Files
zitadel/internal/domain/application_oidc.go
T
jmaretteandGitHub 9070b537d2 feat(oidc): add RFC 7592 dynamic client management (#12315)
# Which Problems Are Solved

#12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591),
but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself
afterwards:

- The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and
no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including
the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration.
- There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without
an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the
Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask
a human.

# How the Problems Are Solved

Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
(RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT`
and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same
`op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint.

## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch

The management endpoints are gated on the
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new
setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it
registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`,
exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does.

`allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply
here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints
in both modes.

## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else

RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token
issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user
credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token
it was handed:

| | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access
token |
| Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None |

Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create*
clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints.
One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two,
and there is no user identity to check against in the first place.
Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the
Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot
obtain a client's registration access token, by design.

Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a
client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is
checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another
client is rejected without touching the database.

## The token itself

- **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted,
through a new
`project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the
plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues
it.
- **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated
encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens.
The opaque token handed to the client encrypts
`client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before
checking the secret against the stored hash.
- **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into
the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent
fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted
before it is projected.
- **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when
the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates,
including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable
token back.

## Reusing the existing persistence

A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and
update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and
`oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`),
so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The
registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a
registered client is never left unmanageable.

# Additional Changes

- Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the
`apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event
modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the
relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep
in sync.
- The registration response (`POST`) now also carries
`registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`.
- Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client
registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization
model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management
endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page.
- Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update,
delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response
mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read,
update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to
another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is
disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token,
which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of
their own.

# Additional Context

- Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313
(RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main`
and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there.
- **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above
(registration access token only, no operator path through these
endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was
never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write`
also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that
is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`.
- Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous
token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is
projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore
fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where
revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the
guide and asserted as such in the integration test.
- A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No
proto change and no new feature flag.
- Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`,
`golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched
package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI
remains the check on it.
2026-08-03 08:37:59 +00:00

