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Author SHA1 Message Date
Max PeintnerandGitHub ba3a45bee4 fix(login): treat user-verified passkey as fulfilling MFA in session validity check (#12575)
# Which Problems Are Solved

Users with a passkey plus an additional configured second factor (TOTP /
OTP Email / OTP SMS) get stuck on the passkey verification page: the
WebAuthn ceremony succeeds, but the continue button just spins and the
user is redirected back to `/passkey` indefinitely. Re-registering the
passkey or switching to a private window does not help.

Since the MFA hardening of `isSessionValid` (56f4798), a session is only
considered valid if one of the user's *configured* MFA methods (TOTP,
OTP Email, OTP SMS, U2F) was verified within the session. A passkey
login sets `factors.webAuthN.verifiedAt` with `userVerified: true`, but
only the U2F method reuses that factor — so a passkey session for a user
whose second factor is TOTP or OTP is deemed invalid at flow completion.

This contradicts the login flow itself: `checkMFAFactors` intentionally
never prompts for a second factor after a passkey login ("escape further
checks if user has authenticated with passkey"). The result is a loop:

1. Passkey is verified on `/passkey` → `sendPasskey` →
`completeAuthFlow` → `loginWithOIDCAndSession`
2. `isSessionValid` returns `false` because the configured TOTP/OTP
factor was never checked in this session
3. The re-authentication branch calls `sendLoginname`, which resolves
the user's preferred method (passkey) and returns a redirect to
`/passkey` — back to step 1, with no way forward

# How the Problems Are Solved

Treat a user-verified passkey authentication as fulfilling the MFA
requirement in `isSessionValid`, consistent with the existing passkey
escape in `checkMFAFactors`. A passkey with user verification is
inherently multi-factor (possession + biometrics/PIN).

- `isSessionValid` now derives `hasAuthenticatedWithPasskey` from
`factors.webAuthN.verifiedAt && factors.webAuthN.userVerified` and
accepts it alongside the configured-factor checks (`totpValid ||
otpEmailValid || otpSmsValid || u2fValid`).
- A presence-only WebAuthn assertion (`userVerified: false`, i.e. a
U2F-style second-factor check) does **not** count, so password-based
sessions still require their configured second factor — the original
security fix remains intact.
- Adds regression tests: a user-verified passkey session with a
configured-but-unverified TOTP factor is valid; a presence-only WebAuthn
session with an unverified TOTP factor remains invalid.
2026-08-11 14:16:45 +02:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub 56f4798ed3 Merge commit from fork
* add mfa check to session validity check

* change session check to check for already set up mfa methods

* lint

* improve naming

* test changes

* cleanup continueWithSession fcn
2026-07-17 08:23:56 +02:00
051506b5bb fix(login): prevent crash on a stale session cookie (#12423)
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# Which Problems Are Solved

The `sessions` cookie lifetime is independent of Zitadel's server-side
session validity, so a cookie can reference an invalid session. In that
case `getSession` throws `not_found` (QUERY-SFeaa).

- `loadMostRecentSession` lets that error propagate instead of treating
it as "no session", crashing the server render of every page that calls
it without its own guard.
- Most visibly, the "forgot password" flow landing on `/password/set`
throws `[not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)` (gRPC code 5,
HTTP 404) and fails to render.
- 12 of the 16 call sites are unguarded and share this crash.

# How the Problems Are Solved

Catch the error in `loadMostRecentSession` and return `undefined`,
unifying "cookie references a dropped session" with the existing "no
cookie" case. Every call site already handles an undefined session,
either with a graceful fallback or by throwing its own explicit error.

```ts
return getSession({ serviceConfig, sessionId: recent.id, sessionToken: recent.token })
  .then((resp: GetSessionResponse) => resp.session)
  .catch((error) => {
    console.warn("[Session] Could not load most recent session", error);
    return undefined;
  });
```

