306 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
3 people	94f53145da	chore(ci): let nx stop continuous run-db tasks instead of compose down from within the test targets (#12663) ... # Which Problems Are Solved CI runs have been flaky since ~Aug 27 with the nx step failing on ``` Task "@zitadel/api:test-integration-run-db" is continuous but exited with code 0 Task "@zitadel/functional-ui:run-db" is continuous but exited with code 0 ``` even when every test passed, and with the sibling test suite killed mid-run (`Process completed with exit code 130`). Root cause: the test targets shoot their own database. `@zitadel/api:test-integration` and `@zitadel/functional-ui:test` end their command list with an explicit `nx run ...:stop` (`compose down`) of the very service their **continuous** `run-db` dependency (`compose up`) is supervising. The `run-db` task then exits on its own, which nx (22.x) counts as a **failed task**: 1. the nx run is marked failed even with all tests green, and 2. with `--nxBail`, the other suite that is still running is aborted mid-flight. Whichever suite finishes first triggers it, so the failure is timing-dependent and flaky. Recent examples: [attempt 1 of this run](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/actions/runs/33161619698/attempts/1) (all 42 integration packages + all Cypress specs green, job still failed) and [this run](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/actions/runs/33166856821) (Cypress finished first, integration tests killed at 4m13s). # How the Problems Are Solved Drop the trailing `nx run ...:stop` commands from the two test targets. nx stops continuous dependencies itself once all their dependents finish, so the self-inflicted exit never happens. The `stop` targets remain unchanged for manual use as documented in CONTRIBUTING.md. Since this PR touches both projects' configuration, both test suites run on this PR — a green pipeline here exercises exactly the raced path. # Additional Context - The race existed since the nx 22 upgrade (#12592) but only started losing consistently around Aug 27, presumably due to changed teardown timing on the updated Depot runner images (same window as the `*.integration.localhost` DNS breakage worked around in #12621). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-28 15:53:57 +02:00
5 people	27ce10276b	docs: create knowledge gap ID 65 (#12646) ... Automatically generated PR resolving Knowledge Gap ID 65. **Thread ID:** manual-1787771291264 **Action:** CREATE **New File:** `apps/docs/content/guides/integrate/login-ui/fork-and-deploy-login-app.mdx` ### AI Summary > My recommendation is to publish a a new Deploy & Operate guide for the Login App, then link to it from the existing Login App page. The existing pages address architecture/development, login-client authorization, and Login V2 adoption separately, but none currently explains long-term fork ownership and upgrades. (Contribution guide, login-client setup, adoption guide) The article should cover: Full-repository fork as the simplest current recommendation. The customer’s history-preserving slim-fork approach as an advanced alternative. Why copying only apps/login is unsafe while the current npm packages remain unavailable, linked to #12250. Release-tag pinning and versioning such as v4.17.0-custom.1. Development, generation, linting, tests, and Docker builds. An EKS/Kubernetes Deployment and Service example. PAT handling through ZITADEL_SERVICE_USER_TOKEN_FILE. Same-origin versus separate-domain proxy requirements. Gradual rollout, break-glass access, rollback, and troubleshooting. A repeatable upstream synchronization and release process. ### Human Reviewer Instructions > Sample content: > Maintain and deploy a customized ZITADEL Login UI > > The ZITADEL Login UI is an MIT-licensed Next.js application maintained in the ZITADEL monorepo. You can customize and deploy it independently, but your fork becomes an application that your team must build, test, secure, monitor, and update. > > This guide describes the current workflow for maintaining a customized Login UI. It is intended for teams that need source-code changes beyond the branding and text customization available through ZITADEL settings. > > If you only need to change colors, logos, fonts, or translated login text, first use ZITADEL's supported branding and customization settings. A source fork creates an ongoing maintenance responsibility. > > Understand the source dependencies > > The Login UI is not currently an isolated project in the repository. Its relevant dependency chain is: > > apps/login > └── packages/zitadel-client > └── packages/zitadel-proto > └── proto > > The root pnpm workspace and Nx configuration also participate in installing, generating, testing, and building these projects. Copying only apps/login can therefore fail or silently separate the UI from the API definitions against which it was developed. > > For the current monorepo workflow, keep the Login UI and these workspace dependencies on the same upstream ZITADEL revision. > > Choose a fork strategy > > Full repository fork — recommended > > Fork the complete zitadel/zitadel repository and limit your own changes to apps/login wherever possible. This is the simplest model to understand and the least likely to miss a new build-time dependency when upstream changes. > > Use two remotes: > > git clone [email protected]:YOUR_ORGANIZATION/zitadel.git > cd zitadel > git remote add upstream https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel.git > git fetch upstream --tags > > Start customization from a released tag rather than an arbitrary commit on main: > > git checkout -b custom-login/vX.Y.Z vX.Y.Z > > Replace vX.Y.Z with the ZITADEL release you have selected. A release tag gives you a reproducible compatibility baseline and a corresponding changelog. > > History-preserving slim fork — advanced > > If repository size or internal policy makes a full fork impractical, you can maintain a filtered fork containing only: > > apps/login > > packages/zitadel-client > > packages/zitadel-proto > > proto > > the root pnpm, lockfile, Node, and Nx configuration required by those projects > > Use git filter-repo identically both when bootstrapping the fork and during every later synchronization. The list of retained paths and all filter arguments must remain stable so that freshly filtered upstream history shares commit ancestry with your fork. > > Important constraints for this model: > > Bootstrap and update with one shared filtering implementation; do not duplicate the path list in separate scripts. > > Merge the initial import and subsequent update branches with a merge commit or fast-forward. Do not squash them, because squashing removes the filtered upstream ancestry needed for future three-way merges. > > Treat any change to the retained path list as a new bootstrap. Adding or removing paths rewrites the filtered commit IDs. > > Re-run pnpm install after filtering or merging so the lockfile is reconciled with the retained workspace. > > Review the retained path list whenever upstream changes the Login build graph. > > This is a valid Git maintenance technique, but it adds machinery that ZITADEL's normal build does not require. Own and test the filtering automation as part of your fork. > > Why a standalone apps/login copy is not recommended today > > At the time of writing, current @zitadel/client and @zitadel/proto releases are not available as version-matched npm dependencies for the Login UI. The application consumes their workspace sources from the monorepo. Until version-matched packages are published, retain those sources rather than replacing the workspace dependencies with old npm versions. Progress is tracked in zitadel/zitadel#12250. > > Configure a development environment > > The current contribution guide requires Node.js 22.x, Corepack/pnpm, and Nx. From the repository root: > > corepack enable > pnpm install > pnpm nx run-many --target generate > > To develop the Login UI against an existing ZITADEL instance, create apps/login/.env.dev.local: > > ZITADEL_API_URL=https://your-zitadel-instance.example.com > ZITADEL_SERVICE_USER_TOKEN=your-login-client-pat > > Do not commit this file or its token. ZITADEL_API_URL must not have a trailing slash. > > Start the development server: > > pnpm nx run @zitadel/login:dev > > The token must belong to a machine user with the Instance Login Client role (IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT). See Connect your self-hosted Login UI to ZITADEL for the supported setup. > > Run the required quality checks > > Run the checks for all three affected projects, not only the Next.js application: > > pnpm nx run-many \ > --projects @zitadel/login @zitadel/client @zitadel/proto \ > --targets lint build test > > If your update includes .proto changes, regenerate the TypeScript clients before testing: > > pnpm nx run @zitadel/proto:generate > > For meaningful Login UI changes, also perform end-to-end tests against a staging ZITADEL instance. At minimum, cover the authentication methods and policies you enable in production: > > Authorization Code Flow with PKCE and callback to the application > > password, passkey, external identity provider, and applicable MFA/OTP flows > > registration, account selection, password reset, verification, and logout > > organization-specific policies, branding, and translated text > > expected negative cases such as invalid or expired codes > > desktop and mobile browsers supported by your application > > Build an immutable image > > The repository's documented Docker build flow is: > > pnpm nx run @zitadel/login:build > docker build -t registry.example.com/identity/zitadel-login:vX.Y.Z-custom.1 apps/login > docker push registry.example.com/identity/zitadel-login:vX.Y.Z-custom.1 > > Use an immutable tag that records both the upstream ZITADEL baseline and your customization revision. For example: > > v4.17.0-custom.1 > > Also retain the source commit and image digest in your release record. Do not deploy a mutable latest tag to production. > > Deploy outside Vercel > > Vercel is not required. The Login UI can run as the Node.js application produced by the Next.js build or as a container. In Kubernetes or EKS, run it as a separate Deployment and Service behind your ingress or load balancer. > > The following fragment shows the important application settings. Adapt registry authentication, resources, topology, and ingress to your platform: > > apiVersion: apps/v1 > kind: Deployment > metadata: > name: zitadel-login > spec: > replicas: 2 > selector: > matchLabels: > app: zitadel-login > template: > metadata: > labels: > app: zitadel-login > spec: > containers: > - name: login > image: registry.example.com/identity/zitadel-login:vX.Y.Z-custom.1 > ports: > - name: http > containerPort: 3000 > env: > - name: ZITADEL_API_URL > value: https://zitadel.example.com > - name: NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH > value: /ui/v2/login > - name: ZITADEL_SERVICE_USER_TOKEN_FILE > value: /var/run/secrets/zitadel/login-client.pat > volumeMounts: > - name: login-client > mountPath: /var/run/secrets/zitadel > readOnly: true > readinessProbe: > tcpSocket: > port: http > livenessProbe: > tcpSocket: > port: http > volumes: > - name: login-client > secret: > secretName: zitadel-login-client > --- > apiVersion: v1 > kind: Service > metadata: > name: zitadel-login > spec: > selector: > app: zitadel-login > ports: > - name: http > port: 3000 > targetPort: http > > Store the PAT in a Kubernetes Secret or external secrets manager and expose it as a read-only file. Restrict access to the Secret and plan token rotation. Do not bake the PAT into the image. > > Add CPU and memory requests and limits based on load tests from your own authentication traffic. Use multiple replicas, disruption controls, and multi-zone scheduling according to your availability requirements. > > Configure routing and domains > > The Login UI contains a server-side component and Next.js middleware that proxies OIDC-related requests to ZITADEL. Correct proxy routing is part of the authentication flow, not only static frontend delivery. > > Same public origin > > When the Login UI and ZITADEL share a public origin, route: > > /ui/v2/login to the Login UI service > > all other ZITADEL paths to the ZITADEL API service > > Set NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH=/ui/v2/login at build and runtime as required by your packaging. Keep the value consistent with the Login V2 base URI configured in ZITADEL. > > Separate Login domain > > If the Login UI uses a separate public domain such as login.example.com: > > Serve it over HTTPS. > > Add the Login domain to the instance's Trusted Domains. > > Configure the proxy in front of the Login UI as documented by ZITADEL: > > x-zitadel-public-host: the public Login UI host, for example login.example.com > > x-zitadel-instance-host: the ZITADEL instance host, for example auth.example.com > > Test OIDC and SAML callbacks and every configured external identity provider through the public route. > > Do not assume that setting only ZITADEL_API_URL replaces the required host-routing behavior for every topology. The Login App architectural and proxy guidance is the source of truth for these headers. > > Enable Login V2 safely > > For an existing self-hosted ZITADEL installation, follow