLoginHint` helper extracted in `flow-initiation.ts`; the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch now reuses it instead of duplicating the `sendLoginname` call. - `submit=true` is no longer emitted for the login-name flow, so the client-side auto-submit in `username-form.tsx` is no longer reached from OIDC initiation. - Tests in `flow-initiation.test.ts`: each `login_hint` branch (org-scope-filtered, unrelated-session, no-session) is covered twice — hint resolves → straight to `/password`; hint unresolved → prefilled `/loginname` with **no** `submit=true`. # Additional Context - The org-only `eligibleSessions` check was introduced in #12346, which correctly handled the *empty* case but did not account for a present-but-unmatched `login_hint`; this PR extends that gate. - Per OIDC, `login_hint` is advisory prefill; a client that wants the chooser would send `prompt=select_account`. Resolving the hint server-side also matches how the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch already behaved. --------- Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> |
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a17af0fe93 |
Merge commit from fork
* fix(login): prevent external-IDP account pre-hijack in Login V1 (GHSA-738m-7888-jfv8) The Login V1 endpoint POST /ui/login/externaluser/option (handleExternalNotFoundOptionCheck) built the new external user's identity and "verified" flags directly from raw POST fields, without checking the server-side authReq.LinkingUsers state that a genuine, protocol-verified IDP callback populates. An unauthenticated attacker could forge that POST to create a real account bound to an arbitrary (IDPConfigID, ExternalUserID) - enabling account pre-hijack of a third party whose public external identifier (e.g. a GitHub numeric user id) was used, so the victim's own future "Sign in with X" logs into the attacker's pre-created account. Primary fix: - Reject the request when authReq.LinkingUsers is empty, mirroring the guarded sibling autoCreateExternalUser. - Source IDPConfigID/ExternalUserID and the email/phone "verified" flags from the trusted linkingUser (the real callback data) instead of the form; the verified flag only survives when the editable value still matches the IDP's. Profile fields (name, nickname, language, edited email/phone) still come from the form, which is the page's legitimate purpose. Secondary hardening: - Treat the OAuth error/error_description callback params as untrusted so a forged GET .../externalidp/callback?error=... can no longer trigger the local-auth fallback (RequestLocalAuth) and undermine the IDP-first login priority. Genuine code-exchange failures keep their existing handling. Tests: - Unit test for mapExternalNotFoundOptionFormDataToLoginUser proving forged identity/verified fields are ignored in favor of the trusted callback data. - A //go:build integration end-to-end reproduction driving the forged registration over raw HTTP and asserting the account is not created. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): handle IDP error callback for logging, keep local-auth fallback Addresses review feedback (livio-a) on GHSA-738m-7888-jfv8: the OAuth error callback is not a security boundary. Blocking only the error= path added no protection (a garbage code triggers the same fallback), the downgrade only affects the attacker's own auth request, and a genuine IDP error on the callback should still fall back to local auth. - handleExternalLoginCallback: on an IDP error response, log it with context and route through externalAuthCallbackFailed so local-auth fallback still happens when the login policy allows it (previous behavior), instead of rendering a plain login error. The displayed message reuses the existing Errors.User.ExternalIDP.LoginFailedSwitchLocal via WrapIdPError. - Drop the now-unused Errors.ExternalIDP.AuthenticationFailed translation (would otherwise need all-language entries) and regenerate the login statik blob. - Reword the externalIDPCallbackData Error/ErrorDescription comment: logging-only, not a security decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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Livio SpringandGitHub
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fe935d91b8 | Merge commit from fork | ||
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6fa5c0e662 |
Merge commit from fork
* feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check. This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account and then complete a login as the victim. Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is persisted. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a second factor on a victim's account. Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim. Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code (mail/onboarding) path is unchanged. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review (Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover: - The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link (the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused). - Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup / VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched. - The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack. Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack surface: - delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route (keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep), - make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only the init-code path, - drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup / HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service and the v2 passkey APIs). A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid code now falls through to the init-code path and fails. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> |