453 lines
14 KiB
Go

package domain
import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
http_util "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/http"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/eventstore/v1/models"
)
const (
httpScheme = "http://"
httpsScheme = "https://"
localhostHostname = "localhost"
)
type OIDCApp struct {
models.ObjectRoot
AppID string
AppName string
ClientID string
EncodedHash string
ClientSecretString string
// RegistrationAccessToken is the plain registration access token (RFC 7592 §3) of a
// dynamically registered client. It is only populated transiently on registration and
// rotation so the registration endpoint can return it to the client; it is never
// persisted (only its hash is, see project.OIDCConfigRegistrationTokenChangedEvent).
RegistrationAccessToken string
RedirectUris []string
ResponseTypes []OIDCResponseType
GrantTypes []OIDCGrantType
ApplicationType *OIDCApplicationType
AuthMethodType *OIDCAuthMethodType
PostLogoutRedirectUris []string
OIDCVersion *OIDCVersion
Compliance *Compliance
DevMode *bool
AccessTokenType *OIDCTokenType
AccessTokenRoleAssertion *bool
IDTokenRoleAssertion *bool
IDTokenUserinfoAssertion *bool
ClockSkew *time.Duration
AdditionalOrigins []string
SkipNativeAppSuccessPage *bool
BackChannelLogoutURI *string
LoginVersion *LoginVersion
LoginBaseURI *string
State AppState
}
func (a *OIDCApp) GetApplicationName() string {
return a.AppName
}
func (a *OIDCApp) GetState() AppState {
return a.State
}
func (a *OIDCApp) setClientID(clientID string) {
a.ClientID = clientID
}
func (a *OIDCApp) setClientSecret(encodedHash string) {
a.EncodedHash = encodedHash
}
func (a *OIDCApp) requiresClientSecret() bool {
return a.AuthMethodType != nil && (*a.AuthMethodType == OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic || *a.AuthMethodType == OIDCAuthMethodTypePost)
}
type OIDCVersion int32
const (
OIDCVersionV1 OIDCVersion = iota
)
type OIDCResponseType int32
const (
OIDCResponseTypeUnspecified OIDCResponseType = iota - 1 // Negative offset not to break existing configs.
OIDCResponseTypeCode
OIDCResponseTypeIDToken
OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken
)
//go:generate enumer -type OIDCResponseMode -transform snake -trimprefix OIDCResponseMode
type OIDCResponseMode int
const (
OIDCResponseModeUnspecified OIDCResponseMode = iota
OIDCResponseModeQuery
OIDCResponseModeFragment
OIDCResponseModeFormPost
)
type OIDCGrantType int32
const (
OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode OIDCGrantType = iota
OIDCGrantTypeImplicit
OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken
OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode
OIDCGrantTypeTokenExchange
)
type OIDCApplicationType int32
const (
OIDCApplicationTypeWeb OIDCApplicationType = iota
OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent
OIDCApplicationTypeNative
)
type OIDCAuthMethodType int32
const (
OIDCAuthMethodTypeBasic OIDCAuthMethodType = iota
OIDCAuthMethodTypePost
OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone
OIDCAuthMethodTypePrivateKeyJWT
)
type Compliance struct {
NoneCompliant bool
Problems []string
}
type OIDCTokenType int32
const (
OIDCTokenTypeBearer OIDCTokenType = iota
OIDCTokenTypeJWT
)
func (a *OIDCApp) IsValid() bool {
if (a.ClockSkew != nil && (*a.ClockSkew > time.Second*5 || *a.ClockSkew < time.Second*0)) || !a.OriginsValid() {
return false
}
grantTypes := a.getRequiredGrantTypes()
if len(grantTypes) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, grantType := range grantTypes {
ok := containsOIDCGrantType(a.GrantTypes, grantType)
if !ok {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (a *OIDCApp) OriginsValid() bool {
for _, origin := range a.AdditionalOrigins {
if !http_util.IsOrigin(strings.TrimSpace(origin)) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func ContainsRequiredGrantTypes(responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) bool {
required := RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(responseTypes, grantTypes)
return ContainsOIDCGrantTypes(required, grantTypes)
}
func RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, grantTypesSet []OIDCGrantType) (grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) {
var implicit bool
for _, r := range responseTypes {
switch r {
case OIDCResponseTypeCode:
// #5684 when "Device Code" is selected, "Authorization Code" is no longer a hard requirement
if !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypesSet, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) {
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode)
} else {
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode)
}
case OIDCResponseTypeIDToken, OIDCResponseTypeIDTokenToken:
if !implicit {
implicit = true
grantTypes = append(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit)
}
}
}
return grantTypes
}
func (a *OIDCApp) getRequiredGrantTypes() []OIDCGrantType {
return RequiredOIDCGrantTypes(a.ResponseTypes, a.GrantTypes)
}
func ContainsOIDCGrantTypes(shouldContain, list []OIDCGrantType) bool {
for _, should := range shouldContain {
if !containsOIDCGrantType(list, should) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, grantType OIDCGrantType) bool {
return slices.Contains(grantTypes, grantType)
}
func (a *OIDCApp) FillCompliance() {
a.Compliance = GetOIDCCompliance(a.OIDCVersion, a.ApplicationType, a.GrantTypes, a.ResponseTypes, a.AuthMethodType, a.RedirectUris)
}
func GetOIDCCompliance(version *OIDCVersion, appType *OIDCApplicationType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, responseTypes []OIDCResponseType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType, redirectUris []string) *Compliance {
if version != nil && *version == OIDCVersionV1 {
return GetOIDCV1Compliance(appType, grantTypes, authMethod, redirectUris)
}
return &Compliance{
NoneCompliant: true,
Problems: []string{"Application.OIDC.UnsupportedVersion"},
}
}
func GetOIDCV1Compliance(appType *OIDCApplicationType, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType, redirectUris []string) *Compliance {
compliance := &Compliance{NoneCompliant: false}
checkGrantTypesCombination(compliance, grantTypes)
checkRedirectURIs(compliance, grantTypes, appType, redirectUris)
checkApplicationType(compliance, appType, authMethod)
if compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NotCompliant"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
return compliance
}
func checkGrantTypesCombination(compliance *Compliance, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType) {
if !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeRefreshToken) && !containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.GrantType.Refresh.NoAuthCode")
}
}
func checkRedirectURIs(compliance *Compliance, grantTypes []OIDCGrantType, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
// See #5684 for OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode and redirectUris further explanation
if len(redirectUris) == 0 && (!containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) || (containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeDeviceCode) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode))) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NoRedirectUris"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit) && containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
} else {
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeImplicit) {
CheckRedirectUrisImplicit(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
}
if containsOIDCGrantType(grantTypes, OIDCGrantTypeAuthorizationCode) {
CheckRedirectUrisCode(compliance, appType, redirectUris)
}
}
}
func checkApplicationType(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if appType != nil {
switch *appType {
case OIDCApplicationTypeNative:
GetOIDCV1NativeApplicationCompliance(compliance, authMethod)
case OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent:
GetOIDCV1UserAgentApplicationCompliance(compliance, authMethod)
case OIDCApplicationTypeWeb:
return
}
}
if compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append([]string{"Application.OIDC.V1.NotCompliant"}, compliance.Problems...)
}
}
func GetOIDCV1NativeApplicationCompliance(compliance *Compliance, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if authMethod != nil && *authMethod != OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.AuthMethodType.NotNone")
}
}
func GetOIDCV1UserAgentApplicationCompliance(compliance *Compliance, authMethod *OIDCAuthMethodType) {
if authMethod != nil && *authMethod != OIDCAuthMethodTypeNone {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.UserAgent.AuthMethodType.NotNone")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisCode(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.HttpOnlyForWeb")
}
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative && !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType != OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.CustomOnlyForNative")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisImplicit(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.CustomNotAllowed")
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
if !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
return
}
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.HttpNotAllowed")
}
}
func CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode(compliance *Compliance, appType *OIDCApplicationType, redirectUris []string) {
if urlsAreHttps(redirectUris) {
return
}
if containsCustom(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType != OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Implicit.RedirectUris.CustomNotAllowed")
}
if urlContainsPrefix(redirectUris, httpScheme) {
if appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeUserAgent {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Code.RedirectUris.HttpOnlyForWeb")
}
if !onlyLocalhostIsHttp(redirectUris) && appType != nil && *appType == OIDCApplicationTypeNative {
compliance.NoneCompliant = true
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.Native.RedirectUris.MustBeHttpLocalhost")
}
}
if !compliance.NoneCompliant {
compliance.Problems = append(compliance.Problems, "Application.OIDC.V1.NotAllCombinationsAreAllowed")
}
}
func urlsAreHttps(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpsScheme) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func urlContainsPrefix(uris []string, prefix string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if strings.HasPrefix(uri, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func containsCustom(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
if !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpScheme) && !strings.HasPrefix(uri, httpsScheme) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// OIDCRedirectURIsRequireNative reports whether the given redirect URIs can only be
// compliant for a native application, because they use a custom scheme. It lets a caller
// that has to infer the application type (see the dynamic client registration endpoint)
// stay in agreement with CheckRedirectUrisCode and CheckRedirectUrisImplicitAndCode, which
// reserve custom schemes for native applications.
func OIDCRedirectURIsRequireNative(redirectURIs []string) bool {
return containsCustom(redirectURIs)
}
// onlyLocalhostIsHttp returns true if:
//
// - input string slice is empty
// - all parseable URIs with scheme `http` in the string slice are localhost/loopback URIs (in all possible forms)
//
// It will return false if:
// - any of the input URIs cannot be parsed
// - any of the parseable input URIs with scheme `http` is not localhost/loopback
func onlyLocalhostIsHttp(uris []string) bool {
for _, uri := range uris {
url, err := url.ParseRequestURI(uri)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if url.Scheme == "http" {
hostname := url.Hostname()
if hostname == localhostHostname {
continue
}
address, err := netip.ParseAddr(hostname)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if address.IsLoopback() {
continue
}
return false
}
}
return true
}
func OIDCOriginAllowList(redirectURIs, additionalOrigins []string) ([]string, error) {
allowList := make([]string, 0)
for _, redirect := range redirectURIs {
origin, err := http_util.GetOriginFromURLString(redirect)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !http_util.IsOriginAllowed(allowList, origin) {
allowList = append(allowList, origin)
}
}
for _, origin := range additionalOrigins {
if !http_util.IsOriginAllowed(allowList, origin) {
allowList = append(allowList, origin)
}
}
return allowList, nil
}