Adopt Login V2 on an existing installation. > > Prefer a gradual rollout: > > Deploy the custom Login UI without changing the instance-wide setting. > > Enable the new Login UI for a non-production test application and set its custom base URL. > > Run the complete authentication test matrix. > > Expand to selected applications. > > Enable it instance-wide only after validation, if that is your intended topology. > > Keep a break-glass PAT for a machine user with the Instance Owner role (IAM_OWNER) so that you can revert the Login V2 setting if interactive login becomes unavailable. Store and audit this credential according to your incident-access policy. > > Keep the fork synchronized > > Treat upstream synchronization as a normal application dependency update, not an automatic deployment. > > For a full repository fork: > > git fetch upstream --tags > git checkout -b update-login-vX.Y.Z > git merge vX.Y.Z > > Resolve conflicts while preserving the intent of your customizations. Then install, generate, test, and build again. For a slim fork, fetch a freshly filtered copy of the same release and merge its history using the identical filter configuration used during bootstrap. > > Recommended update workflow: > > Select a released ZITADEL version and read its release notes and migration guidance. > > Merge that release into a dedicated update branch. > > Review changes to apps/login, packages/zitadel-client, packages/zitadel-proto, proto, and the root build files. > > Reconcile dependencies and generated code. > > Run lint, build, unit, and staging end-to-end tests. > > Build an immutable custom image and scan it using your normal supply-chain controls. > > Deploy to staging, then canary or gradually roll out to production. > > Retain the previous image digest and configuration for rollback. > > Do not merge upstream continuously into production without qualification. Login changes can affect cookies, redirects, external IdP callbacks, API contracts, and authentication-policy behavior. > > Recommended release policy for your fork > > ZITADEL releases are the upstream input; your custom Login UI image is your own release artifact. A useful version format is: > > <upstream-zitadel-version>-custom.<revision> > > Maintain a short release record containing: > > upstream tag and commit > > custom fork commit > > container image digest > > applicable ZITADEL backend version or tested range > > configuration changes and migrations > > test evidence and known limitations > > Subscribe to ZITADEL releases and security notices. Decide deliberately which releases to adopt; prioritize security fixes and changes that affect Login V2 or the APIs it consumes. > > Troubleshooting checklist > > If the Login UI returns an internal error or an authentication flow redirects incorrectly, verify: > > the PAT is readable and belongs to a user with IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT > > ZITADEL_API_URL is reachable from the Login pod and has no trailing slash > > the public Login domain is trusted by the ZITADEL instance > > the configured Login V2 base URI exactly matches the public route and base path > > the ingress sends Login UI traffic to the correct service > > separate-domain deployments set the public-host and instance-host headers correctly > > the selected Login source, client package, proto package, and ZITADEL API version were tested together > > external IdP callback URLs reach the expected public endpoint > > the prior known-good image and configuration can still be restored > > Related documentation > > Login App architecture and setup > > Contribute to the Login UI > > Connect your self-hosted Login UI to ZITADEL > > Adopt Login V2 on an existing installation > > ZITADEL releases ### ⚠️ Manual Action Required > **Sidebar Update Needed:** Because this PR creates a brand new document, it will not automatically appear in the site's navigation. Please review the file location and manually update `apps/docs/lib/sidebar-data.ts` to include a reference to this new page before merging. --- 🤖 **Need adjustments?** Leave a comment below and tag **@zitadel-knowledge-bot** with your requested changes, and I will automatically update the files and push a new commit! --------- Co-authored-by: zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot] <296006658+zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Matías Racedo <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 17:13:04 -03:00
3 people	3c746281f1	fix(login): show account selection after RP-initiated logout (#12638) ... **Supersedes #12471** by @conblem — same fix, rebased onto current `main` with conflicts resolved and review feedback applied. Original commits are preserved, all credit to @conblem. Closes #12252 ### Problem After an RP-initiated logout (`end_session` with `id_token_hint`), Login V2 redirected straight to `/loginname` instead of showing the account picker like Login V1. The `sessions` cookie still referenced the previous accounts, but their server-side sessions had been terminated, so `listSessions` returned nothing and the flow treated the browser as having no accounts at all. ### Solution - `handleOIDCFlowInitiation` now checks the `sessions` cookie (`hasCookieAccount`) when no live session is eligible for the request's organization. If the cookie still knows an account and the RP passed no `login_hint`, the user is sent to `/accounts` instead of `/loginname`. `prompt=none` is excluded since it must never render UI. - `/accounts` synthesizes an (invalid) `Session` for each cookie entry that has no live counterpart, so the account is still listed and a click re-authenticates via `/loginname` → password in one step. - `clearSession` prunes the cookie entry when the server reports the session as already gone (`NotFound` / `PermissionDenied`), so stale cards can be dismissed. Any other error is rethrown so a still-valid server session is never silently orphaned. - `getAllSessionCookieIds` is now a thin wrapper over `getAllSessions`; `FlowInitiationParams.sessionCookies` is typed as `Cookie[]`. - Tests: new `describe` block covering the cookie fallback, `login_hint` precedence, `prompt=none`, org-scope matching/mismatch, and `SELECT_ACCOUNT` / default prompt with live sessions filtered out by org. - Also adds `.claude/`, `.cursor/`, `.codex/`, `.windsurf/`, `.copilot/`, `.aider*` to `.gitignore`. --------- Co-authored-by: conblem <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 11:07:30 +00:00
3 people	c9d747d407	fix(api): prevent cross-instance caching of well-known app link files (#12644) ... # Which Problems Are Solved The `/.well-known/apple-app-site-association` and `/.well-known/assetlinks.json` responses are instance specific: the body depends on the requested host. The responses did not declare this, so a shared cache whose cache key does not include the host could store one instance's file and serve it on another instance's domain. This could result in a wrong or empty file being returned intermittently, breaking native passkey verification. Dropping the `public` directive (#12634) was not sufficient: depending on its cache mode, a shared cache may store any response carrying a `max-age`. The docs page for native app links also still documented the old `Cache-Control: public` header and only the single `get_login_creds` relation (missing `handle_all_urls`, added in #12634). # How the Problems Are Solved - Send **`Vary: Host`** on both well-known responses, declaring that the body depends on the host: a spec-compliant shared cache must store per-host variants or skip caching. Clients addressing a single host (the Apple and Google verifiers, browsers) are unaffected and keep honoring the configured `max-age`. - Correct the outdated caching reasoning in the code comments. - Guard the header with unit and integration tests. - Update the native app links docs page: both Digital Asset Links relations and the current response headers. # Additional Changes None. `WellKnown.AppLinksCacheControlMaxAge` behavior is unchanged (`0` still results in `no-store`). # Additional Context - Follow-up to #12634; relates to #12497. - Verified with interleaved requests against two instances: responses are no longer reused across domains, and each domain consistently serves its own configuration. - To be cherry-picked to `v4.x` from `main` once merged. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-26 10:57:28 +02:00
Marco A.andGitHub	6fdb74593c	docs: remove outdated Actions v2 feature flag references (#12641) ... # Which Problems Are Solved The docs ([Actions v2 concepts page](https://zitadel.com/docs/concepts/features/actions_v2) and the Actions testing guides) state that Actions v2 must be enabled via the "Actions" feature flag. That flag no longer exists — it is `reserved` in `proto/zitadel/feature/v2/instance.proto` and `system.proto` — and Actions v2 is available by default. The callout even linked to a non-existent API field. # How the Problems Are Solved - Removed the stale feature-flag callout (and the roadmap teaser callout) from `concepts/features/actions_v2.mdx`. - Removed the "Your ZITADEL instance needs to have the actions feature enabled." prerequisite bullet from the seven `guides/integrate/actions/testing-*.mdx` guides. Pure deletions, 17 lines across 8 files. # Additional Context The `SetInstanceFeatures` mentions in `hosted-login.mdx` and `webkeys.mdx` refer to flags that still exist and are untouched.	2026-08-25 16:58:43 +02:00
3 people	7e8a3fb21d	docs: add ZITADEL Cloud refund policy (#12577) ... Adds a new public-facing Refund Policy to the documentation for ZITADEL Cloud subscriptions. This document clarifies billing expectations for customers and standardizes support operations by outlining: - **Scope:** Eligible situations for refunds (e.g., accidental overages, billing errors, accidental auto-renewals). - **Out of Scope:** Non-refundable items (e.g., Startup plan, standard usage-based fees, partial periods). - **Process:** Clear instructions on how customers can submit a refund request via the customer portal. --------- Co-authored-by: Maximilian <[email protected]>	2026-08-25 12:09:43 +00:00
3 people	324cc54d9a	fix(console): support Zitadel Support IDP (#12619) ... # Which Problems Are Solved The backend and the new login already support the dedicated ZITADEL IdP template (`AddZitadelProvider`/`UpdateZitadelProvider`, `PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL`, `InstanceRolesInfo`), but the Console does not expose it: - A ZITADEL provider cannot be created or edited from the Console, neither at instance nor at organization level — it is missing from the "add provider" list in the IdP settings. - Providers created through the API are listed in the IdP table as `coming soon` (the type `@switch` has no `PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` case) and the row has no detail route, so an existing provider cannot be opened. - `InstanceRolesInfo` — the organization ID/domain pairs that drive instance-role synchronization for instance-level providers — is not configurable outside the API. # How the Problems Are Solved - Added `ProviderZitadelComponent` (`console/src/app/modules/providers/provider-zitadel/`), modeled on the generic OIDC provider component: - Form for `name`, `issuer`, `clientId`, `clientSecret` and `scopesList` (chip input, defaulting to `openid`, `profile`, `email`), plus the shared `cnsl-provider-options` block. - On edit the client secret is optional and is only sent when the "update client secret" checkbox is set. - Reuses `cnsl-provider-next` for the callback URL, activation and "what now" flow. - Added the instance role mapping section, rendered only for instance-level providers (`serviceType === ADMIN`), since the API rejects `instance_roles_info` on organization-scoped ZITADEL providers. Entries are added as organization ID + organization domain pairs and are submitted as `InstanceRolesInfo`; both values are required and are matched together on login. - Added `addZitadelProvider`/`updateZitadelProvider` to `AdminService` and `ManagementService` wrapping the existing gRPC calls. - Declared the component in `providers.module.ts` and mapped `PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` to the `zitadel` path in `providers-routing.module.ts`, so `/instance/provider/zitadel/...` and `/org/provider/zitadel/...` resolve for both create and edit. - Added a ZITADEL tile to the "add provider" list in the IdP settings and a `PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` case to the IdP table; `IdpTableComponent.routerLinkForRow` now returns the detail route for ZITADEL rows. # Additional Changes - Added the new i18n keys `IDP.CREATE.ZITADEL.TITLE`/`DESCRIPTION`, `IDP.INSTANCEROLESINFO`, `IDP.INSTANCEROLESINFO_DESC`, `IDP.ORGANIZATIONID` and `IDP.ORGANIZATIONDOMAIN` to all 22 Console locale files with actual translations instead of English fallbacks. - The provider tile, table entry and detail header use the colored ZITADEL logo assets (`zitadel-logo-solo-light.svg` in the dark theme, `zitadel-logo-solo-dark.svg` in the light theme), consistent with the header, rather than the monochrome `*-solo-*-icon.svg` variants. - Additional sync roles trigger for the support IDP to behave correctly on first login after a disable/enable cycle — where auto-linking jumps in — but not required for the link to be established. # Additional Context - Closes #11825 - Part of the "Zitadel as an Identity Provider" epic #5127 - Console counterpart to the API work in #12018, #12056 (add), #12371, #12378, #12384 (update), #12394 (get/list), #12396 (delete), #12422 (active IdPs) and to the login support in #12469, #12530 and #12568 --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-08-24 07:00:02 +02:00
