Files
zitadel/internal/api/oidc/client_registration.go
T
jmaretteandGitHub f34cc45eac feat(oidc): add RFC 7591 dynamic client registration (#12313)
# Which Problems Are Solved

ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:

- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.

# How the Problems Are Solved

## Control plane: instance security settings

No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:

| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |

Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.

Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.

## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`

- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.

The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.

## Registration itself

- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.

# Additional Changes

- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).

# Additional Context

- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
2026-07-30 14:43:47 +00:00

560 lines
23 KiB
Go

package oidc
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/muhlemmer/gu"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/authz"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/command"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/domain"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/query"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/zerrors"
)
// registrationMaxBodyBytes bounds the size of a dynamic client registration request body.
const registrationMaxBodyBytes = 100 * 1024
// dynamicClientRegistration handles POST requests to the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client
// Registration endpoint (RFC 7591). The route is always mounted; it only registers clients
// when dynamic client registration is enabled in the instance's security settings,
// otherwise it behaves as if the endpoint did not exist.
func (s *Server) dynamicClientRegistration(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
if !authz.GetInstance(ctx).EnableDynamicClientRegistration() {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ctx, resourceOwner, err := s.dynamicClientRegistrationResourceOwner(ctx, r)
if err != nil {
switch {
// The caller authenticated but is not allowed to register clients: RFC 6750 §3.1
// insufficient_scope, rather than pretending the token itself is invalid.
case errors.Is(err, errRegistrationForbidden):
s.writeRegistrationForbidden(ctx, w)
// Only missing/invalid credentials are a 401; unexpected errors (e.g. a failed
// token lookup) must not be masked as invalid_token.
case zerrors.IsUnauthenticated(err), zerrors.IsPermissionDenied(err):
s.writeRegistrationUnauthorized(ctx, w)
default:
s.writeRegistrationServerError(ctx, w, err)
}
return
}
var req clientRegistrationRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, registrationMaxBodyBytes)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
var maxBytesErr *http.MaxBytesError
if errors.As(err, &maxBytesErr) {
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "the request body is too large"))
return
}
s.writeRegistrationError(ctx, w, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "the request body could not be parsed"))
return
}
app, regErr := req.toOIDCApp()
if regErr != nil {
s.writeRegistrationError(ctx, w, regErr)
return
}
projectID, err := s.ensureDCRProject(ctx, resourceOwner)
if err != nil {
s.writeRegistrationServerError(ctx, w, err)
return
}
registered, err := s.command.AddDynamicOIDCClient(ctx, projectID, resourceOwner, app)
if err != nil {
s.writeRegistrationCommandError(ctx, w, err)
return
}
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusCreated, newClientRegistrationResponse(registered, req.ClientName, time.Now().Unix()))
}
// dynamicClientRegistrationResourceOwner authorizes the registration and returns the
// organization the client is homed in.
//
// In token mode (the default) the caller presents an access token, the client is homed in
// the token's organization and the token's user must hold the org-scoped
// project.app.register_dynamic permission there. That permission is deliberately not
// project.app.write: a service user can be allowed to self-register clients — through the
// dedicated ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR role — without gaining write access to existing
// applications.
//
// In open mode (allow_unauthenticated in the instance's security settings) no token is
// required and no permission is checked, as required by the Model Context Protocol flow.
// Those clients are homed in the instance's default organization.
//
// The check runs before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning of the
// organization's dedicated DCR project.
