Files
zitadel/internal/api/oidc/integration_test/client_registration_test.go
T
jmaretteandGitHub f34cc45eac feat(oidc): add RFC 7591 dynamic client registration (#12313)
# Which Problems Are Solved

ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:

- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.

# How the Problems Are Solved

## Control plane: instance security settings

No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:

| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |

Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.

Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.

## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`

- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.

The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.

## Registration itself

- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.

# Additional Changes

- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).

# Additional Context

- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
2026-07-30 14:43:47 +00:00

252 lines
9.8 KiB
Go

//go:build integration
package oidc_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/zitadel/oidc/v3/pkg/oidc"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/domain"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/integration"
oidc_pb "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pkg/grpc/oidc/v2"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pkg/grpc/settings/v2"
)
// TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration covers the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
// endpoint (RFC 7591) in open mode, where no access token is required.
func TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration(t *testing.T) {
issuer := Instance.OIDCIssuer()
enableDynamicClientRegistration(t, CTXIAM, Instance, true)
t.Run("discovery advertises the registration endpoint", func(t *testing.T) {
discovery := fetchDiscovery(t, issuer)
assert.Equal(t, issuer+"/oauth/v2/register", discovery.RegistrationEndpoint)
})
t.Run("public client without secret, usable for authorization code with PKCE", func(t *testing.T) {
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", map[string]any{
"client_name": "integration public client",
"redirect_uris": []string{redirectURI},
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none",
})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusCreated, status)
clientID, _ := body["client_id"].(string)
require.NotEmpty(t, clientID)
assert.Empty(t, body["client_secret"])
// The returned client_id must be usable for an authorization code + PKCE flow.
// The client and its dedicated project were just created, so wait for the
// projection to catch up before starting the authorization flow.
var authRequestID string
retryDuration, tick := integration.WaitForAndTickWithMaxDuration(CTX, time.Minute)
require.EventuallyWithT(t, func(tt *assert.CollectT) {
_, id, err := Instance.CreateOIDCAuthRequest(CTX, clientID, Instance.Users.Get(integration.UserTypeLogin).ID, redirectURI, oidc.ScopeOpenID)
assert.NoError(tt, err)
authRequestID = id
}, retryDuration, tick, "registered client not usable for authorization")
sessionID, sessionToken, _, _ := Instance.CreateVerifiedWebAuthNSession(t, CTXLOGIN, User.GetUserId())
linkResp, err := Instance.Client.OIDCv2.CreateCallback(CTXLOGIN, &oidc_pb.CreateCallbackRequest{
AuthRequestId: authRequestID,
CallbackKind: &oidc_pb.CreateCallbackRequest_Session{
Session: &oidc_pb.Session{
SessionId: sessionID,
SessionToken: sessionToken,
},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
code := assertCodeResponse(t, linkResp.GetCallbackUrl())
tokens, err := exchangeTokens(t, Instance, clientID, code, redirectURI)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, tokens.AccessToken)
// An Authorization header is always treated as a registration token, even with open
// registration enabled: the request must not fall back to anonymous registration.
// This token belongs to an ordinary user without project.app.register_dynamic, so
// it is rejected rather than silently registering a client.
tokenStatus, tokenBody := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, tokens.AccessToken, map[string]any{
"client_name": "integration token-mode client",
"redirect_uris": []string{redirectURI},
})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, tokenStatus)
assert.Equal(t, "insufficient_scope", tokenBody["error"])
assert.Empty(t, tokenBody["client_id"])
})
t.Run("confidential client returns a secret", func(t *testing.T) {
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", map[string]any{
"client_name": "integration confidential client",
"redirect_uris": []string{redirectURI},
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusCreated, status)
assert.NotEmpty(t, body["client_id"])
assert.NotEmpty(t, body["client_secret"])
})
t.Run("invalid redirect uri is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", map[string]any{
"redirect_uris": []string{"myapp://callback"},
"application_type": "web",
})
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, status)
assert.Equal(t, "invalid_redirect_uri", body["error"])
})
t.Run("malformed request body is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, issuer+"/oauth/v2/register", bytes.NewReader([]byte("{not valid json")))
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer resp.Body.Close()