3 people	a1a4572303	chore(deps): update npm dependencies and clean up pnpm overrides (#12592) ... # Which Problems Are Solved Several dependencies across the workspace had fallen behind their latest patch releases, and the override list in pnpm-workspace.yaml had drifted: many of the 28 entries were no longer needed because the dependency tree had already moved past them, while a few enforced outdated version floors. # How the Problems Are Solved Direct dependencies were updated where newer patch releases were available: `@angular/*` → ^21.2.19, `next` → 16.2.11 (docs and login, incl. `@next/eslint-plugin-next`), `nx` → 22.7.7, and `js-yaml` → ^4.3.1 / `postcss` → ^8.5.23 in docs. The lockfile was regenerated from scratch so all transitive dependencies resolve to the newest versions within their allowed ranges. With that in place, the override list was rebuilt down to the 8 entries that are still required because a parent package pins an older version (axios and brace-expansion via nx, postcss and sharp via next, esbuild via tsx, uuid via testcontainers, and the two OpenTelemetry packages); the other 20 overrides were removed. A verification pass confirmed the resolved versions stay at or above the floors the removed overrides used to enforce, and `pnpm audit` comes back clean. --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-08-19 06:30:10 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub	d488ecb07f	fix(login): don't prepend base path to absolute IdP URL on login_hint redirect (#12610) ... # Which Problems Are Solved When an OIDC authorize request carries a `login_hint` that resolves via domain discovery to an organization configured to auto-redirect to a single external IdP, Login V2's server-side flow initiation returns a malformed `Location` header: the login base path is concatenated with the absolute IdP authorize URL without a separator (e.g. `https://<instance>/ui/v2/loginhttps://login.microsoftonline.com/...`). The flow ends in `{"code":5,"message":"Not Found"}` and the IdP is never contacted. The same IdP works when the user submits the login name interactively, because the client-side handler distinguishes external URLs; only the server-side `login_hint` fast-path introduced in #12431 is affected. Additionally, the same fast-path only handled the `redirect` response shape from `sendLoginname`. When the discovered organization's IdP is SAML with POST binding, `sendLoginname` returns `samlData` (form fields instead of a URL), which was silently ignored — the user fell back to the prefilled `/loginname` screen instead of being signed in silently, unlike the client-side flow, which auto-submits the SAML AuthnRequest form. # How the Problems Are Solved `resolveLoginHint` passed every redirect returned by `sendLoginname` through `constructUrl`, which unconditionally prepends `NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH` and assumes a relative path. It now checks `isExternalUrl` first: absolute URLs are validated with `isSafeRedirectUri` (blocking `javascript:`/`data:`/etc., falling back to `/loginname` if unsafe) and redirected as-is, while relative paths keep being resolved against the base path — matching the handling already used in the idp-scope branch of `handleOIDCFlowInitiation` and in the client-side `handleServerActionResponse`. `resolveLoginHint` also handles the `samlData` response shape now: after validating the target URL with `isSafeRedirectUri`, it responds with the same auto-submit HTML form used by the existing SAML flows, so a `login_hint` resolving to a POST-binding SAML IdP completes silently as well. Since this form was previously duplicated inline three times in `flow-initiation.ts`, it is extracted into a shared `buildAutoSubmitFormResponse` helper used by all call sites. Regression tests cover the absolute-URL redirect (fails on the previous code with the exact malformed URL), the SAML POST auto-submit response, and the unsafe-scheme fallbacks for both shapes.	2026-08-17 15:17:08 +02:00
Livio SpringandGitHub	632a519680	docs: fix redirect to WIP page (#12594) ... Fixes the path for the temporary redirect for all /reference/api/group/* routes to a new "Under Development" page while the API is being built.	2026-08-14 10:33:05 +00:00
3 people	a0e53933a2	docs: redirect /api/group/* to WIP page (#12593) ... Adds a temporary redirect for all /api/group/* routes to a new "Under Development" page while the API is being built. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>	2026-08-14 04:37:01 +00:00
3 people	a4266fa7fc	Merge commit from fork ... * fix(login): strip returnCode from browser supplied session challenges The updateOrCreateSession server action forwarded the browser's challenges object to the session API verbatim and returned the resulting challenges in its response. A party who knew only a victim's login name could create an identify-only session, request OTP-Email and OTP-SMS challenges with the returnCode delivery type, and read both plaintext codes straight out of the server action response. sanitizeChallenges forces returnCode off before anything is forwarded. It is applied in createSessionAndUpdateCookie and setSessionAndUpdateCookie rather than in the action itself, so every caller including sendPasskey is covered by one gate. An OTP-Email returnCode request is rewritten to sendCode rather than dropped, so the legitimate flow still completes and the code is delivered to the user; WebAuthN challenges carry no code and pass through untouched. The action response is also narrowed to the WebAuthN challenge. That is redundant while the sanitizer holds, but it keeps "no OTP code crosses this boundary" a local, readable property. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> * test(login): assert session challenges are sanitized before reaching the API challenges.test.ts covers what sanitizeChallenges does, but nothing asserted that cookie.ts actually calls it. A refactor could drop either call site and the whole suite would still pass, silently reopening the hole. Covers both entry points to the session API by asserting on the challenges the mocked client receives, so the test fails if the sanitizer is ever bypassed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-14 06:12:33 +02:00
3 people	5f3a0de33a	docs: update knowledge gap ID 43 (#12590) ... Automatically generated PR resolving Knowledge Gap ID 43. **Thread ID:** mixpanel-cmvvwsc2uwvlkujw **Action:** UPDATE **Target Files:** 1 ### AI Summary > *Negative Docs Feedback* *Path:* `/sdk-examples/react` *Comment:* "ai generator went crazy it seems, with so many repeated & unfinished sentences" --- 🤖 **Need adjustments?** Leave a comment below and tag **@zitadel-knowledge-bot** with your requested changes, and I will automatically update the files and push a new commit! Co-authored-by: zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot] <296006658+zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-12 15:12:20 -03:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub	a331e5b7ba	fix(login): redirect unknown users to external IdP after domain discovery when enumeration protection is active (#12581) ... # Which Problems Are Solved A `login_hint` that resolves an organization via domain discovery but matches no existing user is no longer automatically redirected to the organization's external IdP when enumeration protection (`ignoreUnknownUsernames`) is active on the request context. #12369 combined the unknown-user IdP redirect into a single condition, but gated it with `&& !ignoreUnknownUsernames`: ```ts if ((!effectiveLoginSettings?.allowLocalAuthentication || discoveredOrganization) && !ignoreUnknownUsernames) { ``` Since the flag is resolved from the pre-discovery context (the instance default settings — during domain discovery there is no organization context yet), enabling enumeration protection instance-wide disables the redirect even for IdP-only organizations (`allowLocalAuthentication: false`). The flow falls through to `preventUserEnumeration()` and strands the user on a decoy Password screen for an account that does not exist; the Back button re-enters the auto-submit loop and dead-ends identically. This breaks silent-SSO first logins where the external IdP is supposed to create the account on first authentication (Login V2). The guard is also counterproductive on its own terms: existing users of the same org still auto-redirect to the IdP, so the divergent treatment acts as an enumeration oracle — redirect means the user exists, password screen means it doesn't. And it protects nothing in practice, since the IdP remains reachable manually via the account switcher → login-name screen → IdP button. # How the Problems Are Solved Split the condition by what known users of the resolved organization actually experience, so unknown usernames always mimic the known-user flow: ```ts if ( !effectiveLoginSettings?.allowLocalAuthentication || (discoveredOrganization && !ignoreUnknownUsernames) ) { ``` - **Local authentication disabled (IdP-only org):** redirect unknown usernames to the single allowed IdP regardless of `ignoreUnknownUsernames`. Known users are auto-redirected there, so the identical redirect is precisely what keeps unknown usernames indistinguishable — and it restores first-login account creation via the external IdP. - **Local authentication enabled:** known (password) users see the password screen, so the decoy password screen remains the indistinguishable behavior and enumeration protection keeps gating the discovery-based IdP redirect, as introduced by #12369. Adds regression tests for both cases: domain discovery into an IdP-only org with `ignoreUnknownUsernames: true` expects the IdP redirect; discovery into a local-auth org expects the decoy `/password` redirect with no IdP flow started.	2026-08-12 13:41:58 +02:00
5 people	6127b567e7	feat(oidc): provide actor information in userinfo actions (#12566) ... # Which Problems Are Solved Expose impersonating actor to `preAccessToken` and `preUserinfo` actions. # How the Problems Are Solved Provide the `actor` information already present in the OIDC session model of JWT token to the relevant actions. Both goja-based actions "v1" and webhook based execution targets carry the actor information now. Actor remains null in case of non-impersonated tokens. Actor may contain nested actors to display a delegation chain of impersonators. # Additional Changes - dba6261c8ed0dfd00ffde6193910b1405b17432f: refactor `userinfoFlows` to reduce complexity, add test coverage and solve a couple of potential bugs. - `getClientId` in actions was previously undocumented. Added to documentation. - A skill that reproduces manual testing using webhook.site or a local sink. # Additional Context - Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12097 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Wim Van Laer <[email protected]>	2026-08-12 07:36:56 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub	790244dd49	feat(login): synchronize instance roles for Zitadel identity provider (#12568) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - Logins through the new login via a Zitadel identity provider with `instanceRolesInfo` configured (e.g. support access) create/update the user, but the instance member roles from the `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles` claim are never assigned — that synchronization only exists in the login v1 flow. Support users therefore end up without any permissions. # How the Problems Are Solved - New `syncInstanceRolesFromIdpIntent` in the login, called after user auto-creation and on existing-user logins. It mirrors the v1 filtering: roles are only honored for ZITADEL IdPs with `instanceRolesInfo`, when granted in a configured organization (matched on ID and domain) and using an instance role key (`IAM_` prefix). Memberships are written merge-only via the v2 `InternalPermissionService` (existing roles are never removed), and a failed sync logs a warning without blocking the login. # Additional Changes - Unit tests for the claim-to-role filtering. # Additional Context - Part of the "ZITADEL as an Identity Provider" epic: #5127 - Follow-up for PR #xxx (ZITADEL provider sign-in button in the new login)	2026-08-12 09:25:12 +02:00
