# Which Problems Are Solved
- Token exchange rejects `urn:zitadel:iam:org:roles🆔{orgID}` when
that scope is not already present on the subject or actor token
(`invalid_scope`).
- A documented least-privilege pattern — exchanging a broad access token
for one whose roles claims are limited to a single organization — has
been broken since the v4.15.3 token-exchange hardening and was not
restored by #12312.
- A naive allow-any-`roles:id` exception would let a previously narrowed
token widen again (switch org filter, or drop the filter and get all
role orgs), including via an actor token's filter on actor-path
exchanges.
- A client-requested bare `urn:zitadel:iam:org:roles🆔` (empty org id)
is not a meaningful filter and should be rejected on exchange.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Treats `OrgRoleIDScope` as a restriction filter with downscope-only
semantics via `applyOrgRoleIDScopeDownscoping(requested,
ceilingScopes)`:
- union / standard exchange passes the **subject** token scopes as the
ceiling (actor filters ignored)
- impersonation (scopeless `user_id` / `id_token` subject) passes the
**actor** token scopes as the ceiling
- ceiling unfiltered → any requested `roles:id` is allowed (broad →
narrow)
- ceiling filtered → requested filters must be ⊆ that set
- ceiling filtered but request omits them → inherit the ceiling (omit
must not re-widen)
- Rejects a **client-requested** bare `urn:zitadel:iam:org:roles🆔` in
`validateTokenExchangeScopes` after normalize (before empty-request
fallback). Input tokens may still carry the bare prefix as a degenerate
ceiling; empty-request / omit inherit does not re-trigger the rejection.
- Keeps non-restriction scopes on the existing subject ∪ actor presence
checks.
- Adds unit coverage for downscope, further downscope, widen rejection,
omit-inherit, mixed subject/actor filters, empty-scope access/JWT
subjects, and bare-prefix request/ceiling cases.
- Adds an integration test for broad → `roles:id` filtered roles, plus a
second exchange that rejects widening to another org.
- Documents downscope-only and omit-inherit behavior in the reserved
scopes table and the token exchange guide.
# Additional Changes
- Updates the token-exchange guide Scope section to reflect that
authorization-related reserved scopes must already be present on input
tokens (aligned with the v4.15.3 hardening), rather than suggesting
scope can be freely extended.
# Additional Context
- Closes#12413
- Follow-up for PR #12312
- Related discussion in #11869 (recommended `roles:id` workaround; this
restores that path for token exchange without allowing filter widening)
- Behavior note for release notes: during token exchange, an existing
`urn:zitadel:iam:org:roles🆔*` filter on the subject is inherited when
omitted from the request, so role claims cannot re-widen.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Expose impersonating actor to `preAccessToken` and `preUserinfo`
actions.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Provide the `actor` information already present in the OIDC session
model of JWT token to the relevant actions. Both goja-based actions "v1"
and webhook based execution targets carry the actor information now.
Actor remains null in case of non-impersonated tokens. Actor may contain
nested actors to display a delegation chain of impersonators.
# Additional Changes
- dba6261c8ed0dfd00ffde6193910b1405b17432f: refactor `userinfoFlows` to
reduce complexity, add test coverage and solve a couple of potential
bugs.
- `getClientId` in actions was previously undocumented. Added to
documentation.
- A skill that reproduces manual testing using webhook.site or a local
sink.
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12097
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Wim Van Laer <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
#12313 lets clients register themselves as OIDC applications (RFC 7591),
but a dynamically registered client has no way to manage itself
afterwards:
- The registration response returns no `registration_access_token` and
no `registration_client_uri`, which RFC 7591 and 7592 clients (including
the MCP SDKs) expect in order to manage their own registration.
- There is no way to read back, update or delete a registration without
an operator acting on the client's behalf through the Console or the
Management API. A client that needs to rotate a redirect URI has to ask
a human.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Implement the [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
(RFC 7592)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7592): `GET`, `PUT`
and `DELETE` on `/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`, wired through the same
`op.WithSetRouter` hook as the registration endpoint.
