# Which Problems Are Solved
TOTP codes could be reused, violating [RFC 6238, section
5.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6238#section-5.2).
# How the Problems Are Solved
Transmitted codes are now recorded in each success event. As the codes
amount to secrets, they are not stored verbatim but as a randomly salted
HMAC-SHA256 (`crypto.HMACValue`). Each value gets a fresh random salt,
so an equal code always produces a different stored value and two
entries can never be recognized as being derived from the same code.
This is deliberately not a replacement for proper secret storage: with
the salt stored alongside the hash and a 6 digit payload, anyone with
event access can brute-force the code in milliseconds. That is
acceptable here because a code is worthless once its window has passed.
The `HMACValue` doc comment states the same.
TOTP codes are low-entropy (6 digits), pseudo random codes. Therefore it
is possible for the same code to be generated more than once over the
lifetime of a user. In order to prevent the (unlikely) case where users
login with large time intervalls and a generated code may be equal to
the one last used a long time ago, we only check for codes used within
the recent period window.
A simpler implementation would be simply storing the latest consumed
step, but the TOTP library does not return this value. Because of the
allowed skew there are always 3 steps within the validation window, so
we can't calculate the current step based on time alone. The retained
history spans one period more than the validation window: validity is
decided by the app server's clock, while the stored events carry the
database clock, and the extra period absorbs the drift between them.
**Note:** a reused code pushes a distinct
`user.human.mfa.otp.check.reused` event, not a failed check event. A
replay therefore stays observable through the Events API without
counting towards the lockout policy. Otherwise anyone who captured a
code could replay it to lock the user out.
# Additional Changes
- Read only the latest events in recheck query
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/6452
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
* fix: block Login V2 auth for users in deactivated organizations
Enforce organization state on session creation, OIDC token issuance/refresh,
and SAML session creation so deactivated org users cannot authenticate.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: reject claim serving for users in deactivated organizations
Require an active resource-owner org in OIDC userinfo and SAML attribute
paths, and use distinct error IDs for inactive user vs inactive org at
token issuance.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: drop sessions and tokens when an organization is deactivated
Mirror OrgRemoved cleanup for OrgDeactivated in the V2 session projection
and V1 auth user_session, token, and refresh_token handlers. Also delete
V2 sessions on OrgRemoved, which does not emit per-user removal events.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: reject API tokens from deactivated organizations
Check the caller's resource-owner org state in authz middleware via a
cached OrgByID lookup, so already-issued tokens lose ZITADEL API access
when their organization is deactivated. Return unauthenticated (401).
Target org remains unrestricted so instance admins can still manage
deactivated orgs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: invalidate OIDC refresh tokens after org deactivation
Reject refresh exchange if the user's organization was deactivated
after the refresh token was issued, so grants stay dead after reactivate.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: invalidate V2 access tokens after org deactivation
Treat OrgDeactivated after the token position as session termination in
ActiveAccessTokenByToken, so issued ATs stay dead after reactivation.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(command): enforce permission check when issuing passkey enrollment codes
addUserPasskeyCode - behind CreatePasskeyRegistrationLink via
AddUserPasskeyCode / AddUserPasskeyCodeURLTemplate / AddUserPasskeyCodeReturn -
issued a passkey enrollment code without any authorization check.
The RPC's auth annotation carries user.passkey.write with no org_field, so the
API interceptor only verifies the caller's permission in the org taken from the
caller-supplied x-zitadel-orgid header, never the org that owns the target user.
The gRPC handlers additionally pass an empty resourceOwner, and the write model
lookup is instance-wide, so the code was minted against the victim's aggregate
regardless of org. An org owner of one organization could therefore issue a
passkey enrollment code for a user in another organization, enroll an
attacker-controlled authenticator and take over the account.
Authorize against the target user's actual resource owner, resolved from the
write model, before pushing the code requested event.
The check uses user.passkey.write - the permission the RPC already declares -
rather than user.credential.write used by the sibling RegisterUserPasskey. This
narrows the organization the permission is evaluated in without narrowing the
set of roles that may call the endpoint: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds
user.passkey.write but not user.credential.write, and would otherwise lose the
endpoint instance-wide.
The enrollment code stays a bearer credential by design, so the unauthenticated
login flows redeeming it are unaffected; issuance is the only place this can be
enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(command): guard cross-org passkey enrollment code issuance
The existing AddUserPasskeyCode* tests all use an allowed permission check, so
none of them fails if the authorization is removed again.
Assert the denial path instead: with the caller passing an empty resourceOwner,
as the v2 gRPC handlers do, the check must receive the target user's real
resource owner resolved from the write model, and no event may be pushed.
Without the check in addUserPasskeyCode all three subtests fail, one of them on
an unexpected Push - a code would actually have been issued.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(user/v2): simulate cross-org passkey registration link attack
End-to-end reproduction against a live instance: an org owner of one
organization requests a passkey registration link, with the request-header org
pinned to its own org, for a user that lives in another organization. Uses the
return-code medium so a successful response would carry the plaintext code,
making a missing denial impossible to pass silently.
The second subtest pins the other half of the contract: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds
user.passkey.write instance-wide and must keep working across organizations, so
the fix cannot be tightened into user.credential.write without regressing it.
