Files
zitadel/cmd/setup/config.go
T
jmaretteandGitHub 9070b537d2 feat(oidc): add RFC 7592 dynamic client management (#12315)
# Which Problems Are Solved

#12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591),
but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself
afterwards:

- The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and
no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including
the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration.
- There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without
an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the
Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask
a human.

# How the Problems Are Solved

Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
(RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT`
and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same
`op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint.

## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch

The management endpoints are gated on the
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new
setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it
registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`,
exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does.

`allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply
here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints
in both modes.

## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else

RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token
issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user
credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token
it was handed:

| | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access
token |
| Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None |

Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create*
clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints.
One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two,
and there is no user identity to check against in the first place.
Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the
Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot
obtain a client's registration access token, by design.

Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a
client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is
checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another
client is rejected without touching the database.

## The token itself

- **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted,
through a new
`project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the
plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues
it.
- **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated
encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens.
The opaque token handed to the client encrypts
`client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before
checking the secret against the stored hash.
- **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into
the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent
fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted
before it is projected.
- **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when
the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates,
including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable
token back.

## Reusing the existing persistence

A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and
update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and
`oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`),
so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The
registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a
registered client is never left unmanageable.

# Additional Changes

- Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the
`apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event
modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the
relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep
in sync.
- The registration response (`POST`) now also carries
`registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`.
- Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client
registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization
model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management
endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page.
- Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update,
delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response
mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read,
update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to
another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is
disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token,
which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of
their own.

# Additional Context

- Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313
(RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main`
and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there.
- **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above
(registration access token only, no operator path through these
endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was
never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write`
also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that
is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`.
- Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous
token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is
projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore
fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where
revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the
guide and asserted as such in the integration test.
- A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No
proto change and no new feature flag.
- Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`,
`golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched
package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI
remains the check on it.
2026-08-03 08:37:59 +00:00

