Files
zitadel/internal/domain/application_oidc.go
T
jmaretteandGitHub f34cc45eac feat(oidc): add RFC 7591 dynamic client registration (#12313)
# Which Problems Are Solved

ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:

- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.

# How the Problems Are Solved

## Control plane: instance security settings

No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:

| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |

Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.

Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.

## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`

- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.

The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.

## Registration itself

- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.

# Additional Changes

- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).

# Additional Context

- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
2026-07-30 14:43:47 +00:00

448 lines
14 KiB
Go

package domain
import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
http_util "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/http"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/eventstore/v1/models"
)
const (
httpScheme = "http://"
httpsScheme = "https://"
localhostHostname = "localhost"
)
type OIDCApp struct {
models.ObjectRoot
AppID string
AppName string
ClientID string
EncodedHash string
ClientSecretString string
RedirectUris []string
ResponseTypes []OIDCResponseType
GrantTypes []OIDCGrantType
ApplicationType *OIDCApplicationType
AuthMethodType *OIDCAuthMethodType
PostLogoutRedirectUris []string
OIDCVersion *OIDCVersion
Compliance *Compliance
DevMode *bool
AccessTokenType *OIDCTokenType
AccessTokenRoleAssertion *bool
IDTokenRoleAssertion *bool
IDTokenUserinfoAssertion *bool
ClockSkew *time.Duration
AdditionalOrigins []string
SkipNativeAppSuccessPage *bool
BackChannelLogoutURI *string
LoginVersion *LoginVersion
LoginBaseURI *string
State AppState
}
func (a *OIDCApp) GetApplicationName() string {
return a.AppName
}
func (a *OIDCApp) GetState() AppState {
return a.State
}
func (a *OIDCApp) setClientID(clientID string) {
a.ClientID = clientID
}
func (a *OIDCApp) setClientSecret(encodedHash string) {
a.EncodedHash = encodedHash
}
func (a *OIDCApp) requiresClientSecret() bool {
return a.AuthMethodType != nil && (*a.AuthMethodType == OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic || *a.AuthMethodType == OIDCAuthMethodTypePost)
}
type OIDCVersion int32
const (
OIDCVersionV1 OIDCVersion = iota
)
type OIDCResponseType int32
const (
OIDCResponseTypeUnspecified OIDCResponseType = iota - 1 // Negative offset not to break existing configs.
OIDCResponseTypeCode
OIDCResponseTypeIDToken
OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken
)
//go:generate enumer -type OIDCResponseMode -transform snake -trimprefix OIDCResponseMode
type OIDCResponseMode int
const (
OIDCResponseModeUnspecified OIDCResponseMode = iota
OIDCResponseModeQuery
OIDCResponseModeFragment
OIDCResponseModeFormPost
)
type OIDCGrantType int32
const (
OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode OIDCGrantType = iota
OIDCGrantTypeImplicit
OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken
OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode
OIDCGrantTypeTokenExchange
)
type OIDCApplicationType int32
const (
OIDCApplicationTypeWeb OIDCApplicationType = iota
OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent
OIDCApplicationTypeNative
)
type OIDCAuthMethodType int32
const (
OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic OIDCAuthMethodType = iota
OIDCAuthMethodTypePost
OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone
OIDCAuthMethodTypePrivateKeyJWT
)
type Compliance struct {
NoneCompliant bool
Problems []string
}
type OIDCTokenType int32
const (
OIDCTokenTypeBearer OIDCTokenType = iota
OIDCTokenTypeJWT
)
func (a *OIDCApp) IsValid() bool {
if (a.ClockSkew != nil && (*a.ClockSkew > time.Second*5 || *a.ClockSkew < time.Second*0)) || !a.OriginsValid() {
return false
}
grantTypes := a.getRequiredGrantTypes()
if len(grantTypes) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, grantType := range grantTypes {
ok := containsOIDCGrantType(a.GrantTypes, grantType)
if !ok {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (a *OIDCApp) OriginsValid() bool {
for _, origin := range a.AdditionalOrigins {
if !http_util.IsOrigin(strings.TrimSpace(origin)) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func ContainsRequiredGrantTypes(responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) bool {
required := RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(responseTypes, grantTypes)
return ContainsOIDCGrantTypes(required, grantTypes)
}
func RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, grantTypesSet []OIDCGrantType) (grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) {
var implicit bool
for _, r := range responseTypes {
switch r {
case OIDCResponseTypeCode:
// #5684 when "Device Code" is selected, "Authorization Code" is no longer a hard requirement
if !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypesSet, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) {
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode)
} else {
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode)
}
case OIDCResponseTypeIDToken, OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken:
if !implicit {
implicit = true
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit)
}
}
}
return grantTypes
}
func (a *OIDCApp) getRequiredGrantTypes() []OIDCGrantType {
return RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(a.ResponseTypes, a.GrantTypes)
}
func ContainsOIDCGrantTypes(shouldContain, list []OIDCGrantType) bool {
for _, should := range shouldContain {
if !containsOIDCGrantType(list, should) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, grantType OIDCGrantType) bool {
return slices.Contains(grantTypes, grantType)
}
func (a *OIDCApp) FillCompliance() {
a.Compliance = GetOIDCCompliance(a.OIDCVersion, a.ApplicationType, a.GrantTypes, a.ResponseTypes, a.AuthMethodType, a.RedirectUris)
}