## Control plane: the same security settings, no new switch
The management endpoints are gated on the
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings.enabled` introduced in #12313. No new
setting, no feature flag: a client that may register may manage what it
registered. When registration is disabled the endpoints answer `404`,
exactly as `POST /oauth/v2/register` does.
`allow_unauthenticated` selects the registration mode and does not apply
here, because the registration access token authorizes these endpoints
in both modes.
## Authorization: the registration access token, and nothing else
RFC 7592 §3 defines the credential as the registration access token
issued at registration and bound to a single client, not a user
credential. So a client manages only itself, proving it with the token
it was handed:
| | Registration (`POST`) | Management (`GET` / `PUT` / `DELETE`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Credential | Access token, or none in open mode | Registration access
token |
| Permission | `project.app.register_dynamic` in token mode | None |
Neither `project.app.register_dynamic`, which governs who may *create*
clients, nor `project.app.write` applies to the management endpoints.
One authorization path per endpoint is easier to reason about than two,
and there is no user identity to check against in the first place.
Operators keep managing dynamically registered clients through the
Management API and the Console, like any other application; they cannot
obtain a client's registration access token, by design.
Status codes: a missing, malformed or non matching token is `401`; a
client that no longer exists is `404`. The token's `client_id` is
checked against the path before any lookup, so a token bound to another
client is rejected without touching the database.
## The token itself
- **Stored like a client secret.** Only its passwap hash is persisted,
through a new
`project.application.config.oidc.registration_token.changed` event; the
plain token leaves the server exactly once, in the response that issues
it.
- **Bound to its client and organization** through authenticated
encryption with the instance key, the same mechanism as refresh tokens.
The opaque token handed to the client encrypts
`client_id:org_id:secret`, so the endpoint recovers the binding before
checking the secret against the stored hash.
- **Verified in O(1)** against the hash on the projection, folded into
the client lookup the handler already does, with a strongly consistent
fallback to the eventstore so a token that was just rotated is accepted
before it is projected.
- **Rotated on update** (RFC 7592 §4.4) and invalidated implicitly when
the client is deleted. A read does not rotate it. Every update rotates,
including one that changes no metadata, so a client always gets a usable
token back.
## Reusing the existing persistence
A small refactor extracts the shared OIDC application creation and
update logic (`pushOIDCApplication` gains a variadic `extraEvents`, and
`oidcApplicationChangeEvent` is lifted out of `UpdateOIDCApplication`),
so the dynamic commands reuse it without the permission check. The
registration token event is pushed atomically with the application, so a
registered client is never left unmanageable.
# Additional Changes
- Setup step **74** adds the `registration_token` column to the
`apps7_oidc_configs` projection, with a reducer for the new event
modelled on the client secret. Applications are not part of the
relational storage projection, so there is no second write path to keep
in sync.
- The registration response (`POST`) now also carries
`registration_access_token` and `registration_client_uri`.
- Docs: a "Manage a registration" section in the dynamic client
registration guide covering the three operations, the authorization
model, token rotation and the new limitations, plus the management
endpoints on the OIDC endpoints page.
- Unit tests for the command layer (issue, verify, rotate, update,
delete), the projection reducer, and the token binding and response
mapping. An integration test covers the full lifecycle (register, read,
update with rotation, delete, read again with `404`), a token bound to
another client, and the endpoints not being served when registration is
disabled. None of the integration calls carries a user access token,
which pins down that the management endpoints require no permission of
their own.
# Additional Context
- Part of the MCP authorization effort in #9810. Follow-up to #12313
(RFC 7591), which is now merged; this branch has been rebased on `main`
and carries the settings and authorization model agreed there.