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gayathriandGitHub
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ffd9b39bdb |
feat: handle Zitadel provider IdP login via login v1 (#12469)
# Which Problems Are Solved This PR adds support for using a ZITADEL IdP provider in the login v1 UI flow and conditionally grants a support-user instance membership based on a ZITADEL-specific project-roles token claim. # How the Problems Are Solved - Introduced ZITADEL IdP handling in the login v1 handler, including extracting the `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles` claim and granting `IAM_OWNER_VIEWER` instance membership when configured orgs match. - Added a new `AddInstanceMemberFromLogin` to assign an instance membership during the login v1 ZITADEL-IdP flow without permission checks (as the authorization is established based on the project roles in the token claim) - Added unit tests # Additional Changes N/A # Additional Context - Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12446 |
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318acd4bc3 |
perf(query): speed up ListUsers login name equality filters (#12460)
<!-- CURSOR_AGENT_PR_BODY_BEGIN --> ## Summary `ListUsers` with `LoginNameQuery` + equals/equals-ignore-case was very slow on large orgs (e.g. ~330k users) because the generated SQL filtered the `projections.login_names3` **view** on the computed `login_name_lower` expression and correlated that subquery on `users14.id`. Postgres nested-looped every user and never used `login_names3_users_search (instance_id, user_name_lower)`. This change rewrites the **query planner** for that hot path: when an equals/equals-ignore-case login-name filter is present (and not under `OR`/`NOT`), the user list query **INNER JOINs** an indexed matches subquery instead of filtering via the view expression. The matches SQL mirrors `user_by_login_name.sql` (`user_name_lower` / domain paths + `preferred` / `is_primary`). Non-equals methods and OR combinations keep the previous view-based filter so semantics stay unchanged. Also adds a k6 use case that mirrors login v2 discovery (`loginNameQuery` EQUALS_IGNORE_CASE + `organizationIdQuery`, `limit: 2`): ```bash cd benchmark make users_by_login_name USER_AMOUNT=100000 VUS=10 DURATION=60s ``` ## Approach 1. `NewLoginNameSearchQuery` for equals / equals-ignore-case returns a marker `loginNameEqualsFilter` (other methods unchanged). 2. `prepareUsersQuery` extracts that marker when safe, then: - builds the usual `sq.SelectBuilder` **without** the login-name view predicate - adds `JoinClause` to `user_login_name_matches(.sql)` / `_case_sensitive.sql` as `login_name_matches` - keeps metadata JOIN/`DISTINCT` only when metadata filters are present (same as before) 3. Embedded SQL files under `internal/query/` for the matches subquery. Local smoke against ~330k synthetic users: baseline ~1392ms → rewritten path ~0.4ms for a single equals-ignore-case lookup. ## Test plan - [x] `go test ./internal/query/ -run 'TestLoginName|TestUsers|TestUserByLoginName'` (after generate-stubs) - [x] Existing `user_test` expected SQL updated (no always-on metadata join; login-name equals uses JOIN) - [ ] Run k6 before/after on a large `USER_AMOUNT` (e.g. 50k–100k+) and compare `list_users_duration` p50/p95/p99 - [x] Manual login v2 username discovery against a large org - [x] Confirm OR / NOT / CONTAINS login-name queries still return expected results <!-- CURSOR_AGENT_PR_BODY_END --> <div><a href="https://cursor.com/agents/bc-252883bd-48d9-492e-b619-5ccfa93cf9c3"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-dark.png"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-light.png"><img alt="Open in Web" width="114" height="28" src="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-web-dark.png"></picture></a> <a href="https://cursor.com/background-agent?bcId=bc-252883bd-48d9-492e-b619-5ccfa93cf9c3"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-dark.png"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-light.png"><img alt="Open in Cursor" width="131" height="28" src="https://cursor.com/assets/images/open-in-cursor-dark.png"></picture></a> </div> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]> |
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87538f29e1 |
docs: prefix legacy V1 API paths in generated OpenAPI (#12491)
# Which Problems Are Solved
- Generated V1 API reference docs are missing their base path prefixes
(e.g. `/admin/v1`, `/auth/v1`, `/management/v1`, `/system/v1`).
- Endpoint pages show routes like `/healthz` instead of
`/admin/v1/healthz`.
This happens because V1 protos still define `base_path` via legacy
OpenAPI v2 swagger annotations, while docs generation uses
`protoc-gen-connect-openapi`, which ignores those annotations and emits
the bare `google.api.http` paths.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- After OpenAPI generation in
`apps/docs/scripts/generate-proto-docs.mjs`, apply a small hardcoded map
of the four legacy V1 services and prepend the correct prefix to each
path in the generated specs.