No equivalent test for user/v2beta: it shares the same internal/command layer
and is fixed by the same change, but the API is deprecated, so the duplicate is
deliberately omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* refactor(command): generate passkey code only after the permission check
Review feedback: the code ID and the passkey code - the latter costs an extra
eventstore filter for the secret generator config - were produced before the
permission check, so an unauthorized caller still paid for both.
The write model is now built with an empty code ID, which is equivalent for
the lookup: the ID only matches events of an already existing code, and a code
about to be created has none. It is assigned right after the check so the
pushed event is still appended to the write model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(command): enforce permission check on v1 passwordless init codes
The deprecated management RPCs AddPasswordlessRegistration and
SendPasswordlessRegistration accept an attacker-controlled user_id and pass the
caller's own organization to the command. That organization only scopes the
write model's read, not the write: for a user of another organization the read
matches nothing, the write model keeps the caller's organization, and on push
the eventstore re-owns the event to the target's real organization
(internal/eventstore/v3/sequence.go). An org admin could therefore mint a
passwordless enrollment link for a user of any other organization and, after
correcting the orgID in the returned link, take the account over.
Same class of flaw as the v2 CreatePasskeyRegistrationLink issue, but a
different command, so the earlier fix does not reach it. Copying that fix
verbatim would not close it either: authorizing against the write model's
resource owner would authorize against the attacker's own organization, where
they legitimately hold the permission. The check is instead handed an empty
resource owner, which makes it resolve the target's real owner from the
eventstore.
The check sits in the two exported commands rather than in the shared inner
function, for two reasons:
- the RPCs declare different permissions, user.credential.write and
user.write. Hardcoding one would either lock IAM_USER_MANAGER and
ORG_USER_MANAGER out of SendPasswordlessRegistration or widen
AddPasswordlessRegistration to them. Access is preserved exactly.
- the inner function is also called by importHuman while creating a user,
whose aggregate has no events yet and whose owner cannot be resolved.
Self management stays allowed, so the auth API's AddMyPasswordlessLink and
SendMyPasswordlessLink are unaffected, as is anonymous redemption of the code
through the login UI - the init code is a bearer credential by design and
issuance is the only place this can be enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(command): guard cross-org v1 passwordless init code issuance
Asserts the organization handed to checkPermission, not merely that a denial
happened. A caller acting in org1 targeting a user of org2 must be authorized
against org2; a test that only asserted PermissionDenied would pass against the
attacker's own organization, where they hold the permission - which is exactly
how a fix copied from the v2 command would fail.
Also pins the permission per command, so a later attempt to hoist the check
into the shared inner function shows up as roles gaining or losing access, and
asserts that self management still skips the check for the auth API.
Negative controls, both confirmed:
- authorizing against the caller-supplied resource owner: the two RPC
subtests fail on org1 != org2.
- dropping the check: they fail on an unexpected ID generation and an
unfulfilled resource owner lookup, i.e. a code would have been issued.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(management): simulate cross-org passwordless registration link attack
Reproduces the attack against a live instance through the deprecated v1
management API, and pins the two access guarantees the fix has to keep.
Verified by running the three builds against a real instance:
| build | cross-org denied | IAM_USER_MANAGER can send |
|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| no check | FAIL, link with | PASS |
| | plaintext code | |
| | returned | |
| user.credential.write for both | PASS | FAIL, AUTH-AWfge |
| per-RPC permissions (shipped) | PASS | PASS |
Row 1 is the vulnerability. Row 2 is why SendPasswordlessRegistration keeps
user.write: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds it instance wide, and instance memberships
resolve in every organization, so the stricter permission would take the
endpoint away from that role everywhere.
ORG_USER_MANAGER gets no separate case: it holds the same user.write through an
org-scoped membership, which the same-org subtest already covers. The auth API's
self-service equivalents have no integration test suite; they are covered by the
self-management unit test instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* chore: trigger checks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
- Native iOS/Android passkeys need OS trust files on the ZITADEL domain;
without them, Associated Domains / App Links verification fails.
- Operators could not configure iOS Team ID + Bundle ID or Android
package name + SHA-256 fingerprints on OIDC apps.
- `/.well-known/apple-app-site-association` and
`/.well-known/assetlinks.json` were not served from application config.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Add iOS/Android app-link fields on OIDC app create/update (Application
API v2 + Management), with validation.
- Persist and project those fields; query active app-link configs
instance-wide.
- Serve AASA (`webcredentials`) and Digital Asset Links
(`get_login_creds`) from well-known paths, with configurable
`Cache-Control` and fingerprint normalization at serve time.
- Console UI to edit the fields, with links to the well-known endpoints.
- Operator docs for configuration, endpoints, caching, and verification.
# Additional Changes
- Document on API fields that well-known responses may be HTTP-cached
and platform verifiers may delay propagation.
- Runtime config: `WellKnown.AppLinksCacheControlMaxAge` (default `5m`;
`0` → `no-store`).
# Additional Context
- Closes#12497
- Implemented and reviewed as stack:
- #12531 API contract
- #12532 storage wiring
- #12536 well-known endpoints
- #12537 console
- #12547 docs
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
#12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591),
but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself
afterwards:
- The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and
no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including
the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration.
- There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without
an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the
Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask
a human.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
(RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT`
and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same
`op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint.
## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch
The management endpoints are gated on the
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new
setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it
registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`,
exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does.
`allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply
here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints
in both modes.
## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else
RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token
issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user
credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token
it was handed:
| | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access
token |
| Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None |
Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create*
clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints.
One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two,
and there is no user identity to check against in the first place.
Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the
Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot
obtain a client's registration access token, by design.
Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a
client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is
checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another
client is rejected without touching the database.
## The token itself
- **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted,
through a new
`project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the
plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues
it.
- **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated
encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens.
The opaque token handed to the client encrypts
`client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before
checking the secret against the stored hash.
- **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into
the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent
fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted
before it is projected.
- **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when
the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates,
including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable
token back.
## Reusing the existing persistence
A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and
update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and
`oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`),
so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The
registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a
registered client is never left unmanageable.
# Additional Changes
- Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the
`apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event
modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the
relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep
in sync.
- The registration response (`POST`) now also carries
`registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`.
- Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client
registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization
model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management
endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page.
- Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update,
delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response
mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read,
update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to
another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is
disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token,
which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of
their own.
# Additional Context
- Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313
(RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main`
and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there.
- **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above
(registration access token only, no operator path through these
endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was
never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write`
also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that
is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`.
- Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous
token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is
projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore
fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where
revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the
guide and asserted as such in the integration test.
- A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No
proto change and no new feature flag.
- Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`,
`golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched
package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI
remains the check on it.
# Which Problems Are Solved
ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:
- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.
# How the Problems Are Solved
## Control plane: instance security settings
No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:
| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |
Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.
Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.
## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`
- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.
The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.
## Registration itself
- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.
# Additional Changes
- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).
# Additional Context
- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR adds support for using a ZITADEL IdP provider in the login v1 UI
flow and conditionally grants a support-user instance membership based
on a ZITADEL-specific project-roles token claim.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Introduced ZITADEL IdP handling in the login v1 handler, including
extracting the `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles` claim and granting
`IAM_OWNER_VIEWER` instance membership when configured orgs match.
- Added a new `AddInstanceMemberFromLogin` to assign an instance
membership during the login v1 ZITADEL-IdP flow without permission
checks (as the authorization is established based on the project roles
in the token claim)
- Added unit tests
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12446
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR extends the Settings Login API (v2 and v2beta) to include
ZITADEL IdP in the list of IdPs returned by `GetActiveIdentityProviders`
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added `IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` to Settings
IdentityProviderType enums (v2 and v2beta) and updated domain display
name handling.
- Updated Settings gRPC converters (v2 and v2beta) to map
`domain.IDPTypeZitadel` to the new proto enum value
- Added unit/integration tests
# Additional Changes
Correctly map `domain.IDPTypeApple` to
`IdentityProviderType_IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_APPLE` in v2beta instead of
unspecified.
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12401
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
* Use slices.Contains over custom function
* Correctly remove roles from granted roles
* fix(setup): repair user grants with stale roles (GHSA-v859-c572-qh5p)
Add setup step 73 that reconciles existing user grants whose roles were
left too broad by the buggy cascade removal in removeRoleFromUserGrant.
The corruption lives in the eventstore event payloads, so the step pushes
a corrective user.grant.cascade.changed event per affected grant (roles
intersected with the currently valid set) and re-triggers the user grant
projection. Runs in the second setup slice, after the projection tables
it reads have been created.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(setup): scope GHSA-v859-c572-qh5p repair to grant-based user grants
Direct user grants can never be hit by this bug (only ChangeProjectGrant's
multi-role cascade to grant-based grants can trigger it), so drop the
direct-grant branch from the finder query to avoid stripping unrelated,
legitimate roles that merely mismatch for other reasons (e.g. stale
role_key drift). Also exclude removed instances from the migration scope,
and log the number of grants fixed per instance.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Persisting instance-level Zitadel provider in the projections.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Defining a new projection table `projections.idp_templates6_zitadel`
and columns for the Zitadel provider
- Adding a reducer `reduceZitadelIDPAdded` to process instance-level
`ZitadelIDPAddedEvent`
- Unit tests
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11823
- Follow-up for PRs https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12018,
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12020
# Which Problems Are Solved
Opaque tokens now use authenticated encryption.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Upgrade zitadel/oidc to v3.47
- Copy crypto implementation for refresh and session tokens (internal to
zitadel)
- Added config that allows validating old tokens for gradual roll-out
# Additional Changes
- Set NX cache for `integration-test-build` to `false`, working on a
seperate fix.
# Additional Context
- closes#11315
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
`@zitadel/api:generate-go` failed due to duplicate generated files.
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11820 removed the old generated
file and added a generate command to the `internal/crypto/crypto.go`
file. However, there was already a `internal/crypto/generate.go` with a
different output file name (the old file).
# How the Problems Are Solved
Removed the `internal/crypto/generate.go` file and moved the second
generate into `internal/crypto/code.go`.
# Additional Changes
Noticed that mockgen is an old version and updated it. Also then checked
all other tools and updated them.