- **Open question for the review**: the authorization model above
(registration access token only, no operator path through these
endpoints) is the one I proposed when #12313 was reviewed, but it was
never explicitly confirmed. If you would rather have `project.app.write`
also grant access to a client in the operator's own organization, that
is a contained change in `authorizeClientManagement`.
- Rotation is eventually consistent: right after an update the previous
token may keep working for a brief moment until the rotation is
projected, while the new token works immediately through the eventstore
fallback. This matches how ZITADEL validates access tokens, where
revocation is likewise eventually consistent. It is documented in the
guide and asserted as such in the integration test.
- A database migration is introduced for the new projection column. No
proto change and no new feature flag.
- Verified locally: full build, `go vet` including `-tags integration`,
`golangci-lint` with 0 issues, and the unit suites for every touched
package. As before, I cannot run the integration suite here, so CI
remains the check on it.
# Which Problems Are Solved
ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:
- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.
# How the Problems Are Solved
## Control plane: instance security settings
No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:
| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |
Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.
Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.
## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`
- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.
The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.
## Registration itself
- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.
# Additional Changes
- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).
# Additional Context
- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
## Which Problems Are Solved
The v4.15.3 token exchange hardening (`#12319`, `#12322`) introduced two
regressions:
1. **Logic bug**: scope validation used intersection (`!inSubject ||
!inActor`) instead of union, so any explicit `scope` on a `user_id`
subject always failed — even `openid` when present on the actor token.
2. **Design gap**: even with union logic, scope-less subjects
(`user_id`, `id_token`) cannot satisfy a rule that requires all
requested scopes to exist on input tokens. This breaks documented
impersonation flows (e.g. service account actor + `user_id` subject
requesting `email`).
## How the Problems Are Solved
- **Standard exchange** (no actor, or subject carries scopes): keep
union validation — requested scopes must be ⊆ subject ∪ actor. For plain
exchange this is effectively a subset of the subject token.
- **Scope-less subject impersonation** (`user_id`, `id_token` on actor
path): split validation:
- **Subject-data scopes** (`openid`, `profile`, `email`, …): client
allowlist only
- **Authorization scopes** (`offline_access`, `:aud`, `projects:roles`,
`role:*`): still ⊆ subject ∪ actor
- Restore subject → actor fallback when `scope` is omitted.
GHSA protections remain: cross-client token binding and
authorization-scope escalation are still rejected.
Closes#12319Closes#12322
## Additional Changes
- Unit tests for scope validators (`token_exchange_test.go`)
- Integration tests covering `user_id`/`id_token` paths, union-path
rejection, and client-credentials actor → `user_id` exchange
## Additional Context
- Relates to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.15.3
- Security fix: GHSA-vrh8-c9cm-wh8v
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* fix: added client and scope validation for token exchange
Verify that the token exchange is not cross client
Only yield scopes which were already on the initial token
* comments
* added test
# Which Problems Are Solved
Incorrectly mapped errors on the `/oauth/v2/token` endpoint lead to a
large number of HTTP status 500 errors.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By mapping invalid jwt assertion errors to OIDC `invalid_client` errors,
which returns a HTTP status 400.
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11924
- Follow-up:
- Fix the [error
handling](https://github.com/zitadel/oidc/blob/main/pkg/oidc/verifier.go#L195)
in the oidc package
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
* fix: add `Scopes` to `Request` interface so that scopes can be validated on all requests
* feat: assert org from scope exists when authorizing requests
* fix: check all scopes
* comments
* check org on callback creation
* fix tests
* clarifications
* fix scope marshaling
* fix: enfore organization for authrequest in initiation
* fix: filter sessions on the accounts page by organization scope
* add integration tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Inconsistent naming of service account, found in the following
variations:
- Machine User
- machine user
- Service User
- Machine Account
- Technical Account
- User: Type Machine
# How the Problems Are Solved
Attentive search and replace.
Localizations have been translated using Copilot
# Additional Changes
Some unused methods have been removed from the Go code.