3 people	318bfc36d7	feat: native app links for passkeys (#12580) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - Native iOS/Android passkeys need OS trust files on the ZITADEL domain; without them, Associated Domains / App Links verification fails. - Operators could not configure iOS Team ID + Bundle ID or Android package name + SHA-256 fingerprints on OIDC apps. - `/.well-known/apple-app-site-association` and `/.well-known/assetlinks.json` were not served from application config. # How the Problems Are Solved - Add iOS/Android app-link fields on OIDC app create/update (Application API v2 + Management), with validation. - Persist and project those fields; query active app-link configs instance-wide. - Serve AASA (`webcredentials`) and Digital Asset Links (`get_login_creds`) from well-known paths, with configurable `Cache-Control` and fingerprint normalization at serve time. - Console UI to edit the fields, with links to the well-known endpoints. - Operator docs for configuration, endpoints, caching, and verification. # Additional Changes - Document on API fields that well-known responses may be HTTP-cached and platform verifiers may delay propagation. - Runtime config: `WellKnown.AppLinksCacheControlMaxAge` (default `5m`; `0` → `no-store`). # Additional Context - Closes #12497 - Implemented and reviewed as stack: - #12531 API contract - #12532 storage wiring - #12536 well-known endpoints - #12537 console - #12547 docs --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>	2026-08-12 08:04:27 +02:00
3 people	2bd42e8fc4	fix(actions): allow adding raw metadata values via appendMetadataRaw (#12567) ... # Which Problems Are Solved Since #10666 (v4.1+, backported to v4.x), metadata values set through actions v1 (`api.metadata.push` and `api.v1.user.appendMetadata`) are always JSON-encoded via `json.Marshal`. This made the write path consistent with the JSON-based read path, but removed the ability to store raw (unencoded) metadata values: - A scalar string is now always stored quoted (`"de"` instead of `de`). - The previous byte-array convention (mapping a string to an integer array in the script, handled by `mapBytesToByteArray` introduced in #5526) now stores the literal integer-array text (e.g. `[100,101]`) instead of the raw bytes. Customers migrating from v3.x whose downstream systems base64-decode metadata values from tokens and expect raw bytes have no way to produce them anymore — changing the consuming system is not always possible. Reverting the default is not an option either, as clients that adopted actions v1 on v4.x now rely on the JSON encoding. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a new, opt-in function `api.v1.user.appendMetadataRaw(key, value)` to the actions v1 login flows (external / internal authentication post authentication and pre creation), next to the existing `appendMetadata`. - The value is stored as raw bytes without JSON encoding: - a string is stored as its plain UTF-8 bytes (`de`, not `"de"`) - byte arrays (`Uint8Array` or a plain array of integers 0-255, the old convention) are stored as-is, so existing v3 scripts using a string-to-byte-array helper only need to switch the function name - other types (and empty values) throw an error - The existing `appendMetadata` and `api.metadata.push` behavior remains byte-for-byte unchanged. # Additional Changes - Documented `appendMetadataRaw` (and the JSON encoding behavior of `appendMetadata`) in the external and internal authentication actions docs. - Added unit tests for the new function (through a real goja runtime) and a test locking in the existing `appendMetadata` JSON-encoding behavior. # Additional Context - Regression introduced as a side effect of #10666 (which fixed #10470); the raw byte handling was originally introduced in #5526. - Reported by a customer upgrading from v3.4.x to v4.16.x, whose PostAuthentication action maps token payload claims into user metadata. - Requires backport to v4.x. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>	2026-08-11 15:44:15 +02:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub	ba3a45bee4	fix(login): treat user-verified passkey as fulfilling MFA in session validity check (#12575) ... # Which Problems Are Solved Users with a passkey plus an additional configured second factor (TOTP / OTP Email / OTP SMS) get stuck on the passkey verification page: the WebAuthn ceremony succeeds, but the continue button just spins and the user is redirected back to `/passkey` indefinitely. Re-registering the passkey or switching to a private window does not help. Since the MFA hardening of `isSessionValid` (56f4798), a session is only considered valid if one of the user's *configured* MFA methods (TOTP, OTP Email, OTP SMS, U2F) was verified within the session. A passkey login sets `factors.webAuthN.verifiedAt` with `userVerified: true`, but only the U2F method reuses that factor — so a passkey session for a user whose second factor is TOTP or OTP is deemed invalid at flow completion. This contradicts the login flow itself: `checkMFAFactors` intentionally never prompts for a second factor after a passkey login ("escape further checks if user has authenticated with passkey"). The result is a loop: 1. Passkey is verified on `/passkey` → `sendPasskey` → `completeAuthFlow` → `loginWithOIDCAndSession` 2. `isSessionValid` returns `false` because the configured TOTP/OTP factor was never checked in this session 3. The re-authentication branch calls `sendLoginname`, which resolves the user's preferred method (passkey) and returns a redirect to `/passkey` — back to step 1, with no way forward # How the Problems Are Solved Treat a user-verified passkey authentication as fulfilling the MFA requirement in `isSessionValid`, consistent with the existing passkey escape in `checkMFAFactors`. A passkey with user verification is inherently multi-factor (possession + biometrics/PIN). - `isSessionValid` now derives `hasAuthenticatedWithPasskey` from `factors.webAuthN.verifiedAt && factors.webAuthN.userVerified` and accepts it alongside the configured-factor checks (`totpValid || otpEmailValid || otpSmsValid || u2fValid`). - A presence-only WebAuthn assertion (`userVerified: false`, i.e. a U2F-style second-factor check) does **not** count, so password-based sessions still require their configured second factor — the original security fix remains intact. - Adds regression tests: a user-verified passkey session with a configured-but-unverified TOTP factor is valid; a presence-only WebAuthn session with an unverified TOTP factor remains invalid.	2026-08-11 14:16:45 +02:00
3 people	30434d176c	feat(login): Sign in with Zitadel (#12530) ... Closes #11824 # Which Problems Are Solved The backend supports the dedicated ZITADEL identity provider template (`AddZitadelProvider`, `IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL`), but the new login (login v2) cannot yet handle providers of this type: A configured and activated ZITADEL IdP is not rendered as a sign-in option, because the provider type is missing from the login's component mapping. # How the Problems Are Solved - Regenerated `@zitadel/proto` (`settings/v2/login_settings_pb` in `types`, `es` and `cjs`) so `IdentityProviderType.ZITADEL = 13` is available (`idp/v2` was already up to date). - `apps/login/src/lib/idp.ts`: - `idpTypeToSlug` maps `ZITADEL` to the `zitadel` slug, used by the generic `/idp/[provider]/process|failure` routes (no route changes needed). - `idpTypeToIdentityProviderType` maps `IDPType.IDP_TYPE_ZITADEL` to `IdentityProviderType.ZITADEL`. - Added `SignInWithZitadel` button (`apps/login/src/components/idps/sign-in-with-zitadel.tsx`) with the Zitadel logo as inline SVG: the brand gradient is theme-independent, accents use `currentColor` to adapt to light/dark, consistent with the other provider buttons. - Registered the Zitadel type in the provider-to-component mapping in `sign-in-with-idp.tsx`. No changes to the IdP intent handling are required: user auto-creation/auto-update consume the pre-mapped `user_action.create_user` / `update_user` from `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent`, which the backend fills for the Zitadel provider like for any generic OIDC provider. # Additional Changes - Added the `signInWithZitadel` i18n key ("Sign in with Zitadel") to all 15 locale files. - Extended `idp.test.ts` with the new slug and type mappings and added the Zitadel type to the exhaustive enum-coverage tests (45 tests passing). # Additional Context - Part of the "Zitadel as an Identity Provider" epic: #5127 - Enables the customer-portal "support access" flow, where support staff sign in to a customer instance via a pre-configured Zitadel Support IdP --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>	2026-08-10 10:27:34 +02:00
MaximilianandGitHub	9fa0cad9d9	docs: Update production guidelines (#12552)	2026-08-07 10:48:21 +02:00
3 people	464d1cb655	fix(login): resolve unknownContext error on password page caused by inconsistent ignoreUnknownUsernames handling (#12512) ... # Which Problems Are Solved The `/password` page (and related password pages) can show the `unknownContext` error even though the user was resolved correctly and login completes fine. Two causes: 1. `sendLoginname` used two different `ignoreUnknownUsernames` sources: session creation was gated on the **user's org** login settings, while the redirect's `loginName` masking and enumeration guards were gated on a **caller-supplied flag** reflecting the request context (instance or org scope). Whenever the two diverge — e.g. `ignoreUnknownUsernames` enabled on the instance but not on the user's org, or the reverse — the redirect carries a `loginName` that doesn't match the session cookie (or no session is created at all), so the `/password` page can't load the session and renders `unknownContext`, while password submission still succeeds via its user-search fallback. This affects every caller of `sendLoginname` — the manual `/loginname` form as well as the server-side `login_hint` resolution; it was most reproducible with `login_hint`, since that path resolves context settings at the instance level, maximizing the chance of divergence with an org-level policy. 2. The password pages tried to re-derive "was enumeration protection applied?" from login settings to suppress the error — but they resolve settings from a different context than `sendLoginname` (falling back to the default organization instead of the instance), so any org-level custom policy made the suppression misfire. More fundamentally, the alert was keyed on a failed session lookup, which is not an error state: under enumeration protection no session exists by design, and the forms recover without one (`sendPassword` falls back to user search; `/password/set` works via code + userId). # How the Problems Are Solved `sendLoginname` no longer accepts `ignoreUnknownUsernames` from the caller. It derives a single constant server-side from the request-context login settings it already fetches and uses it for every decision in the flow: session creation, `preventUserEnumeration`, the multiple-users branch, the INITIAL-user check, the organization reset, the auth-method guards, and the IdP redirect after domain discovery. Redirect params use `session?.factors?.user?.loginName ?? command.loginName`: when a session exists, its loginName goes in the URL so the next page always finds the session cookie; when protection applies, no session (and no session cookie) is created and the raw input is echoed, keeping known and unknown users fully indistinguishable — including the previously observable `Set-Cookie` difference. `UsernameForm` and `resolveLoginHint` stop forwarding the flag, which also removes the redundant `getLoginSettings` call in `resolveLoginHint`. The password pages no longer consult login settings or the session lookup for the `unknownContext` error and instead warn only when required input is actually missing (matching the existing pattern on the passkey/mfa/u2f pages): `/password` and `/password/change` when no `loginName` searchParam is present, `/password/set` when neither `loginName` nor `userId` is present. A missing session alone no longer triggers the error. Verified against a live instance in all four settings combinations (uniform on/off, both divergence directions) including a known-vs-unknown `login_hint` comparison producing byte-identical responses under protection; full unit suite passes. --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-08-04 12:49:28 +00:00