# Additional Context
- relates to #11820
- noted internally
# Which Problems Are Solved
As part of #11035 , this PR implements the Passkey check logic for
session validation
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Refactor webauth FinishLogin to support new domain model
- Add webauth config to defaults
- Implement passkey check logic and tests
- Manual transaction management to avoid stalling the DB while
FinishLogin callback is executed
- Update passkey Type condition to allow passing a text operation
(equal, contains, etc..)
# Additional Context
This is a cherry-picked PR + minor changes, coming from
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11164
- Relates to #11035
---------
Co-authored-by: Fabienne Bühler <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Gayathri Vijayan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Adding recovery code check step required for the CreateSession RT
implementation.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Introduce `RecoveryCodeCheckCommand` (validate/execute/events) for
session creation checks
- Add unit tests
# Additional Changes
- refactor password-check code to reuse a shared lockout-policy helper
- add some missing error translations in `internal/static/i18n/en.yaml`
# Additional Context
- Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11035
---------
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* fix: add `Scopes` to `Request` interface so that scopes can be validated on all requests
* feat: assert org from scope exists when authorizing requests
* fix: check all scopes
* comments
* check org on callback creation
* fix tests
* clarifications
* fix scope marshaling
* fix: enfore organization for authrequest in initiation
* fix: filter sessions on the accounts page by organization scope
* add integration tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Inconsistent naming of passkeys
# How the Problems Are Solved
translations are done using gemini
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
- Closes#11298
---------
Co-authored-by: Gayathri Vijayan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Zitadel did not provide easy correlation between errors, logs, traces
and metrics. The configuration for those instrumentations was also not
consistent, with some supporting different exporters then others.
Implementation and parsing of config was also spaghettified over
multiple packages, with awkward parsing and inconsistent naming of
options.
# How the Problems Are Solved
All telemetry is now merged under the name "instrumentation". Why?
1. We thought it was a good idea in the past to call the milestone
exporter `Telemtry` in the runtime config. Calling this `TelemetryV2`
looks weird.
2. Not everything is a meter and not everything is sent (tele...).
3. It's also
[defined](https://opentelemetry.io/docs/concepts/instrumentation/) as
such by the OTEL documentation.
## New features
- Adds structured, context based logging with trace-ID awareness
- Static log fields are added to the context, such as service and
request path
- Static log fields are injected in each logline emitted by the
application
- Structured logs can also be send to an otel exporter
- Structured logs can be printed to StdErr in text and JSON format
- Error sinks make sure every error is logged at the correct level:
- Warnings for client side errors (HTTP 400 range, Invalid request etc)
- Error for server side errors (Internal server errors)
- Metrics can now also be send to a OTEL collector. (previously they
could only be scraped from `/debug/metrics` with prometheus)
## Exporters
This change adds all the exporters supported by OTEL upstream and some
google specific exporters for our cloud deployment.
- StdOut / StdErr: all instrumentations
- OTEL gRPC / HTTP: all instrumentations
- Google: all instrumentations except logging
- Prometheus (pull-based): only metrics
The exception is profiling, which only supports the google exporting due
to lack of support by OTEL upstream.
## Configuration and structure
- All instrumentation is moved into the new `backend/v3/instrumentation`
package. It reuses configuration types, so both code and runtime
configuration are easier to understand.
- The `internal/telemetry` packages are removed.
- Instrumentation is started with a single function and a proper
shutdown function is now provided.
- Legacy configuration is still parsed from the runtime config, as long
as the new configuration is disabled. This allows backporting this
feature to v4 without breaking existing configurations.
# Additional Changes
- Devcontainer: set `$PATH` variable so installed go binaries can be run
individually, without NX.
- NX: install GCI tool to fix imports
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8408
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/6664
- Backport to v4
# Which Problems Are Solved
Zitadel only accepted ASCII email addresses, while some users need to
enter internationalized addresses. For example `mö[email protected]`
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Use `net/mail` to validate email addresses, instead of a custom regex.
`net/mail` correctly accepts UTF-8 characters.
- In the management/v1 API email address validation is removed (only
string limits are applied)
# Additional Changes
- none
# Additional Context
Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9821
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One-time recovery codes are a common multi-factor authentication (MFA)
backup method, letting users access their account if they lose other MFA
devices. Support for recovery codes can also reduce support burden for
users locked out of their accounts and provide a more secure and
reliable form of verification than security questions.
# Which Problems Are Solved
Zitadel currently lacks support for recovery codes.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR partially addresses recovery code support in Zitadel.
Importantly, it adds recovery codes as a new 2FA `Factor` and an
additional `Check` type for the Session API.
```
Example recovery code flow:
1. User generates N new recovery codes using `POST /v2/users/{user_id}/recovery_codes`
2. Zitadel hashes and stores these codes and returns the un-hashed codes in the response
3. User creates new session with an additional check: `recoveryCode`
4. Code is checked against hash and, if valid, cannot be used again
5. User attempts to adds N more codes using the same endpoint
6. If `remaining_codes + N <= RecoveryCodes->MaxCount` config value, then recovery codes are added in addition to original codes
7. User can remove all recovery codes using `DEL /v2/users/:userId/recovery_codes`
```
This PR adds:
- [x] Session recovery_code check support on `POST+PATCH /v2/sessions`
endpoints
- [x] Adds `mfa_recovery_code_checked_at` column (default null) to
`projections.sessions8` table
- [x] Support for `SECOND_FACTOR_TYPE_RECOVERY_CODES` as available 2FA
method on login policy
- [x] Support for importing recovery codes in /import code
Missing, will _not_ implement in this PR:
- [ ] Admin console support for displaying Recovery Code settings for
user(s)
- [ ] Zitadel Typescript login support for recovery codes
TODO:
- [x] Additional unit and integration tests
- [x] Error translations
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- Closes#6898
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
1. Adding users to user groups and removing users from user groups.
2. Searching for users in user groups by group IDs or user IDs
# How the Problems Are Solved
By adding:
1. The API definitions to manage users in users groups
3. The command-layer implementation of adding users/removing users
to/from user groups.
