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* fix(login): prevent external-IDP account pre-hijack in Login V1 (GHSA-738m-7888-jfv8) The Login V1 endpoint POST /ui/login/externaluser/option (handleExternalNotFoundOptionCheck) built the new external user's identity and "verified" flags directly from raw POST fields, without checking the server-side authReq.LinkingUsers state that a genuine, protocol-verified IDP callback populates. An unauthenticated attacker could forge that POST to create a real account bound to an arbitrary (IDPConfigID, ExternalUserID) - enabling account pre-hijack of a third party whose public external identifier (e.g. a GitHub numeric user id) was used, so the victim's own future "Sign in with X" logs into the attacker's pre-created account. Primary fix: - Reject the request when authReq.LinkingUsers is empty, mirroring the guarded sibling autoCreateExternalUser. - Source IDPConfigID/ExternalUserID and the email/phone "verified" flags from the trusted linkingUser (the real callback data) instead of the form; the verified flag only survives when the editable value still matches the IDP's. Profile fields (name, nickname, language, edited email/phone) still come from the form, which is the page's legitimate purpose. Secondary hardening: - Treat the OAuth error/error_description callback params as untrusted so a forged GET .../externalidp/callback?error=... can no longer trigger the local-auth fallback (RequestLocalAuth) and undermine the IDP-first login priority. Genuine code-exchange failures keep their existing handling. Tests: - Unit test for mapExternalNotFoundOptionFormDataToLoginUser proving forged identity/verified fields are ignored in favor of the trusted callback data. - A //go:build integration end-to-end reproduction driving the forged registration over raw HTTP and asserting the account is not created. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): handle IDP error callback for logging, keep local-auth fallback Addresses review feedback (livio-a) on GHSA-738m-7888-jfv8: the OAuth error callback is not a security boundary. Blocking only the error= path added no protection (a garbage code triggers the same fallback), the downgrade only affects the attacker's own auth request, and a genuine IDP error on the callback should still fall back to local auth. - handleExternalLoginCallback: on an IDP error response, log it with context and route through externalAuthCallbackFailed so local-auth fallback still happens when the login policy allows it (previous behavior), instead of rendering a plain login error. The displayed message reuses the existing Errors.User.ExternalIDP.LoginFailedSwitchLocal via WrapIdPError. - Drop the now-unused Errors.ExternalIDP.AuthenticationFailed translation (would otherwise need all-language entries) and regenerate the login statik blob. - Reword the externalIDPCallbackData Error/ErrorDescription comment: logging-only, not a security decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>