func GetOIDCCompliance(version *OIDCVersion, appType *OIDCApplicationType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType, redirectUris []string) *Compliance {
if version != nil && *version == OIDCVersionV1 {
return GetOIDCV1Compliance(appType, grantTypes, authMethod, redirectUris)
}
return &Compliance{
NoneCompliant: true,
Problems: []string{"Application.OIDC.UnsupportedVersion"},
}
}
func GetOIDCV1Compliance(appType *OIDCApplicationType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType, redirectUris []string) *Compliance {
compliance := &Compliance{NoneCompliant: false}
checkGrantTypesCombination(compliance, grantTypes)
checkRedirectURIs(compliance, grantTypes, appType, redirectUris)
checkApplicationType(compliance, appType, authMethod)
if compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NotCompliant"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
return compliance
}
func checkGrantTypesCombination(compliance *Compliance, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) {
if !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken) && !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.GrantType.Refresh.NoAuthCode")
}
}
func checkRedirectURIs(compliance *Compliance, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
// See #5684 for OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode and redirectUris further explanation
if len(redirectUris) == 0 && (!containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) || (containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode))) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NoRedirectUris"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
} else {
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit) {
CheckRedirectUrisImplicit(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
}
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
CheckRedirectUrisCode(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
}
}
}
func checkApplicationType(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if appType != nil {
switch *appType {
case OIDCApplicationTypeNative:
GetOIDCV1NativeApplicationCompliance(compliance, authMethod)
case OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent:
GetOIDCV1UserAgentApplicationCompliance(compliance, authMethod)
case OIDCApplicationTypeWeb:
return
}
}
if compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NotCompliant"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
}
func GetOIDCV1NativeApplicationCompliance(compliance *Compliance, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if authMethod != nil && *authMethod != OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.AuthMethodType.NotNone")
}
}
func GetOIDCV1UserAgentApplicationCompliance(compliance *Compliance, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if authMethod != nil && *authMethod != OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.UserAgent.AuthMethodType.NotNone")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisCode(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.HttpOnlyForWeb")
}
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative && !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType != OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.CustomOnlyForNative")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisImplicit(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.CustomNotAllowed")
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
if !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
return
}
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.HttpNotAllowed")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType != OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.CustomNotAllowed")
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.HttpOnlyForWeb")
}
if !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
}
if !compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.NotAllCombinationsAreAllowed")
}
}
func urlsAreHttps(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpsScheme) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func urlContainsPrefix(uris []string, prefix string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if strings.HasPrefix(uri, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func containsCustom(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpScheme) && !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpsScheme) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// OIDCRedirectURIsRequireNative reports whether the given redirect URIs can only be
// compliant for a native application, because they use a custom scheme. It lets a caller
// that has to infer the application type (see the dynamic client registration endpoint)
// stay in agreement with CheckRedirectUrisCode and CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode, which
// reserve custom schemes for native applications.
func OIDCRedirectURIsRequireNative(redirectURIs []string) bool {
return containsCustom(redirectURIs)
}
// onlyLocalhostIsHttp returns true if:
//
// - input string slice is empty
// - all parseable URIs with scheme `http` in the string slice are localhost/loopback URIs (in all possible forms)
//
// It will return false if:
// - any of the input URIs cannot be parsed
// - any of the parseable input URIs with scheme `http` is not localhost/loopback
func onlyLocalhostIsHttp(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
url, err := url.ParseRequestURI(uri)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if url.Scheme == "http" {
hostname := url.Hostname()
if hostname == localhostHostname {
continue
}
address, err := netip.ParseAddr(hostname)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if address.IsLoopback() {
continue
}
return false
}
}
return true
}
func OIDCOriginAllowList(redirectURIs, additionalOrigins []string) ([]string, error) {
allowList := make([]string, 0)
for _, redirect := range redirectURIs {
origin, err := http_util.GetOriginFromURLString(redirect)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !http_util.IsOriginAllowed(allowList, origin) {
allowList = append(allowList, origin)
}
}
for _, origin := range additionalOrigins {
if !http_util.IsOriginAllowed(allowList, origin) {
allowList = append(allowList, origin)
}
}
return allowList, nil
}