All `loadMostRecentSession` call sites — **Previous** = behaviour when
the cookie referenced an invalid session; **Change** = what this PR does
to that call site:

| # | Call site | Change in this PR | Previous behaviour (invalid
session) | New behaviour |

|---|-----------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| — | `lib/session.ts` — `loadMostRecentSession` | **Added `.catch` →
`undefined`** (core fix) | Threw `not_found` to caller | Resolves to
`undefined` |
| 1 | `password/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (the reported bug) |
Falls back to login-name flow |
| 2 | `password/change/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` →
`failedLoading` alert if no user |
| 3 | `passkey/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → `userId`
fallback / `unknownContext` |
| 4 | `otp/[method]/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` →
`unknownContext` alert |
| 5 | `otp/[method]/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw
`ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No session found"` |
| 6 | `mfa/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` →
`verify.noResults` alert |
| 7 | `mfa/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw `ConnectError`) |
`undefined` → own `throw "Could not get user id from session"` |
| 8 | `authenticator/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** (raw
`ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own throw / `unknownContext` |
| 9 | `signedin/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders
with `loginName` fallback |
| 10 | `u2f/set/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` →
`unknownContext` alert |
| 11 | `u2f/page.tsx` | none | **Crash** | `undefined` → renders on
`loginName` |
| 12 | `lib/server/verify.ts` — `verifyTOTP` | none | **Crash** (raw
`ConnectError`) | `undefined` → own `throw "No user id found in
session."` |
| 13 | `password/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `try/catch`** | Caught
locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged |
| 14 | `verify/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** ¹ | Caught
locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged |
| 15 | `verify/success/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** |
Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged |
| 16 | `passkey/page.tsx` | **Removed redundant `.catch`** (login-name
path) | Caught locally → `undefined` | `undefined` — unchanged |

Rows 1–12 were unguarded and crashed; the central change fixes them.
Rows 13–16 already handled the error locally.

# Additional Changes

- This makes the four callers that wrapped the call in their own
try/catch or `.catch` redundant, so remove that now-dead handling
(password, verify, verify/success, passkey).
- Add unit tests covering `loadMostRecentSession`: no cookie, success,
and the stale-cookie rejection path.

¹ `verify/page.tsx`'s `.catch` also eagerly fetched `loginSettings`;
that is already covered by the page's own lazy fetch, so behaviour is
unchanged (one cosmetic edge case under `ignoreUnknownUsernames` with
both `userId` and `loginName` present — no functional impact).

# Additional Context

- Session *expiry* alone does not trigger this: expired rows are not
removed from the session projection, so `getSession` still returns them.
The `not_found` specifically means the session was **removed**
server-side (logout, admin/API termination, or a user/org/instance
cascade) while the browser still held the cookie.
- Mirrors the pattern upstream already applies inline in
`verify/page.tsx` (*"ignore error, as we might not have a session
yet"*), lifted to the shared function.
- **Related issue (not in this PR):** the sibling `loadSessionById`
helpers on the `?sessionId=` path (`passkey`, `otp`, `mfa`, `mfa/set`,
`signedin`, `authenticator/set`, `u2f`) call `getSession` directly and
share the same defect. Lower practical exposure (short-lived in-flow
URLs; a clean logout clears the cookie), so a follow-up PR should lift
those into a shared `loadSessionById` in `lib/session.ts`.
- Prior art: upstream added an equivalent guard to verify/page.tsx in
#11130, but the other call sites were never given the same treatment —
this PR resolves that inconsistency at the source.

Error trace:
```
{"level":"error","message":"⨯ Error [ConnectError]: [not_found] Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)\n    at R (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:25490)\n    at <unknown> (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:26477)\n    at next (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:68112)\n    at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:31326)\n    at async (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:10:33734)\n    at async Object.unary (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:66838)\n    at async Object.getSession (.next/server/chunks/ssr/_0uqqxk7._.js:3:72371)\n    at async o (.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0msfcq_._.js:1:7440) {\n  rawMessage: 'Session does not exist (QUERY-SFeaa)',\n  code: 5,\n  metadata: Headers {\n    'accept-encoding': 'gzip',\n    'alt-svc': 'h3=\":443\"; ma=2592000',\n    'content-length': '240',\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    date: 'Wed, 08 Jul 2026 09:06:09 GMT',\n     'strict-transport-security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',\n     vary: 'Origin',\n     },\n  details: [\n    {\n      type: 'zitadel.v1.ErrorDetail',\n      value: [Uint8Array],\n      debug: [Object]\n    }\n  ],\n  cause: undefined,\n  httpStatus: 404,\n  isUserError: true,\n  digest: '634020356'\n}","timestamp":"2026-07-08T09:06:09.969Z"}
```

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Liam Neville <[email protected]>
2026-07-14 09:03:46 +00:00
9f1119823b fix(login): cleanup server logs (#11195)
Closes #11184

# Which Problems Are Solved

- loginName: This information is already retrievable from the URL
parameters during the authentication flow, so logging it presented no
additional exposure.
- idpIntent: This was being logged to the server console (server-side
logs), so it was never exposed to the client/browser.
These changes simply clean up the server logs to prevent unnecessary
data noise.