233 lines
9.6 KiB
Go

package setup
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
old_logging "github.com/zitadel/logging" //nolint:staticcheck
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/backend/v3/instrumentation"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/backend/v3/instrumentation/logging"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/cmd/encryption"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/cmd/hooks"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/actions"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/authz"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/http"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/oidc"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/ui/login"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/cache/connector"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/command"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/config/hook"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/config/systemdefaults"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/database"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/denylist"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/domain"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/eventstore"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/execution"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/id"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/notification/handlers"
"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/query/projection"
static_config "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/static/config"
)
type Config struct {
ForMirror bool
Database database.Config
Caches *connector.CachesConfig
SystemDefaults systemdefaults.SystemDefaults
InternalAuthZ authz.Config
SystemAuthZ authz.Config
ExternalDomain string
ExternalPort uint16
ExternalSecure bool
Instrumentation instrumentation.Config
Log *old_logging.Config
Metrics *instrumentation.LegacyMetricConfig
EncryptionKeys *encryption.EncryptionKeyConfig
DefaultInstance command.InstanceSetup
Machine *id.Config
Projections projection.Config
Notifications handlers.WorkerConfig
Executions execution.WorkerConfig
Eventstore *eventstore.Config
InitProjections InitProjections
AssetStorage static_config.AssetStorageConfig
OIDC oidc.Config
Login login.Config
WebAuthNName string
Telemetry *handlers.TelemetryPusherConfig
SystemAPIUsers map[string]*authz.SystemAPIUser
HTTPClient http.ClientConfig
}
type InitProjections struct {
Enabled bool
RetryFailedAfter time.Duration
MaxFailureCount uint8
BulkLimit uint64
}
func NewConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, v *viper.Viper) (*Config, instrumentation.ShutdownFunc, error) {
config := new(Config)
err := v.Unmarshal(config,
viper.DecodeHook(mapstructure.ComposeDecodeHookFunc(
hooks.SliceTypeStringDecode[*domain.CustomMessageText],
hooks.SliceTypeStringDecode[authz.RoleMapping],
hooks.MapTypeStringDecode[string, *authz.SystemAPIUser],
hooks.MapHTTPHeaderStringDecode,
database.DecodeHook(false),
denylist.DenyListDecodeHook,
actions.HTTPConfigDecodeHook,
hook.EnumHookFunc(authz.MemberTypeString),
hook.Base64ToBytesHookFunc(),
hook.TagToLanguageHookFunc(),
hook.StringToURLHookFunc(),
mapstructure.StringToTimeDurationHookFunc(),
mapstructure.StringToTimeHookFunc(time.RFC3339),
mapstructure.StringToSliceHookFunc(","),
mapstructure.TextUnmarshallerHookFunc(),
)),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to read default config: %w", err)
}
config.Instrumentation.Metric.SetLegacyConfig(config.Metrics)
config.Instrumentation.Log.SetLegacyConfig(config.Log)
shutdown, err := instrumentation.Start(cmd.Context(), config.Instrumentation)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to start instrumentation: %w", err)
}
cmd.SetContext(logging.NewCtx(cmd.Context(), logging.StreamRuntime))
err = config.Log.SetLogger()
if err != nil {
err = errors.Join(err, shutdown(cmd.Context()))
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to set logger: %w", err)
}
id.Configure(config.Machine)
config.HTTPClient.MergeDeprecatedDenylists(nil, config.Executions.DenyList)
// Copy the global role permissions mappings to the instance until we allow instance-level configuration over the API.
config.DefaultInstance.RolePermissionMappings = config.InternalAuthZ.RolePermissionMappings
return config, shutdown, nil
}
type Steps struct {
s1ProjectionTable *ProjectionTable
s2AssetsTable *AssetTable
FirstInstance *FirstInstance
s5LastFailed *LastFailed
s6OwnerRemoveColumns *OwnerRemoveColumns
s7LogstoreTables *LogstoreTables
s8AuthTokens *AuthTokenIndexes
CorrectCreationDate *CorrectCreationDate
s12AddOTPColumns *AddOTPColumns
s13FixQuotaProjection *FixQuotaConstraints
s14NewEventsTable *NewEventsTable
s15CurrentStates *CurrentProjectionState
s16UniqueConstraintsLower *UniqueConstraintToLower
s17AddOffsetToUniqueConstraints *AddOffsetToCurrentStates
s18AddLowerFieldsToLoginNames *AddLowerFieldsToLoginNames
s19AddCurrentStatesIndex *AddCurrentSequencesIndex
s20AddByUserSessionIndex *AddByUserIndexToSession
s21AddBlockFieldToLimits *AddBlockFieldToLimits
s22ActiveInstancesIndex *ActiveInstanceEvents
s23CorrectGlobalUniqueConstraints *CorrectGlobalUniqueConstraints
s24AddActorToAuthTokens *AddActorToAuthTokens
s25User11AddLowerFieldsToVerifiedEmail *User11AddLowerFieldsToVerifiedEmail
s26AuthUsers3 *AuthUsers3
s27IDPTemplate6SAMLNameIDFormat *IDPTemplate6SAMLNameIDFormat
s28AddFieldTable *AddFieldTable
s29FillFieldsForProjectGrant *FillFieldsForProjectGrant
s30FillFieldsForOrgDomainVerified *FillFieldsForOrgDomainVerified
s31AddAggregateIndexToFields *AddAggregateIndexToFields
s32AddAuthSessionID *AddAuthSessionID
s33SMSConfigs3TwilioAddVerifyServiceSid *SMSConfigs3TwilioAddVerifyServiceSid
s34AddCacheSchema *AddCacheSchema
s35AddPositionToIndexEsWm *AddPositionToIndexEsWm
s36FillV2Milestones *FillV3Milestones
s37Apps7OIDConfigsBackChannelLogoutURI *Apps7OIDConfigsBackChannelLogoutURI
s38BackChannelLogoutNotificationStart *BackChannelLogoutNotificationStart
s40InitPushFunc *InitPushFunc
s42Apps7OIDCConfigsLoginVersion *Apps7OIDCConfigsLoginVersion
s43CreateFieldsDomainIndex *CreateFieldsDomainIndex
s44ReplaceCurrentSequencesIndex *ReplaceCurrentSequencesIndex
s45CorrectProjectOwners *CorrectProjectOwners
s46InitPermissionFunctions *InitPermissionFunctions
s47FillMembershipFields *FillMembershipFields
s48Apps7SAMLConfigsLoginVersion *Apps7SAMLConfigsLoginVersion
s49InitPermittedOrgsFunction *InitPermittedOrgsFunction
s50IDPTemplate6UsePKCE *IDPTemplate6UsePKCE
s51IDPTemplate6RootCA *IDPTemplate6RootCA
s52IDPTemplate6LDAP2 *IDPTemplate6LDAP2
s53InitPermittedOrgsFunction *InitPermittedOrgsFunction53
s54InstancePositionIndex *InstancePositionIndex
s55ExecutionHandlerStart *ExecutionHandlerStart
s56IDPTemplate6SAMLFederatedLogout *IDPTemplate6SAMLFederatedLogout
s57CreateResourceCounts *CreateResourceCounts
s58ReplaceLoginNames3View *ReplaceLoginNames3View
s59SetupWebkeys *SetupWebkeys
s60GenerateSystemID *GenerateSystemID
s61IDPTemplate6SAMLSignatureAlgorithm *IDPTemplate6SAMLSignatureAlgorithm
s62HTTPProviderAddSigningKey *HTTPProviderAddSigningKey
s63AlterResourceCounts *AlterResourceCounts
s64ChangePushPosition *ChangePushPosition
s65FixUserMetadata5Index *FixUserMetadata5Index
s66SessionRecoveryCodeCheckedAt *SessionRecoveryCodeCheckedAt
s67SyncMemberRoleFields *SyncMemberRoleFields
s68TargetAddPayloadTypeColumn *TargetAddPayloadTypeColumn
s69CacheTablesLogged *CacheTablesLogged
s70AddEventStoreCommandEnforceOwner *AddEventStoreCommandEnforceOwnerColumn
s71JWTProvideAddAudienceColumn *JWTProvideAddAudienceColumn
s72AddColumnsToLoginNamesView *AddColumnsToLoginNamesView
s73FixUserGrantRoles *FixUserGrantRoles
s74Apps7OIDCConfigsAddRegistrationToken *Apps7OIDCConfigsAddRegistrationToken
RelationalTables *TransactionalTables
}
func NewSteps(ctx context.Context, v *viper.Viper) (*Steps, error) {
v.AutomaticEnv()
v.SetEnvPrefix("ZITADEL")
v.SetEnvKeyReplacer(strings.NewReplacer(".", "_"))
v.SetConfigType("yaml")
err := v.ReadConfig(bytes.NewBuffer(defaultSteps))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to read default steps: %w", err)
}
for _, file := range stepFiles {
v.SetConfigFile(file)
err := v.MergeInConfig()
logging.OnError(ctx, err).Warn("unable to read setup file", "file", file)
}
steps := new(Steps)
err = v.Unmarshal(steps,
viper.DecodeHook(mapstructure.ComposeDecodeHookFunc(
hook.Base64ToBytesHookFunc(),
hook.TagToLanguageHookFunc(),
hook.StringToURLHookFunc(),
mapstructure.StringToTimeDurationHookFunc(),
mapstructure.StringToTimeHookFunc(time.RFC3339),
mapstructure.StringToSliceHookFunc(","),
mapstructure.TextUnmarshallerHookFunc(),
)),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to read steps: %w", err)
}
return steps, nil
}