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https://github.com/andwati/zitadel.git
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01fe34a526
# Which Problems Are Solved Opaque tokens now use authenticated encryption. # How the Problems Are Solved - Upgrade zitadel/oidc to v3.47 - Copy crypto implementation for refresh and session tokens (internal to zitadel) - Added config that allows validating old tokens for gradual roll-out # Additional Changes - Set NX cache for `integration-test-build` to `false`, working on a seperate fix. # Additional Context - closes #11315 --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
358 lines
14 KiB
Go
358 lines
14 KiB
Go
package eventstore
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
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"github.com/muhlemmer/gu"
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"github.com/zitadel/logging"
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"github.com/zitadel/oidc/v3/pkg/oidc"
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"github.com/zitadel/oidc/v3/pkg/op"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/authz"
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http_util "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/http"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/authz/repository/eventsourcing/view"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/command"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/crypto"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/domain"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/eventstore"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/query"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/telemetry/tracing"
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usr_model "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/model"
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usr_view "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/repository/view"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/user/repository/view/model"
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"github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/zerrors"
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)
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type TokenVerifierRepo struct {
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AuthAlgorithm crypto.AuthAlgorithm
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Eventstore *eventstore.Eventstore
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View *view.View
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Query *query.Queries
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ExternalSecure bool
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) Health() error {
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return repo.View.Health()
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) tokenByID(ctx context.Context, tokenID, userID string) (_ *usr_model.TokenView, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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instanceID := authz.GetInstance(ctx).InstanceID()
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// always load the latest sequence first, so in case the token was not found by id,
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// the sequence will be equal or lower than the actual projection and no events are lost
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sequence, err := repo.View.GetLatestState(ctx)
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logging.WithFields("instanceID", instanceID, "userID", userID, "tokenID", tokenID).
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OnError(err).
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Errorf("could not get current sequence for token check")
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token, viewErr := repo.View.TokenByIDs(tokenID, userID, instanceID)
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if viewErr != nil && !zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) {
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return nil, viewErr
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}
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if zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) {
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token = new(model.TokenView)
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token.ID = tokenID
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token.UserID = userID
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if sequence != nil {
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token.ChangeDate = sequence.EventCreatedAt
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}
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}
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events, esErr := repo.getUserEvents(ctx, userID, instanceID, token.ChangeDate, token.GetRelevantEventTypes())
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if zerrors.IsNotFound(viewErr) && len(events) == 0 {
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return nil, zerrors.ThrowNotFound(nil, "EVENT-4T90g", "Errors.Token.NotFound")
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}
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if esErr != nil {
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logging.WithError(viewErr).WithField("traceID", tracing.TraceIDFromCtx(ctx)).Debug("error retrieving new events")
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return model.TokenViewToModel(token), nil
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}
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viewToken := *token
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for _, event := range events {
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err := token.AppendEventIfMyToken(event)
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if err != nil {
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return model.TokenViewToModel(&viewToken), nil
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}
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}
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if !token.Expiration.After(time.Now().UTC()) || token.Deactivated {
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return nil, zerrors.ThrowNotFound(nil, "EVENT-5Bm9s", "Errors.Token.NotFound")
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}
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return model.TokenViewToModel(token), nil
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) VerifyAccessToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID string, agentID string, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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tokenID, subject, ok := repo.getTokenIDAndSubject(ctx, tokenString)
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if !ok {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-Reb32", "invalid token")
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(tokenID, command.IDPrefixV2) {
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return repo.verifyAccessTokenV2(ctx, tokenID, subject, verifierClientID, projectID)
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}
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if sessionID, ok := strings.CutPrefix(tokenID, authz.SessionTokenPrefix); ok {
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userID, clientID, resourceOwner, err = repo.verifySessionToken(ctx, sessionID, tokenString)
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return
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}
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return repo.verifyAccessTokenV1(ctx, tokenID, subject, verifierClientID, projectID)
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifyAccessTokenV1(ctx context.Context, tokenID, subject, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID, agentID, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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_, tokenSpan := tracing.NewNamedSpan(ctx, "tokenByID")
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token, err := repo.tokenByID(ctx, tokenID, subject)
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tokenSpan.EndWithError(err)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(err, "APP-BxUSiL", "invalid token")
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}
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if token.Actor != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "APP-wai8O", "Errors.TokenExchange.Token.NotForAPI")
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}
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if !token.Expiration.After(time.Now().UTC()) {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(err, "APP-k9KS0", "invalid token")
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}
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if token.IsPAT {
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return token.UserID, "", "", "", token.ResourceOwner, nil
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}
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if err = verifyAudience(token.Audience, verifierClientID, projectID); err != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", err
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}
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return token.UserID, token.UserAgentID, token.ApplicationID, token.PreferredLanguage, token.ResourceOwner, nil
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifyAccessTokenV2(ctx context.Context, token, subject, verifierClientID, projectID string) (userID, agentID, clientID, prefLang, resourceOwner string, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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activeToken, err := repo.Query.ActiveAccessTokenByToken(ctx, token)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", err
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}
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if activeToken.Actor != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "APP-Shi0J", "Errors.TokenExchange.Token.NotForAPI")
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}
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if err = verifyAudience(activeToken.Audience, verifierClientID, projectID); err != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", err
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}
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// If the subject doesn't match the userID from the database, the token probably got tampered with or truncated.