jmaretteandGitHub	9070b537d2	feat(oidc): add RFC 7592 dynamic client management (#12315) ... # Which Problems Are Solved #12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591), but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself afterwards: - The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration. - There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask a human. # How the Problems Are Solved Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol (RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT` and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint. ## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch The management endpoints are gated on the `DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`, exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does. `allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints in both modes. ## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token it was handed: | | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) | | --- | --- | --- | | Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access token | | Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None | Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create* clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints. One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two, and there is no user identity to check against in the first place. Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot obtain a client's registration access token, by design. Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another client is rejected without touching the database. ## The token itself - **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted, through a new `project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues it. - **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens. The opaque token handed to the client encrypts `client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before checking the secret against the stored hash. - **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted before it is projected. - **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates, including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable token back. ## Reusing the existing persistence A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and `oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`), so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a registered client is never left unmanageable. # Additional Changes - Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the `apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep in sync. - The registration response (`POST`) now also carries `registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`. - Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page. - Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update, delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read, update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token, which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of their own. # Additional Context - Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313 (RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main` and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there. - **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above (registration access token only, no operator path through these endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write` also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`. - Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the guide and asserted as such in the integration test. - A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No proto change and no new feature flag. - Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`, `golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI remains the check on it.	2026-08-03 08:37:59 +00:00
3 people	dc1c8620bc	fix(login): provide hidden username on password set/change forms (#12490) ... <!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved The set-password, change-password and set-register-password forms render only password fields — there is no username field inside the `<form>`. Password managers look for a username field adjacent to the password field in order to associate and save the credential. Without one, on these screens they either skip offering to save, or save a password entry with no username attached — so the saved record can't later be matched to the account. The existing sign-in form (`password-form.tsx`) already carries a username field for this reason; the password *creation/change* flows were missing the equivalent. # How the Problems Are Solved Add a username field to each of the three forms so the newly set password is saved against the correct account: - `set-password-form.tsx` and `change-password-form.tsx` use the `loginName`. - `set-register-password-form.tsx` uses the `email`. The field is a real, focusable-excluded `type="text"` input rather than `type="hidden"` — password managers ignore `type="hidden"` fields when looking for a username, so a visually-hidden text input is required. It is: - `readOnly` (avoids a controlled-input warning and user edits), - `tabIndex={-1}` and `aria-hidden="true"` (kept out of the tab order and the accessibility tree), - `className="sr-only"` (visually hidden but present in the DOM), - `autoComplete="username"` (tells the password manager what it is). The value comes from props already passed to each form, so no signatures change. # Additional Changes None. # Additional Context - The username values (`loginName` / `email`) are already available in each component, so this is a purely presentational change with no server-side or API impact. Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>	2026-07-31 07:45:01 +00:00
jmaretteandGitHub	f34cc45eac	feat(oidc): add RFC 7591 dynamic client registration (#12313) ... # Which Problems Are Solved ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by clients that need to register themselves at runtime: - There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no `registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document. - This blocks [Model Context Protocol (MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only then start the authorization code + PKCE flow. # How the Problems Are Solved ## Control plane: instance security settings No feature flag and no runtime config. A `DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance `SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and `enable_impersonation`: | `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour | | --- | --- | --- | | `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`, `registration_endpoint` absent from discovery | | `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in the token's organization | | `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the instance default organization | Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query. `allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a single setting closes the endpoint. Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to `projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation setting did for `security_policies2`. ## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write` - New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both `InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write` already lives. - New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without gaining write access to the organization's existing applications. - Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no permission: that is the MCP self-register path. - A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403 insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`, so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the two apart. The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the command layer next to the others (`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the impersonating actor. ## Registration itself - **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint reuses the existing application-creation events (`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged. They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the `IAMProject` or other projects. - Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules; `private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with `invalid_client_metadata`. - **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls `op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered; `op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged. # Additional Changes - **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC 7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs, which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of `web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an `http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR. - **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a `registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page, and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in the Console translations). # Additional Context - Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and #12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this lands. - Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997. - **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` / `jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types. - Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and `zitadel/oidc`).	2026-07-30 14:43:47 +00:00
4 people	10a66b786b	fix(login): honour login_hint and skip the auto-submit loop in OIDC flow (#12431) ... <!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved An OIDC authorize request that carries a `login_hint` (and no `prompt`) is meant to land the user on a **prefilled** login screen and let them proceed straight to authentication. Two problems prevented that: **1. The hint was dropped when an unrelated session existed.** When the browser held a `sessions` cookie for a *different* account: - The user was redirected to the **account picker** (`/accounts`) instead of the prefilled login-name screen. - The picker listed the already-logged-in, unrelated account(s) — never the user identified by `login_hint`. - The `login_hint` was **silently dropped** (the `/accounts` URL carries no hint), so the typed email was lost and the flow dead-ended on the wrong accounts. In a clean session (no `sessions` cookie) the same request prefilled correctly, which made the bug depend on unrelated pre-existing sessions. **2. The prefilled path was jarring and looped on "back".** Even when the hint *was* honoured, the flow redirected to `/loginname?loginName=…&submit=true`. That page renders the username screen and then **client-side auto-submits** it, so the user sees the username flash on screen, watches "Continue" click itself, and only then lands on the password step. Worse, `/loginname?submit=true` stays in browser history, so pressing **Back** from the password screen re-triggers the auto-submit and bounces the user straight forward again — an inescapable loop with no way to edit the username. # How the Problems Are Solved **Honour the hint (problem 1).** In `handleOIDCFlowInitiation`, the default branch (no `prompt`) already calls `findValidSession`, which filters the browser's sessions by `login_hint` and treats the hint as *selecting the user*. When the hint matches none of the sessions it returns `undefined`, and the remaining `eligibleSessions` (filtered by organization only) are therefore never the hinted user. The fallback previously chose between the loginname screen and the account picker based solely on `eligibleSessions.length === 0`, so a present-but-unrelated session sent the user to `gotoAccounts`, discarding the email. The loginname branch is now also gated on `authRequest.loginHint`, mirroring the existing empty-eligible-sessions branch. **Skip the flash and the loop (problem 2).** Instead of bouncing through `/loginname?submit=true` and relying on client-side auto-submit, the hint is now resolved **server-side** via `sendLoginname` (the same approach the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch already used) and the user is redirected **straight to the next step** (e.g. `/password`), skipping the `/loginname` screen entirely. This is factored into a shared `resolveLoginHint` helper and applied to all `login_hint` branches (default-prompt, no-session, and the existing `Prompt.LOGIN` path, now deduplicated). When the hint can't be resolved (unknown/ambiguous user, transient error), the flow falls back to a prefilled `/loginname` **without** `submit=true` — a clean screen where the user clicks once — so there is no auto-submit and no back-button loop in any path. ```ts if (!selectedSession || !selectedSession.id) { // login_hint matches no session: resolve it straight to the next step. if (authRequest.loginHint) { const hintResponse = await resolveLoginHint({ request, requestId, loginHint: authRequest.loginHint, organization }); if (hintResponse) { return hintResponse; } } // Prefill loginname (not the account picker) for an unresolved hint or when no session is eligible. if (authRequest.loginHint || eligibleSessions.length === 0) { return gotoLoginname({ request, requestId, loginHint: authRequest.loginHint, organization, orgDomain }); } return gotoAccounts({ request, requestId, organization, orgDomain }); } ``` Resulting behaviour: - `login_hint` set, a session **matches** it → silent auth (**unchanged**). - `login_hint` set, **no** session matches, hint **resolves** → straight to the next step (e.g. `/password`), no `/loginname` flash (**was**: account picker with the hint dropped / a jarring auto-submit screen). - `login_hint` set, hint **can't** be resolved → prefilled `/loginname`, no auto-submit, Back stays editable. - **No** `login_hint` → account picker / loginname exactly as before (**unchanged**). # Additional Changes - `resolveLoginHint` helper extracted in `flow-initiation.ts`; the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch now reuses it instead of duplicating the `sendLoginname` call. - `submit=true` is no longer emitted for the login-name flow, so the client-side auto-submit in `username-form.tsx` is no longer reached from OIDC initiation. - Tests in `flow-initiation.test.ts`: each `login_hint` branch (org-scope-filtered, unrelated-session, no-session) is covered twice — hint resolves → straight to `/password`; hint unresolved → prefilled `/loginname` with **no** `submit=true`. # Additional Context - The org-only `eligibleSessions` check was introduced in #12346, which correctly handled the *empty* case but did not account for a present-but-unmatched `login_hint`; this PR extends that gate. - Per OIDC, `login_hint` is advisory prefill; a client that wants the chooser would send `prompt=select_account`. Resolving the hint server-side also matches how the `Prompt.LOGIN` branch already behaved. --------- Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>	2026-07-29 12:06:36 +00:00