4. The projection table group_users1
5. Query-side implementation to search for users in user groups
# Additional Changes
1. Remove debug statements from unit tests.
2. Fix removal of groups when orgs are removed
3. Add unit tests for groups projection
# Additional Context
* Related to #9702
* Follow-up for PRs
* https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10455
* https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10758
* https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10853
# Which Problems Are Solved
As part of our efforts to simplify the structure and versions of our
APIs, were moving all existing v2beta endpoints to v2 and deprecate
them. They will be removed in Zitadel V5.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- This PR moves instance v2beta service and its endpoints to a
corresponding v2 version. The v2beta service and endpoints are
deprecated.
- The docs are moved to the new GA service and its endpoints. The v2beta
is not displayed anymore.
- The comments and have been improved and, where not already done, moved
from swagger annotations to proto.
- All required fields have been marked with (google.api.field_behavior)
= REQUIRED and validation rules have been added where missing
- `Domain` has been renamed to `CustomDomain` to align with naming
conventions
- `..Query` has been renamed to `..Filter` to align with other services
- The `instance_id` parameter can now passed on all endpoints and is
properly used, but requires `system` permissions. It can be omitted to
use the own instance (identified by context as any other service).
- The following endpoints are affected:
- GetInstance
- UpdateInstance
- ListCustomDomains
- AddTrustedDomain
- RemoveTrustedDomain
- ListTrustedDomains
- InstanceService has been added the InstanceInterceptor's
`explicitInstanceIdServices` to allow passing the id
- If the instance is not found by id, the error is not directly returned
to prevent enumeration.
- Permissions are checked in the API instead of the interceptor for
these calls.
- Setting the same instance name in the update no longer returns an
error, but the previous change date.
# Additional Changes
none
# Additional Context
- part of https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10772
- requires backport to v4.x
# Which Problems Are Solved
Ensuring the user group resource is managed with appropriate
permissions.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By configuring and checking for the relevant permissions needed to
create, read, update, and delete the user groups resource.
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to #9702
- Follow-up for PRs #10455, #10758
# Which Problems Are Solved
#9861 added a `urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles` claims to include all
roles from all requested roles. The intention was to return them on the
userinfo endpoint. But since the claims might also be returned in the id
and access tokens, they can grow big quite fast and break the size
limits for headers.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR revert the feature. The information for roles of other projects
is already available as a dedicated claim (for each project):
```json
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:328813096124547391:roles": {
"r2": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"r3": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
}
},
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:341406882914631999:roles": {
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost",
"328237605990695334": "aa.localhost"
},
"test": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost",
"328237605990695334": "aa.localhost"
}
},
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles": {
"r2": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"r3": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
}
}
```
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- relates to #9861
- noted issues in production
- requires backport to v4.x
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR adds API definition and backend implementation for GroupService
to manage user groups.
# How the Problems Are Solved
* API definition to create, update, retrieve, and delete groups is added
* Command-side implementation to create, update, and delete user groups
as part of the GroupV2 API is added
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to #10089, #9702 (parent ticket)
- User contribution: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9428/files
- Additional functionalities to list/search user groups, add
permissions, manage users in groups, group scopes will be added in
subsequent PRs.
- Also needs documentation, which will be added once the entire feature
is available
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The /userinfo endpoint only returns roles for the current project, even
if the access token includes multiple project aud scopes.
This prevents clients from retrieving all user roles across multiple
projects, making multi-project access control ineffective.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Modified the /userinfo handler logic to resolve roles across all valid
project audience scopes provided in the token, not just the current
project.
Ensured that if **urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles is in the scopes**,
roles from all declared project audiences are collected and included in
the response in **urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles claim**.
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
This change enables service-to-service authorization workflows and SPA
role resolution across multiple project contexts with a single token.
- Closes#9831
---------
Co-authored-by: Masum Patel <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Tim Möhlmann <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR fixes the self-management of users for metadata and own removal
and improves the corresponding permission checks.
While looking into the problems, I also noticed that there's a bug in
the metadata mapping when using `api.metadata.push` in actions v1 and
that re-adding a previously existing key after its removal was not
possible.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added a parameter `allowSelfManagement` to checkPermissionOnUser to
not require a permission if a user is changing its own data.
- Updated use of `NewPermissionCheckUserWrite` including prevention of
self-management for metadata.
- Pass permission check to the command side (for metadata functions) to
allow it implicitly for login v1 and actions v1.
- Use of json.Marshal for the metadata mapping (as with
`AppendMetadata`)
- Check the metadata state when comparing the value.
# Additional Changes
- added a variadic `roles` parameter to the `CreateOrgMembership`
integration test helper function to allow defining specific roles.