- The rewrite is idempotent (`startsWith(prefix)`), so already-prefixed
paths are left alone.
- Because the prefixes are written into the generated OpenAPI files,
Fumadocs MDX generation and runtime page rendering stay in sync.
# Additional Changes
- None.
# Additional Context
- V1 APIs are legacy and frozen; hardcoding the four known prefixes is
simpler and more reliable than dynamically scraping `.proto` files.
- Changing the protos or dual-generating with `openapiv2` would be much
more invasive for a docs-only issue.
- Verified locally for Admin, Auth, Management, and System pages (e.g.
`/admin/v1/healthz`, `/management/v1/users/{id}`).
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
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Marco A.andGitHub
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ca6595f8c5 |
chore: google.golang.org/grpc deps update (#12484)
# Which Problems Are Solved google.golang.org/grpc < 1.82.1 had a high severity vuln reported here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/dependabot/784 . Needs to be addressed # How the Problems Are Solved `go get -u google.golang.org/grpc` # Additional Context - Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/dependabot/784 |
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bb4f546b7c |
docs: add video walkthrough link to quickstart guide (#12479)
Link the YouTube walkthrough at the end of the quickstart page for users who prefer watching over reading. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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Federico CoppedeandGitHub
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62e56e085c | docs: fixed broken docs references (#12465) | ||
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Livio SpringandGitHub
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d78ed6b5f2 |
fix: improve random string generation (#12266)
# Which Problems Are Solved `GenerateRandomString` used for generating codes incl. OTP was incorrectly ignoring the last rune of the possible set. # How the Problems Are Solved Refactored the function to get the full randomness. # Additional Changes None # Additional Context Thanks @AyushParkara for pointing this out. |
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3e94047da7 |
fix(login): redirect to external IdP after domain discovery regardless of registration policy (#12369)
Closes #12021 Closes #12023 # Which Problems Are Solved When a user entered an email on the login page and domain discovery resolved the correct organization, the login flow failed to redirect to the configured external IdP. Instead it returned a "user not found" error or showed the registration page. This happened because the "user not found" decision tree in `sendLoginname` only attempted an IdP redirect when `allowLocalAuthentication` was disabled. If local auth was enabled but `allowRegister` was `false`, the IdP check was skipped entirely. # How the Problems Are Solved Combined the IdP redirect logic into a single block that triggers when either local authentication is disabled **or** domain discovery resolved an organization. The registration policy (`allowRegister`) now only affects local account creation and no longer gates external IdP authentication. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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2b9b9856b4 |
docs: remove changelog link from sidebar (#12459)
The changelog page on zitadel.com was removed for being unmaintained, leaving the docs sidebar link 404ing. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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 Florian ForsterandGitHub
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437a0802bd |
docs: document initial admin password requirements in compose guide (#12452)
# Which Problems Are Solved - The **Harden secrets** section of the Docker Compose guide lists commands for the masterkey and the two database passwords, but never mentions the **initial admin user password**. - Setting `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_ORG_HUMAN_PASSWORD` to a value that does not meet the default password complexity policy fails the initial setup with a `_password_complexity_model` error, and the requirements were not documented anywhere near the other secrets. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a short note directly below the secret-generation commands documenting the initial admin password: the default (`Password1!` / `[email protected]`), how to override it via `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_ORG_HUMAN_PASSWORD`, and the default complexity requirements (min 8 chars, upper + lower + number + symbol). - Links to the [Password Complexity](/guides/manage/console/default-settings#password-complexity) policy docs and notes that the variable only applies during initial setup. # Additional Changes None. # Additional Context - Reported by a self-hosting user (TrueNAS + Ansible) who hit repeated setup errors because the initial admin password complexity requirement was not documented alongside the masterkey/DB password commands. |
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b91221143b |
feat: extend start/retrieve idp intent for Zitadel provider (#12424)
# Which Problems Are Solved This PR extends `StartIdentityProviderIntent` and `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent` for the new Zitadel provider. # How the Problems Are Solved - Added `domain.IDPTypeZitadel` cases to both the instance and org switches in `NewAllIDPWriteModel` to return Zitadel provider when `GetProvider` is called - Added Zitadel provider to RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent's provider type-switch - Added new `zitadel.go` provider, an OIDC wrapper with forced PKCE - Added unit/integration tests # Additional Changes # Additional Context - Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12050 --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> |
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53d7920349 |
fix(console): display minimum length in password complexity message (#12419)
# Which Problems Are Solved
During user registration and password changes, the console's password
complexity hint displayed the raw `{{value}}` placeholder instead of the
configured minimum length — e.g. `Must be at least {{value}} characters
long (0/8)`. The bug is language-independent (confirmed in English and
Dutch).