# Additional Context
- Closes#11285
# Which Problems Are Solved
In many cases IAM was used where instance was meant.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Rename wrong usage of IAM to instance all over the code base.
- Add an agents.md which explains the terms used in Zitadel's
architecture.
# Additional Context
- closes#11280
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR marks the OAuth2 Token Exchange as general available (GA).
# How the Problems Are Solved
- API:
- deprecated the feature toggle (to prevent breaking changes) in v2beta
and v2 API
- removed all related event logic and updated the projection interation
- removed the toggle usage for token exchange
- removed related translations
- Management Console:
- removed the feature toggle and its translations
- Docs:
- removed all beta labels and feature toggle notes
# Additional Changes
- removed unused `Errors.WebKey.FeatureDisabled` translations
# Additional Context
- closes#11114
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
* fix: Improve host header handling and deployment mode detection
* ZITADEL_CLOUD env
* refactor service config
* service config
* cleanup
* cleanup
* util for original and public host
* instanceHost, publicHost
* cleanup constructUrl
* cleanup middleware
* add x-zitadel-forward-host as fallback for current cloud setup
* fix build
* fix: lint
* fix: update test mocks
* fix: provide basepath to unit tests
* host handling
* unit tests
* imports
* fix: getPublicHost instead of getInstanceHost
* unit tests
* update nextjs, implement jwt verify for logout_token
* pass logout information in jwt to login v2
* handle hosts in jwks url
* point idp callbacks to the api and not the login UI
* logout_hint out of logout token, typecheck
* rm unused imports
* fix oidc integration test
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
If the groups of a user is requested through a scope, details related to
the user's groups are added in the token claims.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By querying the user groups that the user is a part of, and setting them
in the token claims.
This PR introduces two scopes to request user groups: `groups` and
`urn:zitadel:iam:user:groups`
* `groups` returns an array of group names in the token claims with the
same name
* `urn:zitadel:iam:user:groups` returns an array of JSON objects with
information about the user groups in the token claims with the same name
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Closes#9702
- Follow-up for PRs:
* #10455
* #10853
* #10758
* #10940
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
#9861 added a `urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles` claims to include all
roles from all requested roles. The intention was to return them on the
userinfo endpoint. But since the claims might also be returned in the id
and access tokens, they can grow big quite fast and break the size
limits for headers.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR revert the feature. The information for roles of other projects
is already available as a dedicated claim (for each project):
```json
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:328813096124547391:roles": {
"r2": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"r3": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
}
},
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:341406882914631999:roles": {
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost",
"328237605990695334": "aa.localhost"
},
"test": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost",
"328237605990695334": "aa.localhost"
}
},
"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles": {
"r2": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"r3": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
},
"role": {
"306639557921669515": "zitadel.localhost"
}
}
```
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- relates to #9861
- noted issues in production
- requires backport to v4.x
# Which Problems Are Solved
The /userinfo endpoint only returns roles for the current project, even
if the access token includes multiple project aud scopes.
This prevents clients from retrieving all user roles across multiple
projects, making multi-project access control ineffective.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Modified the /userinfo handler logic to resolve roles across all valid
project audience scopes provided in the token, not just the current
project.
Ensured that if **urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles is in the scopes**,
roles from all declared project audiences are collected and included in
the response in **urn:zitadel:iam:org:projects:roles claim**.
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
This change enables service-to-service authorization workflows and SPA
role resolution across multiple project contexts with a single token.
- Closes#9831
---------
Co-authored-by: Masum Patel <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Tim Möhlmann <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Flakiness and conflicts in value from gofakeit.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Move Gofakeit calls to the integration package, to guarantee proper
usage and values for integration testing.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
None
# Which Problems Are Solved
Integration test failed sometimes with `organization already
exists`-errors.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Use a consistent function to generate name used for organization
creation.
# Additional Changes
Correct a eventual consistent test for username around organization
domain changes with eventual consistent loop.