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, resp.StatusCode)
})
t.Run("missing redirect uri is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", map[string]any{
"client_name": "no redirects",
})
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, status)
assert.Equal(t, "invalid_redirect_uri", body["error"])
})
}
// TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration_tokenMode covers the default mode, where a caller
// must present an access token whose user holds project.app.register_dynamic in the token's
// organization.
func TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration_tokenMode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
instance := integration.NewInstance(ctx)
iamCTX := instance.WithAuthorization(ctx, integration.UserTypeIAMOwner)
issuer := instance.OIDCIssuer()
enableDynamicClientRegistration(t, iamCTX, instance, false)
metadata := map[string]any{
"client_name": "token mode client",
"redirect_uris": []string{redirectURI},
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none",
}
t.Run("without a token registration is unauthorized", func(t *testing.T) {
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", metadata)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, status)
assert.Equal(t, "invalid_token", body["error"])
})
t.Run("a token without the permission is forbidden", func(t *testing.T) {
_, pat, err := instance.CreateMachineUserPATWithMembership(iamCTX)
require.NoError(t, err)
status, body := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, pat, metadata)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, status)
assert.Equal(t, "insufficient_scope", body["error"])
})
// The dedicated least-privilege role carries project.app.register_dynamic and nothing
// else, so it is enough on its own to register a client.
t.Run("a token with ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR may register", func(t *testing.T) {
_, pat, err := instance.CreateMachineUserPATWithMembership(iamCTX, domain.RoleOrgDynamicClientRegistrar)
require.NoError(t, err)
var body map[string]any
retryDuration, tick := integration.WaitForAndTickWithMaxDuration(ctx, time.Minute)
require.EventuallyWithT(t, func(tt *assert.CollectT) {
var status int
status, body = registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, pat, metadata)
assert.Equal(tt, http.StatusCreated, status)
}, retryDuration, tick, "membership not effective for registration")
assert.NotEmpty(t, body["client_id"])
})
}
// TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration_disabled verifies that with the setting off the
// endpoint is neither advertised nor served.
func TestServer_DynamicClientRegistration_disabled(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
instance := integration.NewInstance(ctx)
issuer := instance.OIDCIssuer()
discovery := fetchDiscovery(t, issuer)
assert.Empty(t, discovery.RegistrationEndpoint)
status, _ := registerDynamicClient(t, issuer, "", map[string]any{
"redirect_uris": []string{redirectURI},
})
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, status)
}
// enableDynamicClientRegistration turns the endpoint on through the instance's security
// settings and waits until the change is observable, i.e. until the projection behind the
// cached instance has caught up and discovery advertises the endpoint.
func enableDynamicClientRegistration(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, instance *integration.Instance, allowUnauthenticated bool) {
t.Helper()
_, err := instance.Client.SettingsV2.SetSecuritySettings(ctx, &settings.SetSecuritySettingsRequest{
DynamicClientRegistration: &settings.DynamicClientRegistrationSettings{
Enabled: true,
AllowUnauthenticated: allowUnauthenticated,
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
issuer := instance.OIDCIssuer()
retryDuration, tick := integration.WaitForAndTickWithMaxDuration(ctx, time.Minute)
require.EventuallyWithT(t, func(tt *assert.CollectT) {
resp, err := http.Get(issuer + "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
if !assert.NoError(tt, err) {
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var discovery oidc.DiscoveryConfiguration
if !assert.NoError(tt, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&discovery)) {
return
}
assert.Equal(tt, issuer+"/oauth/v2/register", discovery.RegistrationEndpoint)
}, retryDuration, tick, "registration endpoint not advertised")
}
func registerDynamicClient(t testing.TB, issuer, accessToken string, metadata map[string]any) (int, map[string]any) {
t.Helper()
raw, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
require.NoError(t, err)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, issuer+"/oauth/v2/register", bytes.NewReader(raw))
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if accessToken != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+accessToken)
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
}()
var body map[string]any
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body)
return resp.StatusCode, body
}
func fetchDiscovery(t testing.TB, issuer string) oidc.DiscoveryConfiguration {
t.Helper()
resp, err := http.Get(issuer + "/.well-known/openid-configuration")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer resp.Body.Close()
var discovery oidc.DiscoveryConfiguration
require.NoError(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&discovery))
return discovery
}