# How the Problems Are Solved

- Removed idpIntent logging from 
`apps/login/src/lib/server/idp-intent.ts`
- Removed loginName logging from 
`apps/login/src/lib/server/password.ts`

---------

Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
2026-01-05 13:46:09 +00:00
df75be96ff Merge commit from fork
* fix: Improve host header handling and deployment mode detection

* ZITADEL_CLOUD env

* refactor service config

* service config

* cleanup

* cleanup

* util for original and public host

* instanceHost, publicHost

* cleanup constructUrl

* cleanup middleware

* add x-zitadel-forward-host as fallback for current cloud setup

* fix build

* fix: lint

* fix: update test mocks

* fix: provide basepath to unit tests

* host handling

* unit tests

* imports

* fix: getPublicHost instead of getInstanceHost

* unit tests

* update nextjs, implement jwt verify for logout_token

* pass logout information in jwt to login v2

* handle hosts in jwks url

* point idp callbacks to the api and not the login UI

* logout_hint out of logout token, typecheck

* rm unused imports

* fix oidc integration test

---------

Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
2025-12-08 10:01:49 +01:00
86cce629c7 chore(login): add unit tests for core business logic (#11083)
# Which Problems Are Solved

- Adds basic unit tests for core business logic
- Adds playwright tests for core flows

# How the Problems Are Solved

- Extends unit tests for session
- Adds unit tests for other core business logic (oidc, idp, auth etc)

# Additional Changes

- N/A

---------

Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
2025-11-27 16:55:40 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub 434aeb275a feat(login): comprehensive theme system (#10848)
# Which Problems Are Solved

This PR introduces a comprehensive theme customization system for the
login application with responsive behavior and enhanced visual options.

<img width="1122" height="578" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-19 at 09 55 24"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdcc8948-533d-4e13-bf45-fdcc24acfb2b"
/>

# How the Problems Are Solved

## ✨ Features Added

- **🔄 Responsive Layout System**: Automatic switching between
side-by-side and top-to-bottom layouts based on screen size
- **🖼️ Background Image Support**: Custom background images configurable
via environment variables
- **⚙️ Theme Configuration**: Complete theme system with roundness,
spacing, appearance, and layout options
- **📱 Mobile-First Design**: Intelligent layout adaptation for different
screen sizes
- **🎯 Enhanced Typography**: Improved visual hierarchy with larger
titles in side-by-side mode

## 🏗️ Architecture

- **Server-Safe Theme Functions**: Theme configuration accessible on
both server and client
- **SSR-Safe Hooks**: Proper hydration handling for responsive layouts
- **Component Separation**: Clear boundaries between server and client
components
- **Two-Section Layout**: Consistent content structure across all login
pages

## 🔧 Configuration Options

All theme options are configurable via environment variables:

- `NEXT_PUBLIC_THEME_ROUNDNESS`: `edgy` | `mid` | `full`
- `NEXT_PUBLIC_THEME_LAYOUT`: `side-by-side` | `top-to-bottom`
- `NEXT_PUBLIC_THEME_APPEARANCE`: `flat` | `material`
- `NEXT_PUBLIC_THEME_SPACING`: `regular` | `compact`
- `NEXT_PUBLIC_THEME_BACKGROUND_IMAGE`: Custom background image URL

## 📄 Pages Updated

Updated all major login pages to use the new two-section responsive
layout:
- Login name entry
- Password verification
- MFA verification
- User registration
- Account selection
- Device authorization
- Logout confirmation

## 📚 Documentation

- **THEME_ARCHITECTURE.md**: Complete technical documentation of the
theme system
- **THEME_CUSTOMIZATION.md**: User-friendly guide with examples and
troubleshooting

## 🚀 Benefits

- **Better UX**: Responsive design that works seamlessly across all
devices
- **Brand Flexibility**: Easy customization to match any brand identity
- **Maintainable Code**: Clean separation of concerns and
well-documented architecture
- **Future-Proof**: Extensible system for additional theme options