4 people	6fa5c0e662	Merge commit from fork ... * feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check. This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account and then complete a login as the victim. Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is persisted. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a second factor on a victim's account. Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim. Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code (mail/onboarding) path is unchanged. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review (Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover: - The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link (the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused). - Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup / VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched. - The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack. Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack surface: - delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route (keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep), - make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only the init-code path, - drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup / HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service and the v2 passkey APIs). A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid code now falls through to the init-code path and fails. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>	2026-07-29 05:45:56 +02:00
5 people	87538f29e1	docs: prefix legacy V1 API paths in generated OpenAPI (#12491) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - Generated V1 API reference docs are missing their base path prefixes (e.g. `/admin/v1`, `/auth/v1`, `/management/v1`, `/system/v1`). - Endpoint pages show routes like `/healthz` instead of `/admin/v1/healthz`. This happens because V1 protos still define `base_path` via legacy OpenAPI v2 swagger annotations, while docs generation uses `protoc-gen-connect-openapi`, which ignores those annotations and emits the bare `google.api.http` paths. # How the Problems Are Solved - After OpenAPI generation in `apps/docs/scripts/generate-proto-docs.mjs`, apply a small hardcoded map of the four legacy V1 services and prepend the correct prefix to each path in the generated specs. - The rewrite is idempotent (`startsWith(prefix)`), so already-prefixed paths are left alone. - Because the prefixes are written into the generated OpenAPI files, Fumadocs MDX generation and runtime page rendering stay in sync. # Additional Changes - None. # Additional Context - V1 APIs are legacy and frozen; hardcoding the four known prefixes is simpler and more reliable than dynamically scraping `.proto` files. - Changing the protos or dual-generating with `openapiv2` would be much more invasive for a docs-only issue. - Verified locally for Admin, Auth, Management, and System pages (e.g. `/admin/v1/healthz`, `/management/v1/users/{id}`). --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>	2026-07-27 14:59:02 +00:00
3 people	bb4f546b7c	docs: add video walkthrough link to quickstart guide (#12479) ... Link the YouTube walkthrough at the end of the quickstart page for users who prefer watching over reading. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-22 13:47:00 +02:00
Federico CoppedeandGitHub	62e56e085c	docs: fixed broken docs references (#12465)	2026-07-20 15:28:34 +02:00
4 people	3e94047da7	fix(login): redirect to external IdP after domain discovery regardless of registration policy (#12369) ... Closes #12021 Closes #12023 # Which Problems Are Solved When a user entered an email on the login page and domain discovery resolved the correct organization, the login flow failed to redirect to the configured external IdP. Instead it returned a "user not found" error or showed the registration page. This happened because the "user not found" decision tree in `sendLoginname` only attempted an IdP redirect when `allowLocalAuthentication` was disabled. If local auth was enabled but `allowRegister` was `false`, the IdP check was skipped entirely. # How the Problems Are Solved Combined the IdP redirect logic into a single block that triggers when either local authentication is disabled **or** domain discovery resolved an organization. The registration policy (`allowRegister`) now only affects local account creation and no longer gates external IdP authentication. --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-07-17 13:09:48 +00:00
3 people	2b9b9856b4	docs: remove changelog link from sidebar (#12459) ... The changelog page on zitadel.com was removed for being unmaintained, leaving the docs sidebar link 404ing. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-17 14:26:01 +02:00
Florian ForsterandGitHub	437a0802bd	docs: document initial admin password requirements in compose guide (#12452) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - The **Harden secrets** section of the Docker Compose guide lists commands for the masterkey and the two database passwords, but never mentions the **initial admin user password**. - Setting `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_ORG_HUMAN_PASSWORD` to a value that does not meet the default password complexity policy fails the initial setup with a `_password_complexity_model` error, and the requirements were not documented anywhere near the other secrets. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a short note directly below the secret-generation commands documenting the initial admin password: the default (`Password1!` / `[email protected]`), how to override it via `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_ORG_HUMAN_PASSWORD`, and the default complexity requirements (min 8 chars, upper + lower + number + symbol). - Links to the [Password Complexity](/guides/manage/console/default-settings#password-complexity) policy docs and notes that the variable only applies during initial setup. # Additional Changes None. # Additional Context - Reported by a self-hosting user (TrueNAS + Ansible) who hit repeated setup errors because the initial admin password complexity requirement was not documented alongside the masterkey/DB password commands.	2026-07-17 11:36:51 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub	56f4798ed3	Merge commit from fork ... * add mfa check to session validity check * change session check to check for already set up mfa methods * lint * improve naming * test changes * cleanup continueWithSession fcn	2026-07-17 08:23:56 +02:00
3 people	94ac4237a9	docs: add user self-deletion guide (#12458) ... ## Summary - Add a new guide documenting how to let users delete their own account via the User v2 API's `DeleteUser` endpoint, gated by the `user.self.delete` permission (granted via `ORG_USER_SELF_MANAGER`) - Link the new guide from the self-service concepts page and sidebar - Add the `ORG_USER_SELF_MANAGER` role to the administrators reference table ## Test plan - [x] Verified the new and updated pages render correctly in local dev (`pnpm dev`) replaces #12455 and #12457 (branch got renamed from `docs/human-pat-clarification`, which auto-closed #12457). Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-16 16:35:44 +00:00
5 people	75bc058bce	feat(eventstore): autovacuum tuning for events2 table (#12449) ... # Which Problems Are Solved In Zitadel's append-only event-sourced architecture, the `eventstore.events2` table grows indefinitely. PostgreSQL's default autovacuum uses a percentage-based scale factor, so as the table grows, the number of changed rows required to trigger a `VACUUM` or `ANALYZE` drifts towards infinity. Without regular vacuums, the table's Visibility Map becomes stale, disabling fast Index-Only Scans and forcing expensive heap reads. Without regular analyzes, query planner statistics become stale, leading to suboptimal execution plans. This causes eventstore operations to progressively degrade as `events2` grows, even without CPU, memory, or I/O saturation. A manual `VACUUM ANALYZE` immediately restores performance, confirming the root cause. - If `Eventstore.Autovacuum` is left at its default, `events2` keeps using PostgreSQL's default, percentage-based autovacuum/autoanalyze scale factors, which become impractically infrequent on large tables. - There was previously no supported way to apply static, table-level autovacuum tuning to `events2` through Zitadel's own configuration/setup process. # How the Problems Are Solved - Added an `Eventstore.Autovacuum` runtime configuration block to `cmd/defaults.yaml` (disabled by default): ```yaml Eventstore: Autovacuum: Enabled: false # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_ENABLED VacuumThreshold: 50000 # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_VACUUMTHRESHOLD AnalyzeThreshold: 50000 # ZITADEL_EVENTSTORE_AUTOVACUUM_ANALYZETHRESHOLD ``` - Added a repeatable `zitadel setup` migration step (`cmd/setup/eventstore_autovacuum.go`) that: - When `Enabled: true`, disables the percentage-based `autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor`, `autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor`, and `autovacuum_vacuum_insert_scale_factor` on `eventstore.events2`, and applies static thresholds (`autovacuum_vacuum_insert_threshold`, `autovacuum_vacuum_threshold`, `autovacuum_analyze_threshold`) from the config instead. - When `Enabled: false`, resets those storage parameters on `eventstore.events2` back to the cluster defaults. - Implements `Repeatable.Check()` so the step only re-runs when the configuration actually changed since the last `zitadel setup` run. - Added documentation in the new "Performance tuning" page. # Additional Changes - Move the projection documentation into performance tuning page - Expand and update the projection documentation to the latest state in zitadel. (contained some stale information) # Additional Context Several other issues describe read-performance symptoms consistent with this same root cause (stale `events2` visibility map / planner statistics at scale, without resource saturation). Since this PR addresses the shared root cause: - Closes #12448 - Closes #10754 - Closes #10260 - Closes #8585 - Closes #9239 --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01HoKvEY7niCVgLCz7CajBwW)_ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>	2026-07-16 14:42:11 +00:00
3 people	6bd46c5fb6	feat(login): idp userAction oneof (#12433) ... Closes #11369 # Which Problems Are Solved During SSO login with an external IdP, Actions v2 lets you manipulate the `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent` response to shape the user that ZITADEL creates or updates. There was an inconsistency between the two flows: - **First login (user does not exist):** the response carried an `addHumanUser` object (mirroring the deprecated `AddHumanUser` API), which **does** allow setting user `metadata`. - **Subsequent logins (user exists):** the response carried an `updateHumanUser` object (mirroring the deprecated `UpdateHumanUser` API), which does **not** support metadata. As a result, actions could set metadata when creating a user but not when updating one. Customers doing SSO attribute mapping had to make a separate `SetUserMetadata` call on every subsequent login — extra latency and a non-atomic update. The proto/backend already gained a non-deprecated `user_action` oneof (`create_user` → `CreateUserRequest`, `update_user` → `UpdateUserRequest`, both supporting metadata), but the login app was still reading the deprecated flat fields, so the new capability was unreachable from the frontend. # How the Problems Are Solved Migrate the login app's IDP intent handler to consume the new `user_action` oneof, with a fallback to the deprecated fields so older API responses keep working during the transition. - **`zitadel.ts`** — added `createUser` / `updateUser` client wrappers calling the non-deprecated `UserService.CreateUser` / `UserService.UpdateUser` endpoints. - **`idp-intent.ts`** — added three helpers, each preferring `user_action` and falling back to `add_human_user` / `update_human_user`: - `resolveCreateUser` — flat read view for org resolution, required-field checks, and registration-form pre-fill. - `buildCreateUserRequest` — passes the action's `CreateUserRequest` through and injects the resolved `organizationId`; maps the deprecated flat payload into the nested shape on fallback. - `buildUpdateUserRequest` — builds an `UpdateUserRequest` **including metadata** (the fix); deliberately syncs only profile/email/phone/metadata (not username) to preserve existing auto-update behavior and avoid invalidating sessions. - Rewired all handlers (`handleUserExists`, `handleAutoLinking`, `handleAutoCreation`, `handleManualCreation`, `resolveOrganizationForUser`) to use these, and switched auto-create to read `CreateUserResponse.id`. - **Tests** — updated mocks/assertions to the new request shapes and added two cases exercising the `user_action` oneof with metadata (create + update). 817/817 login unit tests pass; no new type errors. # Additional Changes Updated the Actions v2 guide `guides/integrate/actions/testing-response-manipulation.mdx` (the unreleased/`latest` docs) to reflect the new response shape: - Go handler example now manipulates `resp.GetCreateUser()` / `resp.GetUpdateUser()` and appends `user.Metadata`, demonstrating metadata on both flows. - Both JSON payloads switched from `addHumanUser` to the nested `createUser` shape (`human.profile`, `human.email`, `human.idpLinks`, top-level `metadata`). - Added a Callout explaining first-login → `createUser` vs. existing-user → `updateUser`, that both support metadata, and that `addHumanUser`/`updateHumanUser` are deprecated. - Updated the claim-mapping debugging section to the new `createUser.human.profile.givenName` path. Versioned snapshots (`v4.12`/`v4.13`/`v4.14`) were intentionally left unchanged, as they document releases where the old API was correct. --------- Co-authored-by: gayathri <[email protected]>	2026-07-16 12:01:07 +02:00