# How the Problems Are Solved
The `password-complexity-view` template passed `policy.minLength` — a
proto `uint64` that deserializes to a JavaScript `bigint` — to the
ngx-translate pipe. ngx-translate v17's `formatValue` returns
`undefined` for a `bigint`, so the `{{value}}` token was never
substituted. The template now passes the component's existing
`minLength` getter (`Number(policy.minLength)`), so the value
interpolates correctly.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- Closes #12390
- Reported on ZITADEL Cloud v4.15.3
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Ramon <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
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Max PeintnerandGitHub
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56f4798ed3 |
Merge commit from fork
* add mfa check to session validity check * change session check to check for already set up mfa methods * lint * improve naming * test changes * cleanup continueWithSession fcn |
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Livio SpringandGitHub
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baf6ed501b |
Merge commit from fork
* fix(actions): prevent disk access via require * add test to ensure native modules are still possible |
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94ac4237a9 |
docs: add user self-deletion guide (#12458)
## Summary - Add a new guide documenting how to let users delete their own account via the User v2 API's `DeleteUser` endpoint, gated by the `user.self.delete` permission (granted via `ORG_USER_SELF_MANAGER`) - Link the new guide from the self-service concepts page and sidebar - Add the `ORG_USER_SELF_MANAGER` role to the administrators reference table ## Test plan - [x] Verified the new and updated pages render correctly in local dev (`pnpm dev`) replaces #12455 and #12457 (branch got renamed from `docs/human-pat-clarification`, which auto-closed #12457). Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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75bc058bce |
feat(eventstore): autovacuum tuning for events2 table (#12449)
# Which Problems Are Solved
In Zitadel's append-only event-sourced architecture, the
`eventstore.events2` table grows indefinitely. PostgreSQL's default
autovacuum uses a percentage-based scale factor, so as the table grows,
the number of changed rows required to trigger a `VACUUM` or `ANALYZE`
drifts towards infinity. Without regular vacuums, the table's Visibility
Map becomes stale, disabling fast Index-Only Scans and forcing expensive
heap reads. Without regular analyzes, query planner statistics become
stale, leading to suboptimal execution plans.
This causes eventstore operations to progressively degrade as `events2`
grows, even without CPU, memory, or I/O saturation. A manual `VACUUM
ANALYZE` immediately restores performance, confirming the root cause.
- If `Eventstore.Autovacuum` is left at its default, `events2` keeps
using PostgreSQL's default, percentage-based autovacuum/autoanalyze
scale factors, which become impractically infrequent on large tables.
- There was previously no supported way to apply static, table-level
autovacuum tuning to `events2` through Zitadel's own configuration/setup
process.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added an `Eventstore.Autovacuum` runtime configuration block to
`cmd/defaults.yaml` (disabled by default):
```yaml
Eventstore:
Autovacuum:
Enabled: false # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_ENABLED
VacuumThreshold: 50000 # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_VACUUMTHRESHOLD
AnalyzeThreshold: 50000 # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_ANALYZETHRESHOLD
```
- Added a repeatable `zitadel setup` migration step
(`cmd/setup/eventstore_autovacuum.go`) that:
- When `Enabled: true`, disables the percentage-based
`autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor`, `autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor`, and
`autovacuum_vacuum_insert_scale_factor` on `eventstore.events2`, and
applies static thresholds (`autovacuum_vacuum_insert_threshold`,
`autovacuum_vacuum_threshold`, `autovacuum_analyze_threshold`) from the
config instead.
- When `Enabled: false`, resets those storage parameters on
`eventstore.events2` back to the cluster defaults.
- Implements `Repeatable.Check()` so the step only re-runs when the
configuration actually changed since the last `zitadel setup` run.