<img width="580" height="680" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-19 at 09 22 23"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9de8da37-6d56-4fe9-b337-5d8ad2a3ba59"
/>
<img width="599" height="689" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-19 at 09 23 45"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/26a30cc7-4017-4f4b-8b87-a49466c42b94"
/>
<img width="595" height="681" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-19 at 09 23 17"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a3d31088-4545-4f36-aafe-1aae1253d677"
/>
2025-10-10 10:26:06 +02:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub 09d09ab337 fix(login): host utility to provide correct host behind proxies (#10770)
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# Which Problems Are Solved

When deploying the login application behind proxies or using Vercel
rewrites (e.g., `zitadel.com/login` → `login-zitadel-qa.vercel.app`),
the application was using the internal rewritten host instead of the
original user-facing host. This caused several issues:

1. **Broken Password Reset Emails**: Email links contained internal
hosts like `login-zitadel-qa.vercel.app` instead of `zitadel.com`
2. **Inconsistent User Experience**: Users would see different domains
in various parts of the flow
3. **Security Concerns**: Internal infrastructure details were exposed
to end users
4. **Scattered Logic**: Host detection logic was duplicated across
multiple files with inconsistent error handling

# How the Problems Are Solved

Created comprehensive host detection utilities in `/lib/server/host.ts`
and `/lib/client/host.ts`:

**Server-side utilities:**
- `getOriginalHost()` - Returns the original user-facing host
- `getOriginalHostWithProtocol()` - Returns host with proper protocol
(http/https)
2025-09-23 16:21:01 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub 637b370c17 chore(login): Extract auth flow utilities and eliminate RSC request interference (#10644)
The /login route was experiencing issues with React Server Component
(RSC) requests interfering with one-time authentication callbacks. When
users navigated to /login via client-side routing (router.push()),
Next.js automatically triggered _rsc requests that could consume
single-use createCallback tokens, breaking OIDC and SAML authentication
flows.

# Which Problems Are Solved

When users attempt to log in, Next.js automatically makes requests with
the `_rsc=1` query parameter for React Server Components. The current
implementation treats these as server errors:

```typescript
// Before
if (_rsc) {
  return NextResponse.json({ error: "No _rsc supported" }, { status: 500 });
}
```

This results in:
- Spurious 500 error logs polluting monitoring systems
- False alerts for server failures 
- Difficulty distinguishing real issues from benign RSC requests

# How the Problems Are Solved

This PR implements a comprehensive refactoring that:

- Eliminates RSC interference by providing server actions for internal
auth flow completion
- Separates concerns between external flow initiation and internal flow
completion
- Extracts shared utilities to improve code maintainability and
reusability
- Maintains full backward compatibility for external applications

# Additional Context

## New Architecture
- auth-flow.ts: Shared utilities for auth flow completion with RSC
protection
- flow-initiation.ts: Extracted OIDC/SAML flow initiation logic (~400
lines)
- auth.ts: Server actions for internal components

## Route Handler Simplification
- route.ts: Reduced from ~350 lines to ~75 lines
- External-only focus: Now handles only flow initiation for external
applications
- Removed completion logic: External apps use their own callback URLs
- Enhanced validation: Early RSC blocking and parameter validation

## Flow Logic Improvements
- Early return patterns: Guard clauses eliminate deep nesting
- Better error handling: Specific error messages for different failure
modes
- Fixed SAML flow: Addressed incomplete logic
- Consistent session handling: Unified approach across OIDC and SAML
2025-09-22 16:09:20 +00:00
Max PeintnerandGitHub b6cbb68428 fix(login): MFA session validation to support multiple authentication methods (#10610)
Fixed an issue in `isSessionValid()` where users with multiple
configured MFA methods (e.g., TOTP and U2F) would have their sessions
incorrectly invalidated. The function previously used exclusive if-else
logic that only checked the first matching method, causing validation to
fail even when other configured methods were successfully verified.

Closes #10529 

# Which Problems Are Solved

[#10529](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10529)

# How the Problems Are Solved

- Replaced exclusive if-else if chain with inclusive validation logic
- Session is now considered valid if ANY configured MFA method has been
verified
- Improved error logging to show all configured methods and their
verification status

Example: A user with both TOTP and U2F configured can now successfully
authenticate using either method, whereas previously the session would
be invalid if they used U2F but TOTP was checked first.
2025-09-11 10:36:39 +02:00