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* feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check. This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account and then complete a login as the victim. Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is persisted. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a second factor on a victim's account. Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim. Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code (mail/onboarding) path is unchanged. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review (Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover: - The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link (the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused). - Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup / VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched. - The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack. Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack surface: - delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route (keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep), - make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only the init-code path, - drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup / VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup / HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service and the v2 passkey APIs). A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid code now falls through to the init-code path and fails. GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> * check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>