3 people	8395d4326e	docs: add v3 to v4 upgrade and Login V2 adoption guides (#12443) ... <!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved - Operators upgrading from ZITADEL v3 to v4 lacked a clear, docs-backed upgrade path covering web keys (A-10017), Login V1 vs Login V2 expectations, and post-upgrade options. - There was no standalone guide for adopting Login V2 after already running on v4. - Related ops/docs pages did not consistently point readers to the upgrade and Login V2 adoption material. - Kubernetes/Helm operators upgrading to a chart that ships ZITADEL v4 had no ops-page section linking the advisory, upgrade guide, optional Login V2 deferral (`login.enabled: false`), and chart README upgrade notes. # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds technical advisory **A-10017** documenting OIDC web key staging requirements before upgrading to v4. - Adds an **upgrade-v3-to-v4** guide with the recommended upgrade path (Login V1 remains supported; Login V2 is optional at upgrade time). - Adds a **v4-only adopt-login-v2** guide for teams adopting Login V2 later, with steps and caveats separate from the version upgrade. - Adds an **Upgrading to ZITADEL v4** subsection under `self-hosting/deploy/kubernetes/operations.mdx` that links to A-10017, the upgrade guide, Adopt Login V2, notes `login.enabled: false` when not adopting Login V2 yet, and points to the [Helm chart README](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel-charts/blob/main/charts/zitadel/README.md) for chart-specific breaking changes. # Additional Changes - Registers new docs in the sidebar and wires Related / cross-links from upgrade and ops pages so the advisory and guides are discoverable together. - Aligns language so upgrade vs. Login V2 adoption are clearly separated concerns. - Light cross-link updates on troubleshooting / updating-scaling / login-client pages where related. # Additional Context - Related: A-10017 (web keys advisory) - Docs paths introduced/updated: - `apps/docs/content/support/advisory/a10017.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/manage/upgrade-v3-to-v4.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/manage/adopt-login-v2.mdx` - `apps/docs/content/self-hosting/deploy/kubernetes/operations.mdx` (new "Upgrading to ZITADEL v4" section) - Sidebar and Related / cross-links - Companion Helm chart README PR: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel-charts/pull/608 --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>	2026-07-15 15:14:18 +00:00
4 people	1e09b4fc19	feat(login): hu translations + I18n consistency v2 (#12447) ... # Which Problems Are Solved Fixes i18n consistency and adds HU translations for login v2 # How the Problems Are Solved - Updated i18n files and added hu.json - Moved all translations to v2-default.json --------- Co-authored-by: Dobos Zoltán <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Liam Neville <[email protected]>	2026-07-15 11:27:25 +00:00
4 people	305579dd07	docs: update V2 end-of-support copy in roadmap (#12435) ... ## Summary - V2 has already reached end of support; the roadmap page previously implied end-of-support timelines for V2 and V3 were both still forthcoming. - Updated copy to state V2's end-of-support status plainly and note that V3's timeline and migration guidance will be published soon. ## Test plan - [x] Verified the updated sentence renders correctly in `apps/docs/content/product/roadmap.mdx` 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>	2026-07-15 04:35:41 +00:00
3 people	f0a999bccd	docs: clarify human PAT limitation and link issue #10915 (#12412) ... ## Which Problems Are Solved There is currently a knowledge gap in the documentation where users are unclear on if or why human accounts cannot have Personal Access Tokens (PATs), which has led to confusion in community channels like Discord and GitHub. ## How the Problems Are Solved Clarified that human PATs are currently not supported in the Personal Access Token documentation and added a direct link to GitHub Issue #10915 so users can track and upvote this capability. ## Additional Changes None ## Additional Context None --------- Signed-off-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-14 14:16:13 +00:00
5 people	051506b5bb	fix(login): prevent crash on a stale session cookie (#12423) ... <!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved The `sessions` cookie lifetime is independent of Zitadel's server-side session validity, so a cookie can reference an invalid session. In that case `getSession` throws `not_found` (QUERY-SFeaa). - `loadMostRecentSession` lets that error propagate instead of treating it as "no session", crashing the server render of every page that calls it without its own guard. - Most visibly, the "forgot password" flow landing on `/password/set` throws `[not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)` (gRPC code 5, HTTP 404) and fails to render. - 12 of the 16 call sites are unguarded and share this crash. # How the Problems Are Solved Catch the error in `loadMostRecentSession` and return `undefined`, unifying "cookie references a dropped session" with the existing "no cookie" case. Every call site already handles an undefined session, either with a graceful fallback or by throwing its own explicit error. ```ts return getSession({ serviceConfig, sessionId: recent.id, sessionToken: recent.token }) .then((resp: GetSessionResponse) => resp.session) .catch((error) => { console.warn("[Session] Could not load most recent session", error); return undefined; }); ``` All `loadMostRecentSession` call sites — **Previous** = behaviour when the cookie referenced an invalid session; **Change** = what this PR does to that call site: | # | Call site | Change in this PR | Previous behaviour (invalid session) | New behaviour | |---|-----------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------| | — | `lib/session.ts` — `loadMostRecentSession` | **Added `.catch` → `undefined`** (core fix) | Threw `not_found` to caller | Resolves to `undefined` | | 1 | `password/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (the reported bug) | Falls back to login-name flow | | 2 | `password/change/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `failedLoading` alert if no user | | 3 | `passkey/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `userId` fallback / `unknownContext` | | 4 | `otp/[method]/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `unknownContext` alert | | 5 | `otp/[method]/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No session found"` | | 6 | `mfa/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `verify.noResults` alert | | 7 | `mfa/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "Could not get user id from session"` | | 8 | `authenticator/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own throw / `unknownContext` | | 9 | `signedin/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders with `loginName` fallback | | 10 | `u2f/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `unknownContext` alert | | 11 | `u2f/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders on `loginName` | | 12 | `lib/server/verify.ts` — `verifyTOTP` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No user id found in session."` | | 13 | `password/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `try/catch`** | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 14 | `verify/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** ¹ | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 15 | `verify/success/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | | 16 | `passkey/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** (login-name path) | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged | Rows 1–12 were unguarded and crashed; the central change fixes them. Rows 13–16 already handled the error locally. # Additional Changes - This makes the four callers that wrapped the call in their own try/catch or `.catch` redundant, so remove that now-dead handling (password, verify, verify/success, passkey). - Add unit tests covering `loadMostRecentSession`: no cookie, success, and the stale-cookie rejection path. ¹ `verify/page.tsx`'s `.catch` also eagerly fetched `loginSettings`; that is already covered by the page's own lazy fetch, so behaviour is unchanged (one cosmetic edge case under `ignoreUnknownUsernames` with both `userId` and `loginName` present — no functional impact). # Additional Context - Session *expiry* alone does not trigger this: expired rows are not removed from the session projection, so `getSession` still returns them. The `not_found` specifically means the session was **removed** server-side (logout, admin/API termination, or a user/org/instance cascade) while the browser still held the cookie. - Mirrors the pattern upstream already applies inline in `verify/page.tsx` (*"ignore error, as we might not have a session yet"*), lifted to the shared function. - **Related issue (not in this PR):** the sibling `loadSessionById` helpers on the `?sessionId=` path (`passkey`, `otp`, `mfa`, `mfa/set`, `signedin`, `authenticator/set`, `u2f`) call `getSession` directly and share the same defect. Lower practical exposure (short-lived in-flow URLs; a clean logout clears the cookie), so a follow-up PR should lift those into a shared `loadSessionById` in `lib/session.ts`. - Prior art: upstream added an equivalent guard to verify/page.tsx in #11130, but the other call sites were never given the same treatment — this PR resolves that inconsistency at the source. Error trace: ``` {"level":"error","message":"⨯ Error [ConnectError]: [not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)\n at R (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:25490)\n at <unknown> (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:26477)\n at next (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:68112)\n at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:31326)\n at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:33734)\n at async Object.unary (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:66838)\n at async Object.getSession (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:72371)\n at async o (.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0msfcq_._.js:1:7440) {\n rawMessage: 'Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)',\n code: 5,\n metadata: Headers {\n 'accept-encoding': 'gzip',\n 'alt-svc': 'h3=\":443\"; ma=2592000',\n 'content-length': '240',\n 'content-type': 'application/json',\n date: 'Wed, 08 Jul 2026 09:06:09 GMT',\n 'strict-transport-security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',\n vary: 'Origin',\n },\n details: [\n {\n type: 'zitadel.v1.ErrorDetail',\n value: [Uint8Array],\n debug: [Object]\n }\n ],\n cause: undefined,\n httpStatus: 404,\n isUserError: true,\n digest: '634020356'\n}","timestamp":"2026-07-08T09:06:09.969Z"} ``` --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Liam Neville <[email protected]>	2026-07-14 09:03:46 +00:00
3 people	aa76c3be27	fix(login): keep submit button disabled/loading during password set r… (#12429) ... <!-- Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a PR here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr. Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections. It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed and why. Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our Licensing Policy as described here: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions. --> # Which Problems Are Solved - On Login V2 after a user sets their password during the invite or reset-password flows and clicks continue, there is a few seconds delay before the redirect occurs because no loading spinner is visible on the button during this delay users assume nothing happened and click continue again. - Clicking the button again starts a duplicate form submission. Since the first request was already fired the second request triggers an error right before the redirect from the first request completion creating a bad user experience # How the Problems Are Solved - Kept the `loading` state active `true` throughout the lifeline of the request which includes the 2-second database consistency delay and the subsequent `sendPassword` verification request. - Added `setLoading(false)` calls only in early-return error handling blocks and at the end of the redirection flow ensuring the button remains disabled and shows the spinner until the redirect happens. # Additional Changes - None # Additional Context - Solves #12416 Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>	2026-07-14 10:05:09 +02:00
