6fa5c0e662 Merge commit from fork
* feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard

Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides
whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified
primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for
onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check.

This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which
is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the
remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment

addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to
a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting
a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could
therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account
and then complete a login as the victim.

Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or
verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is
persisted.

GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment

verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any
session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form
without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a
second factor on a victim's account.

Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now
render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is
not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added
guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided.

GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment

The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup
for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first
factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's
login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to
plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim.

Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit
enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or
an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before
BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also
bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a
credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code
(mail/onboarding) path is unchanged.

GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path

Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review
(Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based
passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover:

- The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button
  and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link
  (the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused).
- Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the
  emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup /
  VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched.
- The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup /
  VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the
  GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack.

Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack
surface:
- delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route
  (keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page
  for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep),
- make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only
  the init-code path,
- drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup /
  VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl
  template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup /
  HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service
  and the v2 passkey APIs).

A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid
code now falls through to the init-code path and fails.

GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 05:45:56 +02:00
2026-07-29 05:45:56 +02:00
2026-07-29 05:45:56 +02:00
2023-07-17 10:08:20 +02:00
2024-07-26 22:39:55 +02:00
2021-02-08 16:48:41 +01:00
2025-04-02 16:53:06 +02:00
2026-02-04 11:51:43 +01:00
2026-06-04 14:33:04 +02:00
2026-02-25 19:36:00 -03:00
2026-06-10 11:53:26 +00:00

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ZITADEL is an open-source identity and access management platform built for teams that need more than basic auth. Whether you're securing a SaaS product, building a B2B platform, or self-hosting a production IAM stack — ZITADEL gives you everything out of the box: SSO, MFA, Passkeys, OIDC, SAML, SCIM, and a battle-tested multi-tenancy model.

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