# Additional Context
None
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The OIDC session endpoint allows to pass a `id_token_hint` to identify
the session to terminate. In case the application is not able to pass
that, e.g. Console currently allows multiple sessions to be open, but
will only store the id_token of the current session, allowing to pass
the `logout_hint` to identify the user adds some new possibilities.
# How the Problems Are Solved
In case the end_session_endpoint is called with no `id_token_hint`, but
a `logout_hint` and the v2 login UI is configured, the information is
passed to the login UI also as `login_hint` parameter to allow the login
UI to determine the session to be terminated, resp. let the user decide.
# Additional Changes
Also added the `ui_locales` as parameter to handle and pass to the V2
login UI.
# Dependencies ⚠️
~These changes depend on https://github.com/zitadel/oidc/pull/774~
# Additional Context
closes#9847
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco Ardizzone <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Remove the feature flag that allowed triggers in introspection. This
option was a fallback in case introspection would not function properly
without triggers. The API documentation asked for anyone using this flag
to raise an issue. No such issue was received, hence we concluded it is
safe to remove it.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Remove flags from the system and instance level feature APIs.
- Remove trigger functions that are no longer used
- Adjust tests that used the flag.
# Additional Changes
- none
# Additional Context
- Closes#10026
- Flag was introduced in #7356
---------
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Stabilize the usage of webkeys.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Remove all legacy signing key code from the OIDC API
- Remove the webkey feature flag from proto
- Remove the webkey feature flag from console
- Cleanup documentation
# Additional Changes
- Resolved some canonical header linter errors in OIDC
- Use the constant for `projections.lock` in the saml package.
# Additional Context
- Closes#10029
- After #10105
- After #10061
# Which Problems Are Solved
Stabilize the optimized introspection code and cleanup unused code.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- `oidc_legacy_introspection` feature flag is removed and reserved.
- `OPStorage` which are no longer needed have their bodies removed.
- The method definitions need to remain in place so the interface
remains implemented.
- A panic is thrown in case any such method is still called
# Additional Changes
- A number of `OPStorage` methods related to token creation were already
unused. These are also cleaned up.
# Additional Context
- Closes#10027
- #7822
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Resource management of projects and sub-resources was before limited by
the context provided by the management API, which would mean you could
only manage resources belonging to a specific organization.
# How the Problems Are Solved
With the addition of a resource-based API, it is now possible to manage
projects and sub-resources on the basis of the resources themselves,
which means that as long as you have the permission for the resource,
you can create, read, update and delete it.
- CreateProject to create a project under an organization
- UpdateProject to update an existing project
- DeleteProject to delete an existing project
- DeactivateProject and ActivateProject to change the status of a
project
- GetProject to query for a specific project with an identifier
- ListProject to query for projects and granted projects
- CreateProjectGrant to create a project grant with project and granted
organization
- UpdateProjectGrant to update the roles of a project grant
- DeactivateProjectGrant and ActivateProjectGrant to change the status
of a project grant
- DeleteProjectGrant to delete an existing project grant
- ListProjectGrants to query for project grants
- AddProjectRole to add a role to an existing project
- UpdateProjectRole to change texts of an existing role
- RemoveProjectRole to remove an existing role
- ListProjectRoles to query for project roles
# Additional Changes
- Changes to ListProjects, which now contains granted projects as well
- Changes to messages as defined in the
[API_DESIGN](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/API_DESIGN.md)
- Permission checks for project functionality on query and command side
- Added testing to unit tests on command side
- Change update endpoints to no error returns if nothing changes in the
resource
- Changed all integration test utility to the new service
- ListProjects now also correctly lists `granted projects`
- Permission checks for project grant and project role functionality on
query and command side
- Change existing pre checks so that they also work resource specific
without resourceowner
- Added the resourceowner to the grant and role if no resourceowner is
provided
- Corrected import tests with project grants and roles
- Added testing to unit tests on command side
- Change update endpoints to no error returns if nothing changes in the
resource
- Changed all integration test utility to the new service
- Corrected some naming in the proto files to adhere to the API_DESIGN
# Additional Context
Closes#9177
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
When requesting a JWT (`urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt`) to be
returned in a Token Exchange request, ZITADEL would panic if the `actor`
was not granted the necessary permission.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Properly check the error and return it.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- closes#9436
# Which Problems Are Solved
The OAuth2 Device Authorization Grant could not yet been handled through
the new login UI, resp. using the session API.