# Additional Context
- noted internally while testing v4.1.x
- requires backport to v4.x
- closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10470
- relates to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10426
# Which Problems Are Solved
The event execution system currently uses a projection handler that
subscribes to and processes all events for all instances. This creates a
high static cost because the system over-fetches event data, handling
many events that are not needed by most instances. This inefficiency is
also reflected in high "rows returned" metrics in the database.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Eliminate the use of a project handler. Instead, events for which
"execution targets" are defined, are directly pushed to the queue by the
eventstore. A Router is populated in the Instance object in the authz
middleware.
- By joining the execution targets to the instance, no additional
queries are needed anymore.
- As part of the instance object, execution targets are now cached as
well.
- Events are queued within the same transaction, giving transactional
guarantees on delivery.
- Uses the "insert many fast` variant of River. Multiple jobs are queued
in a single round-trip to the database.
- Fix compatibility with PostgreSQL 15
# Additional Changes
- The signing key was stored as plain-text in the river job payload in
the DB. This violated our [Secrets
Storage](https://zitadel.com/docs/concepts/architecture/secrets#secrets-storage)
principle. This change removed the field and only uses the encrypted
version of the signing key.
- Fixed the target ordering from descending to ascending.
- Some minor linter warnings on the use of `io.WriteString()`.
# Additional Context
- Introduced in https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9249
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10553
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9832
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10372
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10492
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
When a user with an `ORG_PROJECT_CREATOR` role tries to create a
project, the request fails with `No matching permissions found
(AUTH-AWfge)` error. This is because `project.write` was set as the
required permission instead of `project.create` during project creation.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By setting the right required permission (`project.create`) while
creating new projects.
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Closes#10399
# Which Problems Are Solved
Currently the username uniqueness is on instance level, we want to
achieve a way to set it at organization level.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Addition of endpoints and a resource on organization level, where this
setting can be managed. If nothing it set, the uniqueness is expected to
be at instance level, where only users with instance permissions should
be able to change this setting.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
Includes #10086Closes#9964
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
When adding 2 orgs with the same ID, you get a positive response from
the API, later when the org is projected, it errors due to the id
already in use
# How the Problems Are Solved
Check org with orgID specified does not already exist before adding
events
# Additional Changes
Added additional test case for adding same org with same name twice
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10127
---------
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The commands for the resource based v2beta AuthorizationService API are
added.
Authorizations, previously knows as user grants, give a user in a
specific organization and project context roles.
The project can be owned or granted.
The given roles can be used to restrict access within the projects
applications.
The commands for the resource based v2beta InteralPermissionService API
are added.
Administrators, previously knows as memberships, give a user in a
specific organization and project context roles.
The project can be owned or granted.
The give roles give the user permissions to manage different resources
in Zitadel.
API definitions from https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9165 are
implemented.
Contains endpoints for user metadata.
# How the Problems Are Solved
### New Methods
- CreateAuthorization
- UpdateAuthorization
- DeleteAuthorization
- ActivateAuthorization
- DeactivateAuthorization
- ListAuthorizations
- CreateAdministrator
- UpdateAdministrator
- DeleteAdministrator
- ListAdministrators
- SetUserMetadata to set metadata on a user
- DeleteUserMetadata to delete metadata on a user
- ListUserMetadata to query for metadata of a user
## Deprecated Methods
### v1.ManagementService
- GetUserGrantByID
- ListUserGrants
- AddUserGrant
- UpdateUserGrant
- DeactivateUserGrant
- ReactivateUserGrant
- RemoveUserGrant
- BulkRemoveUserGrant
### v1.AuthService
- ListMyUserGrants
- ListMyProjectPermissions
# Additional Changes
- Permission checks for metadata functionality on query and command side
- correct existence checks for resources, for example you can only be an
administrator on an existing project
- combined all member tables to singular query for the administrators
- add permission checks for command an query side functionality
- combined functions on command side where necessary for easier
maintainability
# Additional Context
Closes#9165
---------
Co-authored-by: Elio Bischof <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
We provide a seamless way to initialize Zitadel and the login together.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Additionally to the `IAM_OWNER` role, a set up admin user also gets the
`IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT` role if it is a machine user with a PAT.
# Additional Changes
- Simplifies the load balancing example, as the intermediate
configuration step is not needed anymore.
# Additional Context
- Depends on #10116
- Contributes to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel-charts/issues/332
- Contributes to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10016
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR *partially* addresses #9450 . Specifically, it implements the
resource based API for app keys.
This PR, together with https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10077
completes #9450 .
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Implementation of the following endpoints: `CreateApplicationKey`,
`DeleteApplicationKey`, `GetApplicationKey`, `ListApplicationKeys`
- `ListApplicationKeys` can filter by project, app or organization ID.
Sorting is also possible according to some criteria.
- All endpoints use permissions V2
# TODO
- [x] Deprecate old endpoints
# Additional Context
Closes#9450
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR *partially* addresses #9450 . Specifically, it implements the
resource based API for the apps. APIs for app keys ARE not part of this
PR.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- `CreateApplication`, `PatchApplication` (update) and
`RegenerateClientSecret` endpoints are now unique for all app types:
API, SAML and OIDC apps.