- Added documentation in the new "Performance tuning" page.
# Additional Changes
- Move the projection documentation into performance tuning page
- Expand and update the projection documentation to the latest state in
zitadel. (contained some stale information)
# Additional Context
Several other issues describe read-performance symptoms consistent with
this same root cause (stale `events2` visibility map / planner
statistics at scale, without resource saturation). Since this PR
addresses the shared root cause:
- Closes #12448
- Closes #10754
- Closes #10260
- Closes #8585
- Closes #9239
---
_Generated by [Claude
Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01HoKvEY7niCVgLCz7CajBwW)_
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
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6bd46c5fb6 |
feat(login): idp userAction oneof (#12433)
Closes #11369 # Which Problems Are Solved During SSO login with an external IdP, Actions v2 lets you manipulate the `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent` response to shape the user that ZITADEL creates or updates. There was an inconsistency between the two flows: - **First login (user does not exist):** the response carried an `addHumanUser` object (mirroring the deprecated `AddHumanUser` API), which **does** allow setting user `metadata`. - **Subsequent logins (user exists):** the response carried an `updateHumanUser` object (mirroring the deprecated `UpdateHumanUser` API), which does **not** support metadata. As a result, actions could set metadata when creating a user but not when updating one. Customers doing SSO attribute mapping had to make a separate `SetUserMetadata` call on every subsequent login — extra latency and a non-atomic update. The proto/backend already gained a non-deprecated `user_action` oneof (`create_user` → `CreateUserRequest`, `update_user` → `UpdateUserRequest`, both supporting metadata), but the login app was still reading the deprecated flat fields, so the new capability was unreachable from the frontend. # How the Problems Are Solved Migrate the login app's IDP intent handler to consume the new `user_action` oneof, with a fallback to the deprecated fields so older API responses keep working during the transition. - **`zitadel.ts`** — added `createUser` / `updateUser` client wrappers calling the non-deprecated `UserService.CreateUser` / `UserService.UpdateUser` endpoints. - **`idp-intent.ts`** — added three helpers, each preferring `user_action` and falling back to `add_human_user` / `update_human_user`: - `resolveCreateUser` — flat read view for org resolution, required-field checks, and registration-form pre-fill. - `buildCreateUserRequest` — passes the action's `CreateUserRequest` through and injects the resolved `organizationId`; maps the deprecated flat payload into the nested shape on fallback. - `buildUpdateUserRequest` — builds an `UpdateUserRequest` **including metadata** (the fix); deliberately syncs only profile/email/phone/metadata (not username) to preserve existing auto-update behavior and avoid invalidating sessions. - Rewired all handlers (`handleUserExists`, `handleAutoLinking`, `handleAutoCreation`, `handleManualCreation`, `resolveOrganizationForUser`) to use these, and switched auto-create to read `CreateUserResponse.id`. - **Tests** — updated mocks/assertions to the new request shapes and added two cases exercising the `user_action` oneof with metadata (create + update). 817/817 login unit tests pass; no new type errors. # Additional Changes Updated the Actions v2 guide `guides/integrate/actions/testing-response-manipulation.mdx` (the unreleased/`latest` docs) to reflect the new response shape: - Go handler example now manipulates `resp.GetCreateUser()` / `resp.GetUpdateUser()` and appends `user.Metadata`, demonstrating metadata on both flows. - Both JSON payloads switched from `addHumanUser` to the nested `createUser` shape (`human.profile`, `human.email`, `human.idpLinks`, top-level `metadata`). - Added a Callout explaining first-login → `createUser` vs. existing-user → `updateUser`, that both support metadata, and that `addHumanUser`/`updateHumanUser` are deprecated. - Updated the claim-mapping debugging section to the new `createUser.human.profile.givenName` path. Versioned snapshots (`v4.12`/`v4.13`/`v4.14`) were intentionally left unchanged, as they document releases where the old API was correct. --------- Co-authored-by: gayathri <[email protected]> |
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8395d4326e |
docs: add v3 to v4 upgrade and Login V2 adoption guides (#12443)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved - Operators upgrading from ZITADEL v3 to v4 lacked a clear, docs-backed upgrade path covering web keys (A-10017), Login V1 vs Login V2 expectations, and post-upgrade options. - There was no standalone guide for adopting Login V2 after already running on v4. - Related ops/docs pages did not consistently point readers to the upgrade and Login V2 adoption material. - Kubernetes/Helm operators upgrading to a chart that ships ZITADEL v4 had no ops-page section linking the advisory, upgrade guide, optional Login V2 deferral (`login.enabled: false`), and chart README upgrade notes. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds technical advisory **A-10017** documenting OIDC web key staging requirements before upgrading to v4. - Adds an **upgrade-v3-to-v4** guide with the recommended upgrade path (Login V1 remains supported; Login V2 is optional at upgrade time). - Adds a **v4-only adopt-login-v2** guide for teams adopting Login V2 later, with steps and caveats separate from the version upgrade. - Adds an **Upgrading to ZITADEL v4** subsection under `self-hosting/deploy/kubernetes/operations.mdx` that links to A-10017, the upgrade guide, Adopt Login V2, notes `login.enabled: false` when not adopting Login V2 yet, and points to the [Helm chart README](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel-charts/blob/main/charts/zitadel/README.md) for chart-specific breaking changes. # Additional Changes - Registers new docs in the sidebar and wires Related / cross-links from upgrade and ops pages so the advisory and guides are discoverable together. - Aligns language so upgrade vs. Login V2 adoption are clearly separated concerns. - Light cross-link updates on troubleshooting / updating-scaling / login-client pages where related. # Additional Context - Related: A-10017 (web keys advisory) - Docs paths introduced/updated: - `apps/docs/content/support/advisory/a10017.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/manage/upgrade-v3-to-v4.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/manage/adopt-login-v2.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/deploy/kubernetes/operations.mdx` (new "Upgrading to ZITADEL v4" section) - Sidebar and Related / cross-links - Companion Helm chart README PR: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel-charts/pull/608 --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]> |
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93209bd348 |
chore(deps): update benchmark dependencies (#12442)
# Which Problems Are Solved Outdated deps on the benchmark typscript modules. # How the Problems Are Solved Upgrade all deps # Additional Changes - Add xk6 a prerequisite for running benchmarks - Update the moduleResolution setting in tsconfig to a non-deprecated value - Some automatic code formatting --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> |
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1e09b4fc19 |
feat(login): hu translations + I18n consistency v2 (#12447)
# Which Problems Are Solved Fixes i18n consistency and adds HU translations for login v2 # How the Problems Are Solved - Updated i18n files and added hu.json - Moved all translations to v2-default.json --------- Co-authored-by: Dobos Zoltán <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Liam Neville <[email protected]> |
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305579dd07 |
docs: update V2 end-of-support copy in roadmap (#12435)
## Summary - V2 has already reached end of support; the roadmap page previously implied end-of-support timelines for V2 and V3 were both still forthcoming. - Updated copy to state V2's end-of-support status plainly and note that V3's timeline and migration guidance will be published soon. ## Test plan - [x] Verified the updated sentence renders correctly in `apps/docs/content/product/roadmap.mdx` 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> |
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Tim MöhlmannandGitHub
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11e71e969a |
docs(deps): upgrade image versions in env examples (#12441)
# Which Problems Are Solved Image versions in the example env, used in the docker quickstart, were outdated. # How the Problems Are Solved Update all image versions. |
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f0a999bccd |
docs: clarify human PAT limitation and link issue #10915 (#12412)
## Which Problems Are Solved There is currently a knowledge gap in the documentation where users are unclear on if or why human accounts cannot have Personal Access Tokens (PATs), which has led to confusion in community channels like Discord and GitHub. ## How the Problems Are Solved Clarified that human PATs are currently not supported in the Personal Access Token documentation and added a direct link to GitHub Issue #10915 so users can track and upvote this capability. ## Additional Changes None ## Additional Context None --------- Signed-off-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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6eafca2872 |
feat: update GetActiveIdentityProviders to return Zitadel in the IdP list (#12422)
# Which Problems Are Solved This PR extends the Settings Login API (v2 and v2beta) to include ZITADEL IdP in the list of IdPs returned by `GetActiveIdentityProviders` # How the Problems Are Solved - Added `IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` to Settings IdentityProviderType enums (v2 and v2beta) and updated domain display name handling. - Updated Settings gRPC converters (v2 and v2beta) to map `domain.IDPTypeZitadel` to the new proto enum value - Added unit/integration tests # Additional Changes Correctly map `domain.IDPTypeApple` to `IdentityProviderType_IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_APPLE` in v2beta instead of unspecified. # Additional Context - Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12401 --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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051506b5bb |
fix(login): prevent crash on a stale session cookie (#12423)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved The `sessions` cookie lifetime is independent of