3 people	b429ec240a	docs: remove GitHub discussion link from TOTP issuer callout (#12428) ... ## Which Problems Are Solved The callout added in #12335 included a link to a GitHub discussion which will become outdated and difficult to maintain. ## How the Problems Are Solved Removes the discussion link from the ZITADEL Cloud bullet point in the TOTP issuer callout, keeping the rest of the callout intact. Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-13 12:43:47 -03:00
3 people	6bcdb27e17	docs: document TOTP issuer name configuration for self-hosted and cloud instances (#12335) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - No documentation explained that the TOTP issuer name defaults to "ZITADEL" and is not derived from the domain - No documentation clarified how to change it on self-hosted (env var only, Helm values don't work) - No documentation communicated that it is not configurable on ZITADEL Cloud # How the Problems Are Solved - Adds a callout in the MFA section of the default settings page covering both self-hosted (ZITADEL_SYSTEMDEFAULTS_MULTIFACTORS_OTP_ISSUER) and cloud (not configurable, discussion link) # Additional Changes None # Additional Context - https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/discussions/5453 Signed-off-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Rajat Singh <[email protected]>	2026-07-13 11:37:43 +00:00
4 people	a97999e5ca	docs: update roadmap page content (#12402) ... ## Summary - Update the description frontmatter and reword "next generation" to "next iteration" throughout - Add a "What this means for existing customers" subsection after the disclaimer, before the Strategic Roadmap section - Convert `### **Strategic Investments**` / `### **Customer Outcomes**` subheadings to bold text so they no longer appear in the TOC - Rename the closing section to "Migration and Adoption" with updated content ## Test plan - [x] Diffed against source content to confirm all requested sections match - [x] Verified no remaining "next generation" occurrences --------- Co-authored-by: Elina Sokolovska <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Florian Forster <[email protected]>	2026-07-10 09:52:56 +00:00
3 people	8b9d3637fd	chore(deps): bump the go_modules group across 2 directories with 1 update (#12393) ... Bumps the go_modules group with 1 update in the /apps/login/acceptance/idp/saml directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto). Bumps the go_modules group with 1 update in the /apps/login/acceptance/samlsp directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto). Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.36.0 to 0.52.0 <details> <summary>Commits</summary> <ul> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/a1c0d9929856c8aba2b31f079340f00578eda803"><code>a1c0d99</code></a> go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/3c7c86938f4541c333d506f719388d9c42d4763d"><code>3c7c869</code></a> ssh: fix deadlock on unexpected channel responses</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/533fb3f7e4a5ae23f69d1837cd851d35ff5b76ce"><code>533fb3f</code></a> ssh: fix source-address critical option bypass</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/abbc44d451a6f9236a2bbd26cbcd4d0fec473da3"><code>abbc44d</code></a> ssh: fix incorrect operator order</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/e052873987615dc96fe67607a9a6adb76311344f"><code>e052873</code></a> ssh: fix infinite loop on large channel writes due to integer overflow</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b61cf853a89d82cad68da5e12a6beca2116f8456"><code>b61cf85</code></a> ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/9c2cd33e8d96a96133fd6ff732510ebba539c2bd"><code>9c2cd33</code></a> ssh: enforce strict limits on DSA key parameters</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/890731877d85f71cfdc9554e7a27fec4684fc4c4"><code>8907318</code></a> ssh: reject RSA keys with excessively large moduli</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/ffd87b4878fa98ca2908ec534e1a410bf095a35e"><code>ffd87b4</code></a> ssh: fix panic when authority callbacks are nil</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/4e7a7384ecbc8d519f6f4c11b36fa9d761fc8946"><code>4e7a738</code></a> ssh: fix deadlock on unexpected global responses</li> <li>Additional commits viewable in <a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.36.0...v0.52.0">compare view</a></li> </ul> </details> <br /> Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.36.0 to 0.52.0 <details> <summary>Commits</summary> <ul> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/a1c0d9929856c8aba2b31f079340f00578eda803"><code>a1c0d99</code></a> go.mod: update golang.org/x dependencies</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/3c7c86938f4541c333d506f719388d9c42d4763d"><code>3c7c869</code></a> ssh: fix deadlock on unexpected channel responses</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/533fb3f7e4a5ae23f69d1837cd851d35ff5b76ce"><code>533fb3f</code></a> ssh: fix source-address critical option bypass</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/abbc44d451a6f9236a2bbd26cbcd4d0fec473da3"><code>abbc44d</code></a> ssh: fix incorrect operator order</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/e052873987615dc96fe67607a9a6adb76311344f"><code>e052873</code></a> ssh: fix infinite loop on large channel writes due to integer overflow</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b61cf853a89d82cad68da5e12a6beca2116f8456"><code>b61cf85</code></a> ssh: enforce user presence verification for security keys</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/9c2cd33e8d96a96133fd6ff732510ebba539c2bd"><code>9c2cd33</code></a> ssh: enforce strict limits on DSA key parameters</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/890731877d85f71cfdc9554e7a27fec4684fc4c4"><code>8907318</code></a> ssh: reject RSA keys with excessively large moduli</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/ffd87b4878fa98ca2908ec534e1a410bf095a35e"><code>ffd87b4</code></a> ssh: fix panic when authority callbacks are nil</li> <li><a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/4e7a7384ecbc8d519f6f4c11b36fa9d761fc8946"><code>4e7a738</code></a> ssh: fix deadlock on unexpected global responses</li> <li>Additional commits viewable in <a href="https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.36.0...v0.52.0">compare view</a></li> </ul> </details> <br /> Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting `@dependabot rebase`. [//]: # (dependabot-automerge-start) [//]: # (dependabot-automerge-end) --- <details> <summary>Dependabot commands and options</summary> <br /> You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR: - `@dependabot rebase` will rebase this PR - `@dependabot recreate` will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it - `@dependabot show <dependency name> ignore conditions` will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency - `@dependabot ignore <dependency name> major version` will close this group update PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for the specific dependency's major version (unless you unignore this specific dependency's major version or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore <dependency name> minor version` will close this group update PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for the specific dependency's minor version (unless you unignore this specific dependency's minor version or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore <dependency name>` will close this group update PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for the specific dependency (unless you unignore this specific dependency or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot unignore <dependency name>` will remove all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency - `@dependabot unignore <dependency name> <ignore condition>` will remove the ignore condition of the specified dependency and ignore conditions You can disable automated security fix PRs for this repo from the [Security Alerts page](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/network/alerts). </details> Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-08 12:46:42 +02:00
4 people	d15b4e2da2	docs: create knowledge gap ID 34 (#12388) ... Automatically generated PR resolving Knowledge Gap ID 34. **Thread ID:** manual-1783339162398 **Action:** CREATE **New File:** `content/docs/drafts/gap-manual-1783339162398.mdx` ### AI Summary > Add a user migration guide for firebase to Zitadel ### Human Reviewer Instructions > Firebase to Zitadel Migration Summary > The Blocker: Incompatible Password Hashes > > Firebase uses a proprietary, modified scrypt algorithm requiring project-specific keys. > > Zitadel supports standard algorithms but lacks a verifier for Firebase's custom format. > > Result: Passwords cannot be directly imported. Firebase hashes must be discarded. > > Strategy 1: Bulk Import & Password Reset (Standard) > Requires users to set a new password on their first login. > > Export: Run firebase auth:export users.json --format=json. > > Map: Convert Firebase fields (e.g., localId) to Zitadel's schema. > > Import to Zitadel: Call the Zitadel import API. > > Action: Omit the hashedPassword object entirely. > > Action: Include "passwordChangeRequired": true in the JSON payload to trigger a reset flow via email or login prompt. > > Strategy 2: Just-In-Time (JIT) Migration (Seamless) > Migrates users transparently behind the scenes during an active grace period. > > Intercept Login: Your backend captures the plain-text password during login. > > Verify: Backend POSTs credentials to Firebase Auth REST API: > > https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/v1/accounts:signInWithPassword?key=[WEB_API_KEY] > > Migrate to Zitadel: > > If Valid (200 OK): Create the user in Zitadel immediately using the plain-text password (Zitadel will natively hash it). > > If Invalid (400): Reject login or check if the user is already in Zitadel. > > Sunset: After the grace period ends, migrate remaining inactive users using Strategy 1. > (Note: Do not log plain-text passwords and strictly enforce HTTPS during this phase). --- 🤖 **Need adjustments?** Leave a comment below and tag **@zitadel-knowledge-bot** with your requested changes, and I will automatically update the files and push a new commit! --------- Co-authored-by: zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot] <296006658+zitadel-knowledge-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>	2026-07-07 12:43:28 +00:00
3 people	bc9333aef9	chore: update npm dependencies (#12375) ... # Which Problems Are Solved - npm dependencies across the monorepo are behind current patch/minor releases. - Transitive dependencies are pinned to older versions by parent packages (karma, nx, @changesets/cli, etc.). - Console build fails after the Angular toolchain update because `angular.json` references assets outside the workspace root. # How the Problems Are Solved - Bumps `@angular/*` to `^21.2.17` in console. - Bumps `js-yaml` to `^4.2.0` in docs. - Bumps `concurrently` to `^10.0.3` in login. - Adds pnpm overrides for transitive deps that cannot be bumped directly (ws, undici, minimatch, esbuild, dompurify, qs, and others). # Additional Changes - Removes 10 overrides that are no longer needed after parent packages resolve to newer versions. - Updates 4 existing overrides (`tar`, `js-yaml`, `dompurify`, `brace-expansion`) to match current upstream ranges. - 2 low-severity findings remain via the abandoned `raw-loader` package in docs (peer dep resolution; no upstream fix without replacing `raw-loader`). - Fixes console build: replaced the `angular.json` asset glob `../apps/docs/public/img/tech` with a `prebuild` script that copies tech images into `src/assets/docs/img/tech`. **Verify at runtime that tech images on project grant / integration pages still load.** # Additional Context - Overrides remain where parent packages still pin older transitive versions. - The `angular.json` asset path issue predates this PR (not introduced by the Angular bump). --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-07-06 14:18:51 +00:00
3 people	1beabed8cf	fix(login): preserve org domain suffix through account chooser navigation (#12304) ... Closes #12024 # Which Problems Are Solved When the login flow is started with an `urn:zitadel:iam:org:domain:primary:{domain}` scope, the resolved domain suffix is lost if the user navigates through the account chooser (e.g. clicking "Use another account"). This causes the login to fail with "User not found" because the organization can no longer be resolved. Additionally, the `hideLoginNameSuffix` branding setting was never respected by the login app. # How the Problems Are Solved - Forward the `orgDomain` parameter through `gotoAccounts()` and the `/accounts` page, so it survives navigation to `/loginname` — the same way `organization` and `requestId` are already forwarded. - Respect `BrandingSettings.hideLoginNameSuffix`: when enabled, the `@domain.com` suffix is hidden from the input UI but still used internally for user search. --------- Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>	2026-07-03 16:25:20 +02:00