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// See https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-6mq3-xmgp-pjm5
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if activeToken.UserID != subject {
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return "", "", "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-3f4fs", "invalid token")
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}
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if err = repo.checkAuthentication(ctx, activeToken.AuthMethods, activeToken.UserID); err != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", "", err
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}
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prefLang = gu.Value(activeToken.PreferredLanguage).String()
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agentID = gu.Value(gu.Value(activeToken.UserAgent).FingerprintID)
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return activeToken.UserID, agentID, activeToken.ClientID, prefLang, activeToken.ResourceOwner, nil
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) verifySessionToken(ctx context.Context, sessionID, token string) (userID, clientID, resourceOwner string, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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session, err := repo.Query.SessionByID(ctx, true, sessionID, token, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", "", err
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}
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if !session.Expiration.IsZero() && session.Expiration.Before(time.Now()) {
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return "", "", "", zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-EGDo3", "session expired")
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}
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if err = repo.checkAuthentication(ctx, authMethodsFromSession(session), session.UserFactor.UserID); err != nil {
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return "", "", "", err
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}
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return session.UserFactor.UserID, "", session.UserFactor.ResourceOwner, nil
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}
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// checkAuthentication ensures the session or token was authenticated (at least a single [domain.UserAuthMethodType]).
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// It will also check if there was a multi-factor authentication, if either MFA is forced by the login policy or if the user has set up any second factor
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) checkAuthentication(ctx context.Context, authMethods []domain.UserAuthMethodType, userID string) error {
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if len(authMethods) == 0 {
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return zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-Kl3p0", "authentication required")
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}
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// if the user has MFA, we don't need to check any mfa requirements
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if domain.HasMFA(authMethods) {
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return nil
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}
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requirements, err := repo.Query.ListUserAuthMethodTypesRequired(setCallerCtx(ctx, userID), userID)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// service accounts do not have interactive logins, so we don't check for MFA requirements
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if requirements.UserType == domain.UserTypeMachine {
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return nil
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}
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// we'll only require 2FA factors, that are allowed by the policy
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allowedFactors := allowed2FAFactors(requirements.AllowedSecondFactors, requirements.SetUpFactors)
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// if either the user has set up a factor that is allowed by the policy
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// or the policy requires MFA, we'll require it and can directly return the error
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// since the token/session was not authenticated with MFA
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if domain.Has2FA(allowedFactors) ||
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domain.RequiresMFA(
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requirements.ForceMFA,
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requirements.ForceMFALocalOnly,
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!hasIDPAuthentication(authMethods),
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) {
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return zerrors.ThrowPermissionDenied(nil, "AUTHZ-Kl3p0", "mfa required")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func allowed2FAFactors(factors []domain.SecondFactorType, authMethods []domain.UserAuthMethodType) []domain.UserAuthMethodType {
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allowedFactors := make([]domain.UserAuthMethodType, 0, len(factors))
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for _, method := range authMethods {
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factorType := domain.AuthMethodToSecondFactor(method)
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if factorType != domain.SecondFactorTypeUnspecified &&
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slices.Contains(factors, factorType) {
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allowedFactors = append(allowedFactors, method)
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}
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}
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return allowedFactors
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}
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func hasIDPAuthentication(authMethods []domain.UserAuthMethodType) bool {
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for _, method := range authMethods {
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if method == domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func authMethodsFromSession(session *query.Session) []domain.UserAuthMethodType {
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types := make([]domain.UserAuthMethodType, 0, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP)
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if !session.PasswordFactor.PasswordCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypePassword)
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}
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if !session.WebAuthNFactor.WebAuthNCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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if session.WebAuthNFactor.UserVerified {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypePasswordless)
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} else {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeU2F)
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}
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}
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if !session.IntentFactor.IntentCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeIDP)
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}