Zitadel's server-side session validity, so a cookie can reference an invalid session. In that case `getSession` throws `not_found` (QUERY-SFeaa). - `loadMostRecentSession` lets that error propagate instead of treating it as "no session", crashing the server render of every page that calls it without its own guard. - Most visibly, the "forgot password" flow landing on `/password/set` throws `[not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)` (gRPC code 5, HTTP 404) and fails to render. - 12 of the 16 call sites are unguarded and share this crash. # How the Problems Are Solved Catch the error in `loadMostRecentSession` and return `undefined`, unifying "cookie references a dropped session" with the existing "no cookie" case. Every call site already handles an undefined session, either with a graceful fallback or by throwing its own explicit error. ```ts return getSession({ serviceConfig, sessionId: recent.id, sessionToken: recent.token }) .then((resp: GetSessionResponse) => resp.session) .catch((error) => { console.warn("[Session] Could not load most recent session", error); return undefined; }); ``` All `loadMostRecentSession` call sites — **Previous** = behaviour when the cookie referenced an invalid session; **Change** = what this PR does to that call site: | # | Call site | Change in this PR | Previous behaviour (invalid session) | New behaviour | |---|-----------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------| | — | `lib/session.ts` — `loadMostRecentSession` | **Added `.catch` → `undefined`** (core fix) | Threw `not_found` to caller | Resolves to `undefined` | | 1 | `password/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (the reported bug) | Falls back to login-name flow | | 2 | `password/change/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `failedLoading` alert if no user | | 3 | `passkey/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `userId` fallback / `unknownContext` | | 4 | `otp/[method]/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `unknownContext` alert | | 5 | `otp/[method]/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No session found"` | | 6 | `mfa/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `verify.noResults` alert | | 7 | `mfa/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "Could not get user id from session"` | | 8 | `authenticator/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own throw / `unknownContext` | | 9 | `signedin/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders with `loginName` fallback | | 10 | `u2f/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `unknownContext` alert | | 11 | `u2f/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders on `loginName` | | 12 | `lib/server/verify.ts` — `verifyTOTP` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No user id found in session."` | | 13 | `password/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `try/catch`** | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 14 | `verify/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** ¹ | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 15 | `verify/success/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 16 | `passkey/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** (login-name path) | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | Rows 1–12 were unguarded and crashed; the central change fixes them. Rows 13–16 already handled the error locally. # Additional Changes - This makes the four callers that wrapped the call in their own try/catch or `.catch` redundant, so remove that now-dead handling (password, verify, verify/success, passkey). - Add unit tests covering `loadMostRecentSession`: no cookie, success, and the stale-cookie rejection path. ¹ `verify/page.tsx`'s `.catch` also eagerly fetched `loginSettings`; that is already covered by the page's own lazy fetch, so behaviour is unchanged (one cosmetic edge case under `ignoreUnknownUsernames` with both `userId` and `loginName` present — no functional impact). # Additional Context - Session *expiry* alone does not trigger this: expired rows are not removed from the session projection, so `getSession` still returns them. The `not_found` specifically means the session was **removed** server-side (logout, admin/API termination, or a user/org/instance cascade) while the browser still held the cookie. - Mirrors the pattern upstream already applies inline in `verify/page.tsx` (*"ignore error, as we might not have a session yet"*), lifted to the shared function. - **Related issue (not in this PR):** the sibling `loadSessionById` helpers on the `?sessionId=` path (`passkey`, `otp`, `mfa`, `mfa/set`, `signedin`, `authenticator/set`, `u2f`) call `getSession` directly and share the same defect. Lower practical exposure (short-lived in-flow URLs; a clean logout clears the cookie), so a follow-up PR should lift those into a shared `loadSessionById` in `lib/session.ts`. - Prior art: upstream added an equivalent guard to verify/page.tsx in #11130, but the other call sites were never given the same treatment — this PR resolves that inconsistency at the source. Error trace: ``` {"level":"error","message":"⨯ Error [ConnectError]: [not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)\n at R (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:25490)\n at <unknown> (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:26477)\n at next (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:68112)\n at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:31326)\n at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:33734)\n at async Object.unary (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:66838)\n at async Object.getSession (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:72371)\n at async o (.