- All new endpoints have integration tests
- All new endpoints are using permission checks V2
# Additional Changes
- The `ListApplications` endpoint allows to do sorting (see protobuf for
details) and filtering by app type (see protobuf).
- SAML and OIDC update endpoint can now receive requests for partial
updates
# Additional Context
Partially addresses #9450
# Which Problems Are Solved
Permission checks in project v2beta API did not cover projects and
granted projects correctly.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add permission checks v1 correctly to the list queries, add correct
permission checks v2 for projects.
# Additional Changes
Correct Pre-Checks for project grants that the right resource owner is
used.
# Additional Context
Permission checks v2 for project grants is still outstanding under
#9972.
# Which Problems Are Solved
This pull request addresses a significant gap in the user service v2
API, which currently lacks methods for managing machine users.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR adds new API endpoints to the user service v2 to manage machine
users including their secret, keys and personal access tokens.
Additionally, there's now a CreateUser and UpdateUser endpoints which
allow to create either a human or machine user and update them. The
existing `CreateHumanUser` endpoint has been deprecated along the
corresponding management service endpoints. For details check the
additional context section.
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9349
## More details
- API changes: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9680
- Implementation: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9763
- Tests: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9771
## Follow-ups
- Metadata: support managing user metadata using resource API
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/10005
- Machine token type: support managing the machine token type (migrate
to new enum with zero value unspecified?)
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Add the ability to keep track of the current counts of projection
resources. We want to prevent calling `SELECT COUNT(*)` on tables, as
that forces a full scan and sudden spikes of DB resource uses.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- A resource_counts table is added
- Triggers that increment and decrement the counted values on inserts
and deletes
- Triggers that delete all counts of a table when the source table is
TRUNCATEd. This is not in the business logic, but prevents wrong counts
in case someone want to force a re-projection.
- Triggers that delete all counts if the parent resource is deleted
- Script to pre-populate the resource_counts table when a new source
table is added.
The triggers are reusable for any type of resource, in case we choose to
add more in the future.
Counts are aggregated by a given parent. Currently only `instance` and
`organization` are defined as possible parent. This can later be
extended to other types, such as `project`, should the need arise.
I deliberately chose to use `parent_id` to distinguish from the
de-factor `resource_owner` which is usually an organization ID. For
example:
- For users the parent is an organization and the `parent_id` matches
`resource_owner`.
- For organizations the parent is an instance, but the `resource_owner`
is the `org_id`. In this case the `parent_id` is the `instance_id`.
- Applications would have a similar problem, where the parent is a
project, but the `resource_owner` is the `org_id`
# Additional Context
Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9957
# Which Problems Are Solved
Currently if a user signs in using an IdP, once they sign out of
Zitadel, the corresponding IdP session is not terminated. This can be
the desired behavior. In some cases, e.g. when using a shared computer
it results in a potential security risk, since a follower user might be
able to sign in as the previous using the still open IdP session.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Admins can enabled a federated logout option on SAML IdPs through the
Admin and Management APIs.
- During the termination of a login V1 session using OIDC end_session
endpoint, Zitadel will check if an IdP was used to authenticate that
session.
- In case there was a SAML IdP used with Federated Logout enabled, it
will intercept the logout process, store the information into the shared
cache and redirect to the federated logout endpoint in the V1 login.
- The V1 login federated logout endpoint checks every request on an
existing cache entry. On success it will create a SAML logout request
for the used IdP and either redirect or POST to the configured SLO
endpoint. The cache entry is updated with a `redirected` state.
- A SLO endpoint is added to the `/idp` handlers, which will handle the
SAML logout responses. At the moment it will check again for an existing
federated logout entry (with state `redirected`) in the cache. On
success, the user is redirected to the initially provided
`post_logout_redirect_uri` from the end_session request.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- This PR merges the https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9841 and
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/9854 to main, additionally
updating the docs on Entra ID SAML.
- closes#9228
- backport to 3.x
---------
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Zach Hirschtritt <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Resource management of projects and sub-resources was before limited by
the context provided by the management API, which would mean you could
only manage resources belonging to a specific organization.
# How the Problems Are Solved
With the addition of a resource-based API, it is now possible to manage
projects and sub-resources on the basis of the resources themselves,
which means that as long as you have the permission for the resource,
you can create, read, update and delete it.
- CreateProject to create a project under an organization
- UpdateProject to update an existing project
- DeleteProject to delete an existing project
- DeactivateProject and ActivateProject to change the status of a
project
- GetProject to query for a specific project with an identifier
- ListProject to query for projects and granted projects
- CreateProjectGrant to create a project grant with project and granted
organization
- UpdateProjectGrant to update the roles of a project grant
- DeactivateProjectGrant and ActivateProjectGrant to change the status
of a project grant
- DeleteProjectGrant to delete an existing project grant
- ListProjectGrants to query for project grants
- AddProjectRole to add a role to an existing project
- UpdateProjectRole to change texts of an existing role
- RemoveProjectRole to remove an existing role
- ListProjectRoles to query for project roles
# Additional Changes
- Changes to ListProjects, which now contains granted projects as well
- Changes to messages as defined in the
[API_DESIGN](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/API_DESIGN.md)
- Permission checks for project functionality on query and command side
- Added testing to unit tests on command side
- Change update endpoints to no error returns if nothing changes in the
resource
- Changed all integration test utility to the new service
- ListProjects now also correctly lists `granted projects`
- Permission checks for project grant and project role functionality on
query and command side
- Change existing pre checks so that they also work resource specific
without resourceowner
- Added the resourceowner to the grant and role if no resourceowner is
provided
- Corrected import tests with project grants and roles
- Added testing to unit tests on command side
- Change update endpoints to no error returns if nothing changes in the
resource
- Changed all integration test utility to the new service
- Corrected some naming in the proto files to adhere to the API_DESIGN
# Additional Context
Closes#9177
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Actions v2 are not executed in different functions, as provided by the
actions v1.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add functionality to call actions v2 through OIDC and SAML logic to
complement tokens and SAMLResponses.