func (s *Server) dynamicClientRegistrationResourceOwner(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) (context.Context, string, error) {
token := bearerToken(r)
if token == "" {
if !authz.GetInstance(ctx).AllowUnauthenticatedDynamicClientRegistration() {
return ctx, "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "OIDC-Eich8", "Errors.Token.Invalid")
}
return ctx, authz.GetInstance(ctx).DefaultOrganisationID(), nil
}
accessToken, err := s.verifyAccessToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return ctx, "", err
}
// The permission check resolves the caller's memberships from the context, which the
// OIDC endpoints do not populate: unlike the gRPC APIs they are not behind the
// authorization interceptor. Derive it from the verified token, as the token exchange
// does for the impersonating actor.
ctx = authz.SetCtxData(ctx, authz.CtxData{
UserID: accessToken.userID,
OrgID: accessToken.resourceOwner,
})
if err := s.command.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient(ctx, accessToken.resourceOwner); err != nil {
// verifyAccessToken also reports invalid tokens as permission denied, so mark the
// authorization failure explicitly to keep 401 and 403 apart.
return ctx, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errRegistrationForbidden, err)
}
return ctx, accessToken.resourceOwner, nil
}
// errRegistrationForbidden marks a caller that presented a valid access token but does not
// hold the project.app.register_dynamic permission in the token's organization.
var errRegistrationForbidden = errors.New("dynamic client registration not permitted")
// ensureDCRProject returns the dedicated project that holds dynamically registered clients
// for the organization, creating it on first use. The common case (the project already
// exists) is served from the projection; the creation and the concurrent-creation race are
// delegated to the command, which resolves them strongly consistently from the eventstore.
func (s *Server) ensureDCRProject(ctx context.Context, resourceOwner string) (string, error) {
projectID, err := s.dcrProjectIDFromProjection(ctx, resourceOwner)
if err != nil || projectID != "" {
return projectID, err
}
return s.command.EnsureDCRProject(ctx, resourceOwner)
}
func (s *Server) dcrProjectIDFromProjection(ctx context.Context, resourceOwner string) (string, error) {
nameQuery, err := query.NewProjectNameSearchQuery(query.TextEquals, command.DCRProjectName)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
ownerQuery, err := query.NewProjectResourceOwnerSearchQuery(resourceOwner)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// No permission check: access to the registration endpoint is the authorization
// boundary for dynamic client registration.
projects, err := s.query.SearchProjects(ctx, &query.ProjectSearchQueries{Queries: []query.SearchQuery{nameQuery, ownerQuery}}, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if len(projects.Projects) == 0 {
return "", nil
}
return projects.Projects[0].ID, nil
}
func bearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
scheme, token, found := strings.Cut(auth, " ")
if !found || !strings.EqualFold(scheme, "Bearer") {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(token)
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationJSON(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body); err != nil {
s.getLogger(ctx).ErrorContext(ctx, "dynamic client registration: encode response", "err", err)
}
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationError(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, regErr *registrationError) {
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusBadRequest, regErr)
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationUnauthorized(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter) {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer error="invalid_token"`)
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusUnauthorized, newRegistrationError("invalid_token", "a valid access token is required to register a client"))
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationForbidden(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter) {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer error="insufficient_scope"`)
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusForbidden, newRegistrationError("insufficient_scope", "the access token is not allowed to register clients"))
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationServerError(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
s.getLogger(ctx).ErrorContext(ctx, "dynamic client registration", "err", err)
s.writeRegistrationJSON(ctx, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, newRegistrationError("server_error", "the client could not be registered"))
}