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if !session.TOTPFactor.TOTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeTOTP)
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}
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if !session.OTPSMSFactor.OTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeOTPSMS)
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}
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if !session.OTPEmailFactor.OTPCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeOTPEmail)
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}
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if !session.RecoveryCodeFactor.RecoveryCodeCheckedAt.IsZero() {
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types = append(types, domain.UserAuthMethodTypeRecoveryCode)
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}
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return types
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}
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func setCallerCtx(ctx context.Context, userID string) context.Context {
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ctxData := authz.GetCtxData(ctx)
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ctxData.UserID = userID
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return authz.SetCtxData(ctx, ctxData)
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) ProjectIDAndOriginsByClientID(ctx context.Context, clientID string) (projectID string, origins []string, err error) {
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app, err := repo.View.ApplicationByOIDCClientID(ctx, clientID)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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return app.ProjectID, app.OIDCConfig.AllowedOrigins, nil
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) VerifierClientID(ctx context.Context, appName string) (clientID, projectID string, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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app, err := repo.View.ApplicationByProjecIDAndAppName(ctx, authz.GetInstance(ctx).ProjectID(), appName)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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if app.OIDCConfig != nil {
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clientID = app.OIDCConfig.ClientID
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} else if app.APIConfig != nil {
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clientID = app.APIConfig.ClientID
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}
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return clientID, app.ProjectID, nil
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) getUserEvents(ctx context.Context, userID, instanceID string, changeDate time.Time, eventTypes []eventstore.EventType) (_ []eventstore.Event, err error) {
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ctx, span := tracing.NewSpan(ctx)
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defer func() { span.EndWithError(err) }()
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query, err := usr_view.UserByIDQuery(userID, instanceID, changeDate, eventTypes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return repo.Eventstore.Filter(ctx, query)
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}
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// getTokenIDAndSubject returns the TokenID and Subject of both opaque tokens and JWTs
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) getTokenIDAndSubject(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) (tokenID string, subject string, valid bool) {
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// accessToken can be either opaque or JWT
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// let's try opaque first:
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tokenIDSubject, err := repo.AuthAlgorithm.DecryptToken(accessToken)
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if err != nil {
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logging.WithError(err).Warn("token verifier repo: decrypt access token")
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// if decryption did not work, it might be a JWT
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accessTokenClaims, err := op.VerifyAccessToken[*oidc.AccessTokenClaims](ctx, accessToken, repo.jwtTokenVerifier(ctx))
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if err != nil {
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logging.WithError(err).Warn("token verifier repo: verify JWT access token")
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return "", "", false
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}
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return accessTokenClaims.JWTID, accessTokenClaims.Subject, true
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}
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splitToken := strings.Split(tokenIDSubject, ":")
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if len(splitToken) != 2 {
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return "", "", false
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}
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return splitToken[0], splitToken[1], true
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}
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func (repo *TokenVerifierRepo) jwtTokenVerifier(ctx context.Context) *op.AccessTokenVerifier {
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keySet := &openIDKeySet{repo.Query}
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return op.NewAccessTokenVerifier(http_util.DomainContext(ctx).Origin(), keySet)
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}
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func verifyAudience(audience []string, verifierClientID, projectID string) error {
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for _, aud := range audience {
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if verifierClientID == aud || projectID == aud {
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return nil
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}
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}
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return zerrors.ThrowUnauthenticated(nil, "APP-Zxfako", "invalid audience")
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}
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type openIDKeySet struct {
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*query.Queries
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}
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// VerifySignature implements the oidc.KeySet interface
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// providing an implementation for the keys retrieved directly from Queries
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func (o *openIDKeySet) VerifySignature(ctx context.Context, jws *jose.JSONWebSignature) (payload []byte, err error) {
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keySet, err := o.Queries.GetWebKeySet(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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keyID, alg := oidc.GetKeyIDAndAlg(jws)
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key, err := oidc.FindMatchingKey(keyID, oidc.KeyUseSignature, alg, keySet.Keys...)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature: %w", err)
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}
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return jws.Verify(&key)
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}
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