# Additional Changes
- Corrected testing for retrieved intent information
- Added testing for IDP types
- Corrected handling of context for issuer in SAML logic
# Additional Context
- Closes#7247
- Dependent on https://github.com/zitadel/saml/pull/97
- docs for migration are done in separate issue:
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9456
---------
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Some OAuth2 and OIDC providers require the use of PKCE for all their
clients. While ZITADEL already recommended the same for its clients, it
did not yet support the option on the IdP configuration.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- A new boolean `use_pkce` is added to the add/update generic OAuth/OIDC
endpoints.
- A new checkbox is added to the generic OAuth and OIDC provider
templates.
- The `rp.WithPKCE` option is added to the provider if the use of PKCE
has been set.
- The `rp.WithCodeChallenge` and `rp.WithCodeVerifier` options are added
to the OIDC/Auth BeginAuth and CodeExchange function.
- Store verifier or any other persistent argument in the intent or auth
request.
- Create corresponding session object before creating the intent, to be
able to store the information.
- (refactored session structs to use a constructor for unified creation
and better overview of actual usage)
Here's a screenshot showing the URI including the PKCE params:
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
- Closes#6449
- This PR replaces the existing PR (#8228) of @doncicuto. The base he
did was cherry picked. Thank you very much for that!
---------
Co-authored-by: Miguel Cabrerizo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The OAuth2 Device Authorization Grant could not yet been handled through
the new login UI, resp. using the session API.
This PR adds the ability for the login UI to get the required
information to display the user and handle their decision (approve with
authorization or deny) using the OIDC Service API.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added a `GetDeviceAuthorizationRequest` endpoint, which allows getting
the `id`, `client_id`, `scope`, `app_name` and `project_name` of the
device authorization request
- Added a `AuthorizeOrDenyDeviceAuthorization` endpoint, which allows to
approve/authorize with the session information or deny the request. The
identification of the request is done by the `device_authorization_id` /
`id` returned in the previous request.
- To prevent leaking the `device_code` to the UI, but still having an
easy reference, it's encrypted and returned as `id`, resp. decrypted
when used.
- Fixed returned error types for device token responses on token
endpoint:
- Explicitly return `access_denied` (without internal error) when user
denied the request
- Default to `invalid_grant` instead of `access_denied`
- Explicitly check on initial state when approving the reqeust
- Properly handle done case (also relates to initial check)
- Documented the flow and handling in custom UIs (according to OIDC /
SAML)
# Additional Changes
- fixed some typos and punctuation in the corresponding OIDC / SAML
guides.
- added some missing translations for auth and saml request
# Additional Context
- closes#6239
---------
Co-authored-by: Tim Möhlmann <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
OIDC applications can configure the used login version, which is
currently not possible for SAML applications.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add the same functionality dependent on the feature-flag for SAML
applications.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
Closes#9267
Follow up issue for frontend changes #9354
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Through configuration on projects, there can be additional permission
checks enabled through an OIDC or SAML flow, which were not included in
the OIDC and SAML services.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add permission check through the query-side of Zitadel in a singular SQL
query, when an OIDC or SAML flow should be linked to a SSO session. That
way it is eventual consistent, but will not impact the performance on
the eventstore. The permission check is defined in the API, which
provides the necessary function to the command side.
# Additional Changes
Added integration tests for the permission check on OIDC and SAML
service for every combination.
Corrected session list integration test, to content checks without
ordering.
Corrected get auth and saml request integration tests, to check for
timestamp of creation, not start of test.
# Additional Context
Closes#9265
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The current login will always prefer external authentication (through an
IdP) over local authentication. So as soon as either the user had
connected to an IdP or even when the login policy was just set up to
have an IdP allowed, users would be redirected to that IdP for
(re)authentication.
This could lead to problems, where the IdP was not available or any
other error occurred in the process (such as secret expired for
EntraID).
Even when local authentication (passkeys or password) was allowed for
the corresponding user, they would always be redirected to the IdP
again, preventing any authentication. If admins were affected, they
might not even be able to update the client secret of the IdP.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Errors during the external IdP flow are handled in an
`externalAuthFailed` function, which will check if the organisation
allows local authentication and if the user has set up such.
If either password or passkeys is set up, the corresponding login page
will be presented to the user. As already with local auth passkeys is
preferred over password authentication.
The user is informed that the external login failed and fail back to
local auth as an error on the corresponding page in a focused mode. Any
interaction or after 5 second the focus mode is disabled.
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
closes#6466
jmaretteandGitHub
gayathriandGitHub