func (s *Server) writeRegistrationCommandError(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
if zerrors.IsErrorInvalidArgument(err) {
s.writeRegistrationError(ctx, w, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "the requested client metadata is not supported"))
return
}
s.writeRegistrationServerError(ctx, w, err)
}
// OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration error codes as defined in RFC 7591 §3.2.2.
const (
registrationErrorInvalidRedirectURI = "invalid_redirect_uri"
registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata = "invalid_client_metadata"
)
// registrationError is an OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration error response
// (RFC 7591 §3.2.2). Invalid client metadata is returned with HTTP status 400; the same
// shape is reused for the 401 (invalid_token) and 500 (server_error) responses.
type registrationError struct {
ErrorType string `json:"error"`
ErrorDescription string `json:"error_description,omitempty"`
}
func (e *registrationError) Error() string {
if e.ErrorDescription == "" {
return e.ErrorType
}
return e.ErrorType + ": " + e.ErrorDescription
}
func newRegistrationError(errorType, description string) *registrationError {
return &registrationError{ErrorType: errorType, ErrorDescription: description}
}
// clientRegistrationRequest holds the client metadata of an OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client
// Registration request (RFC 7591 §2, extended by OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
// Registration 1.0 §2). Only the members relevant for a ZITADEL OIDC application are
// interpreted. Free-form metadata (client_uri, logo_uri, contacts, etc.) is accepted but
// not persisted in this version. Members that imply unsupported behaviour (jwks/jwks_uri,
// private_key_jwt) are rejected explicitly.
type clientRegistrationRequest struct {
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris,omitempty"`
ResponseTypes []string `json:"response_types,omitempty"`
GrantTypes []string `json:"grant_types,omitempty"`
ApplicationType string `json:"application_type,omitempty"`
ClientName string `json:"client_name,omitempty"`
TokenEndpointAuthMethod string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_method,omitempty"`
PostLogoutRedirectURIs []string `json:"post_logout_redirect_uris,omitempty"`
JWKsURI string `json:"jwks_uri,omitempty"`
JWKs json.RawMessage `json:"jwks,omitempty"`
}
// clientRegistrationResponse is the client information response of a successful
// registration (RFC 7591 §3.2.1).
type clientRegistrationResponse struct {
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret,omitempty"`
ClientIDIssuedAt int64 `json:"client_id_issued_at,omitempty"`
ClientSecretExpiresAt *int64 `json:"client_secret_expires_at,omitempty"`
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris,omitempty"`
ResponseTypes []string `json:"response_types,omitempty"`
GrantTypes []string `json:"grant_types,omitempty"`
ApplicationType string `json:"application_type,omitempty"`
ClientName string `json:"client_name,omitempty"`
TokenEndpointAuthMethod string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_method,omitempty"`
PostLogoutRedirectURIs []string `json:"post_logout_redirect_uris,omitempty"`
}
// toOIDCApp maps the registration request to a domain OIDC application, applying the RFC
// 7591 defaults and rejecting unsupported metadata. The returned application is not yet
// persisted; the application name and the client credentials are assigned by the command.
func (req *clientRegistrationRequest) toOIDCApp() (*domain.OIDCApp, *registrationError) {
if req.JWKsURI != "" || len(req.JWKs) > 0 {
return nil, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "jwks and jwks_uri are not supported")
}
redirectURIs := trimSpaceSlice(req.RedirectURIs)
if len(redirectURIs) == 0 {
return nil, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidRedirectURI, "at least one redirect_uri is required")
}
applicationType, regErr := registrationApplicationTypeToDomain(req.ApplicationType, redirectURIs)
if regErr != nil {
return nil, regErr
}
authMethod, regErr := registrationAuthMethodToDomain(req.TokenEndpointAuthMethod, applicationType)
if regErr != nil {
return nil, regErr
}
grantTypes, regErr := registrationGrantTypesToDomain(req.GrantTypes)
if regErr != nil {
return nil, regErr
}
responseTypes, regErr := registrationResponseTypesToDomain(req.ResponseTypes)
if regErr != nil {
return nil, regErr
}
app := &domain.OIDCApp{
AppName: strings.TrimSpace(req.ClientName),
RedirectUris: redirectURIs,
ResponseTypes: responseTypes,
GrantTypes: grantTypes,
ApplicationType: gu.Ptr(applicationType),
AuthMethodType: gu.Ptr(authMethod),
PostLogoutRedirectUris: trimSpaceSlice(req.PostLogoutRedirectURIs),
OIDCVersion: gu.Ptr(domain.OIDCVersionV1),
AccessTokenType: gu.Ptr(domain.OIDCTokenTypeBearer),
