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# Which Problems Are Solved - Native apps (mobile/desktop) use custom protocol schemes (e.g. `myapp://callback`, `io.zitadel.app://auth`) as OAuth/OIDC redirect URIs. The previous redirect-safety check in the login UI only allowed `http:`/`https:` absolute URLs, so these custom-scheme callbacks were wrongly rejected and native app login flows were broken. - Even for valid external redirects, `router.push()` triggers an RSC prefetch `fetch()` that is blocked by the CSP `connect-src 'self'` directive for non-same-origin URLs, so navigation to external/custom-protocol targets failed. - SAML and OIDC callback URLs returned from the backend were not consistently validated before being used for redirects/POSTs across the various flow entry points. # How the Problems Are Solved - Reworked `isSafeRedirectUri` to use `@braintree/sanitize-url` instead of a strict `http/https`-only allowlist. Custom protocol schemes are now permitted, while dangerous schemes (`javascript:`, `data:`, plus an explicit block of `file:`, `blob:`, `about:`) are still rejected. - Added `isExternalUrl` helper to distinguish internal relative paths (`/...`) from external/custom-protocol targets. - In `handleServerActionResponse`, external/custom-protocol redirects now navigate via `window.location.href` (full navigation) instead of `router.push()`, avoiding the CSP-blocked RSC prefetch. Internal paths continue to use `router.push()`. - Added consistent redirect-URI validation for SAML and OIDC callbacks across all relevant entry points (`oidc.ts`, `saml.ts`, `server/flow-initiation.ts` including the `prompt=none` path, and the SAML `samlData` POST case), blocking unsafe URLs with a clear warning and error response. # Additional Changes - Added `@braintree/sanitize-url` (`^7.1.2`) dependency to `apps/login` (`package.json` / `pnpm-lock.yaml`). - Added unit tests for `isExternalUrl` covering relative paths, absolute HTTP/HTTPS URLs, custom protocol schemes, and protocol-relative URLs. - Annotated the intentional `window.location.href` navigation with a CodeQL suppression comment, documenting that the URL is validated by `isSafeRedirectUri` beforehand. - Minor formatting cleanup in `console` JWT provider component. # Additional Context - This restores behavior that previously worked for native apps but regressed when redirect validation was tightened to `http`/`https` only. --------- Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>