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0msfcq_._.js:1:7440) {\n rawMessage: 'Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)',\n code: 5,\n metadata: Headers {\n 'accept-encoding': 'gzip',\n 'alt-svc': 'h3=\":443\"; ma=2592000',\n 'content-length': '240',\n 'content-type': 'application/json',\n date: 'Wed, 08 Jul 2026 09:06:09 GMT',\n 'strict-transport-security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',\n vary: 'Origin',\n },\n details: [\n {\n type: 'zitadel.v1.ErrorDetail',\n value: [Uint8Array],\n debug: [Object]\n }\n ],\n cause: undefined,\n httpStatus: 404,\n isUserError: true,\n digest: '634020356'\n}","timestamp":"2026-07-08T09:06:09.969Z"} ``` --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Liam Neville <[email protected]> |
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aa76c3be27 |
fix(login): keep submit button disabled/loading during password set r… (#12429)
<!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved - On Login V2 after a user sets their password during the invite or reset-password flows and clicks continue, there is a few seconds delay before the redirect occurs because no loading spinner is visible on the button during this delay users assume nothing happened and click continue again. - Clicking the button again starts a duplicate form submission. Since the first request was already fired the second request triggers an error right before the redirect from the first request completion creating a bad user experience # How the Problems Are Solved - Kept the `loading` state active `true` throughout the lifeline of the request which includes the 2-second database consistency delay and the subsequent `sendPassword` verification request. - Added `setLoading(false)` calls only in early-return error handling blocks and at the end of the redirection flow ensuring the button remains disabled and shows the spinner until the redirect happens. # Additional Changes - None # Additional Context - Solves #12416 Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> |
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b429ec240a |
docs: remove GitHub discussion link from TOTP issuer callout (#12428)
## Which Problems Are Solved The callout added in #12335 included a link to a GitHub discussion which will become outdated and difficult to maintain. ## How the Problems Are Solved Removes the discussion link from the ZITADEL Cloud bullet point in the TOTP issuer callout, keeping the rest of the callout intact. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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6bcdb27e17 |
docs: document TOTP issuer name configuration for self-hosted and cloud instances (#12335)
# Which Problems Are Solved - No documentation explained that the TOTP issuer name defaults to "ZITADEL" and is not derived from the domain - No documentation clarified how to change it on self-hosted (env var only, Helm values don't work) - No documentation communicated that it is not configurable on ZITADEL Cloud # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a callout in the MFA section of the default settings page covering both self-hosted (ZITADEL_SYSTEMDEFAULTS_MULTIFACTORS_OTP_ISSUER) and cloud (not configurable, discussion link) # Additional Changes None # Additional Context - https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/discussions/5453 Signed-off-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> |
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5bdfd96be5 |
feat: extend DeleteProvider to include Zitadel IdP (#12396)
# Which Problems Are Solved This PR extends `DeleteProvider` to include Zitadel provider enabling the deletion of Zitadel IdP. # How the Problems Are Solved - Extend org/instance IDP remove write models to include `ZitadelIDPAddedEvent` in event appends and queries. - Extend command-side IDP reduction/type handling for Zitadel IDP add events. - Add management/admin integration tests for deleting Zitadel providers - Add error translation key in all language locales for org-level “IDP config not existing”. # Additional Changes N/A # Additional Context. Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12397 --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> |
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a97999e5ca |
docs: update roadmap page content (#12402)
## Summary - Update the description frontmatter and reword "next generation" to "next iteration" throughout - Add a "What this means for existing customers" subsection after the disclaimer, before the Strategic Roadmap section - Convert `### **Strategic Investments**` / `### **Customer Outcomes**` subheadings to bold text so they no longer appear in the TOC - Rename the closing section to "Migration and Adoption" with updated content ## Test plan - [x] Diffed against source content to confirm all requested sections match - [x] Verified no remaining "next generation" occurrences --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Florian Forster <[email protected]> |