}
if !app.IsValid() {
return nil, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "the requested grant and response type combination is not supported")
}
if compliance := domain.GetOIDCV1Compliance(app.ApplicationType, app.GrantTypes, app.AuthMethodType, app.RedirectUris); compliance.NoneCompliant {
return nil, registrationComplianceError(compliance)
}
return app, nil
}
// registrationComplianceError maps a domain compliance failure to the matching RFC 7591
// error. Auth-method and grant/response combination problems are client metadata errors;
// redirect URI scheme problems are reported as an invalid redirect URI. The internal
// compliance keys (see internal/domain/application_oidc.go) are not exposed to the client.
func registrationComplianceError(compliance *domain.Compliance) *registrationError {
for _, problem := range compliance.Problems {
if strings.Contains(problem, "AuthMethodType") || strings.Contains(problem, "GrantType") || strings.Contains(problem, "Combinations") {
return newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "the requested client metadata is not supported")
}
}
return newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidRedirectURI, "one or more redirect_uris are invalid for the requested application type")
}
func registrationAuthMethodToDomain(method string, applicationType domain.OIDCApplicationType) (domain.OIDCAuthMethodType, *registrationError) {
switch method {
case "":
// Default the auth method to the application type. Native and user-agent
// applications must be public (none); web applications default to
// client_secret_basic per RFC 7591 §2.
if applicationType == domain.OIDCApplicationTypeNative || applicationType == domain.OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent {
return domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone, nil
}
return domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic, nil
case "client_secret_basic":
return domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic, nil
case "client_secret_post":
return domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypePost, nil
case "none":
return domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone, nil
default:
return 0, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "token_endpoint_auth_method "+method+" is not supported")
}
}
func registrationGrantTypesToDomain(grantTypes []string) ([]domain.OIDCGrantType, *registrationError) {
if len(grantTypes) == 0 {
// RFC 7591 §2: authorization_code is the default.
return []domain.OIDCGrantType{domain.OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode}, nil
}
mapped := make([]domain.OIDCGrantType, 0, len(grantTypes))
for _, grantType := range grantTypes {
switch grantType {
case "authorization_code":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode)
case "refresh_token":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken)
case "implicit":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCGrantTypeImplicit)
case "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode)
case "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCGrantTypeTokenExchange)
default:
return nil, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "grant_type "+grantType+" is not supported")
}
}
return mapped, nil
}
func registrationResponseTypesToDomain(responseTypes []string) ([]domain.OIDCResponseType, *registrationError) {
if len(responseTypes) == 0 {
// RFC 7591 §2: code is the default.
return []domain.OIDCResponseType{domain.OIDCResponseTypeCode}, nil
}
mapped := make([]domain.OIDCResponseType, 0, len(responseTypes))
for _, responseType := range responseTypes {
switch normalizeResponseType(responseType) {
case "code":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCResponseTypeCode)
case "id_token":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCResponseTypeIDToken)
case "id_token token":
mapped = append(mapped, domain.OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken)
default:
return nil, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "response_type "+responseType+" is not supported")
}
}
return mapped, nil
}
// normalizeResponseType sorts the space separated values of a response_type so that the
// order of "token" and "id_token" does not matter.
func normalizeResponseType(responseType string) string {
fields := strings.Fields(responseType)
hasToken, hasIDToken, hasCode := false, false, false
for _, field := range fields {
switch field {
case "token":
hasToken = true
case "id_token":
hasIDToken = true
case "code":
hasCode = true
}
}
switch {
case hasCode && !hasToken && !hasIDToken:
return "code"
case hasIDToken && hasToken && !hasCode:
return "id_token token"
case hasIDToken && !hasToken && !hasCode:
return "id_token"
default:
return strings.Join(fields, " ")
}
}
// registrationApplicationTypeToDomain resolves the application type of a registration
// request. An explicit application_type is always honoured; it is only inferred when the
// member is absent.
//
// OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 §2 defaults to web, but application_type is
// an OpenID Connect member: clients that only implement RFC 7591, which does not define it,
// omit it. Native hosts doing so (Cursor and other MCP clients) register custom-scheme
// redirect URIs, which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, so the web default would
// reject them for a redirect URI that is in fact valid for what they are. Infer native in
// exactly that case; everything that is accepted today keeps its current type.
func registrationApplicationTypeToDomain(applicationType string, redirectURIs []string) (domain.OIDCApplicationType, *registrationError) {
switch applicationType {
case "":
if domain.OIDCRedirectURIsRequireNative(redirectURIs) {
return domain.OIDCApplicationTypeNative, nil
}
return domain.OIDCApplicationTypeWeb, nil
case "web":
return domain.OIDCApplicationTypeWeb, nil
case "native":
return domain.OIDCApplicationTypeNative, nil
default:
return 0, newRegistrationError(registrationErrorInvalidClientMetadata, "application_type "+applicationType+" is not supported")
}
}
// newClientRegistrationResponse builds the RFC 7591 §3.2.1 response from the registered
// application. The client name is echoed from the request, as the human-readable name is
// not persisted as-is in this version.
func newClientRegistrationResponse(app *domain.OIDCApp, clientName string, issuedAt int64) *clientRegistrationResponse {
resp := &clientRegistrationResponse{
ClientID: app.ClientID,
ClientSecret: app.ClientSecretString,
ClientIDIssuedAt: issuedAt,
RedirectURIs: app.RedirectUris,
ResponseTypes: responseTypesToRegistration(app.ResponseTypes),
GrantTypes: grantTypesToRegistration(app.GrantTypes),
ApplicationType: applicationTypeToRegistration(gu.Value(app.ApplicationType)),
ClientName: strings.TrimSpace(clientName),
TokenEndpointAuthMethod: authMethodToRegistration(gu.Value(app.AuthMethodType)),
PostLogoutRedirectURIs: app.PostLogoutRedirectUris,
}
if app.ClientSecretString != "" {
// RFC 7591 §3.2.1: client_secret_expires_at is REQUIRED if client_secret is
// issued. 0 means the secret never expires.
resp.ClientSecretExpiresAt = gu.Ptr(int64(0))
}
return resp
}
func authMethodToRegistration(authMethod domain.OIDCAuthMethodType) string {
switch authMethod {
case domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic:
return "client_secret_basic"
case domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypePost:
return "client_secret_post"
case domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone:
return "none"
case domain.OIDCAuthMethodTypePrivateKeyJWT:
return "private_key_jwt"
default:
return ""
}
}
func grantTypesToRegistration(grantTypes []domain.OIDCGrantType) []string {
mapped := make([]string, 0, len(grantTypes))
for _, grantType := range grantTypes {
switch grantType {
case domain.OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode:
mapped = append(mapped, "authorization_code")
case domain.OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken:
mapped = append(mapped, "refresh_token")
case domain.OIDCGrantTypeImplicit:
mapped = append(mapped, "implicit")
case domain.OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode:
mapped = append(mapped, "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code")
case domain.OIDCGrantTypeTokenExchange:
mapped = append(mapped, "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange")
}
}
return mapped
}
func responseTypesToRegistration(responseTypes []domain.OIDCResponseType) []string {
mapped := make([]string, 0, len(responseTypes))
for _, responseType := range responseTypes {
switch responseType {
case domain.OIDCResponseTypeCode:
mapped = append(mapped, "code")
case domain.OIDCResponseTypeIDToken:
mapped = append(mapped, "id_token")
case domain.OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken:
mapped = append(mapped, "id_token token")
case domain.OIDCResponseTypeUnspecified:
// not exposed through dynamic client registration
}
}
return mapped
}
func applicationTypeToRegistration(applicationType domain.OIDCApplicationType) string {
switch applicationType {
case domain.OIDCApplicationTypeWeb:
return "web"
case domain.OIDCApplicationTypeNative:
return "native"
case domain.OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent:
return "user_agent"
default:
return ""
}
}
func trimSpaceSlice(values []string) []string {
if len(values) == 0 {
return nil
}
trimmed := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if value != "" {
trimmed = append(trimmed, value)
}
}
if len(trimmed) == 0 {
return nil
}
return trimmed
}