This PR adds the ability for the login UI to get the required
information to display the user and handle their decision (approve with
authorization or deny) using the OIDC Service API.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added a `GetDeviceAuthorizationRequest` endpoint, which allows getting
the `id`, `client_id`, `scope`, `app_name` and `project_name` of the
device authorization request
- Added a `AuthorizeOrDenyDeviceAuthorization` endpoint, which allows to
approve/authorize with the session information or deny the request. The
identification of the request is done by the `device_authorization_id` /
`id` returned in the previous request.
- To prevent leaking the `device_code` to the UI, but still having an
easy reference, it's encrypted and returned as `id`, resp. decrypted
when used.
- Fixed returned error types for device token responses on token
endpoint:
- Explicitly return `access_denied` (without internal error) when user
denied the request
- Default to `invalid_grant` instead of `access_denied`
- Explicitly check on initial state when approving the reqeust
- Properly handle done case (also relates to initial check)
- Documented the flow and handling in custom UIs (according to OIDC /
SAML)
# Additional Changes
- fixed some typos and punctuation in the corresponding OIDC / SAML
guides.
- added some missing translations for auth and saml request
# Additional Context
- closes#6239
---------
Co-authored-by: Tim Möhlmann <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Through configuration on projects, there can be additional permission
checks enabled through an OIDC or SAML flow, which were not included in
the OIDC and SAML services.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Add permission check through the query-side of Zitadel in a singular SQL
query, when an OIDC or SAML flow should be linked to a SSO session. That
way it is eventual consistent, but will not impact the performance on
the eventstore. The permission check is defined in the API, which
provides the necessary function to the command side.
# Additional Changes
Added integration tests for the permission check on OIDC and SAML
service for every combination.
Corrected session list integration test, to content checks without
ordering.
Corrected get auth and saml request integration tests, to check for
timestamp of creation, not start of test.
# Additional Context
Closes#9265
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
To be able to migrate or test the new login UI, admins might want to
(temporarily) switch individual apps.
At a later point admin might want to make sure all applications use the
new login UI.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added a feature flag `` on instance level to require all apps to use
the new login and provide an optional base url.
- if the flag is enabled, all (OIDC) applications will automatically use
the v2 login.
- if disabled, applications can decide based on their configuration
- Added an option on OIDC apps to use the new login UI and an optional
base url.
- Removed the requirement to use `x-zitadel-login-client` to be
redirected to the login V2 and retrieve created authrequest and link
them to SSO sessions.
- Added a new "IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT" role to allow management of users,
sessions, grants and more without `x-zitadel-login-client`.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8702
# Which Problems Are Solved
Integration tests are flaky due to eventual consistency.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Remove t.Parallel so that less concurrent requests on multiple instance
happen. This allows the projections to catch up more easily.
# Additional Changes
- none
# Additional Context
- none
Improve integration tests:
- spliting the tests in TokenExchange to isolated instances and in
parallel
- corrected some test structure so that the check for Details is no done
anymore if the test already failed
- replace required-calls with assert-calls to not stop the testing
- add gofakeit for application, project and usernames(emails)
- add eventually checks for testing in actions v2, so the request only
get called when the execution is defined
- check for length of results in list/search endpoints to avoid index
errors
# Which Problems Are Solved
Calls with tokens issued through JWT Profile or Client Credentials
Grants were no longer possible and threw a "could not read projectid by
clientid (AUTH-GHpw2)" error.
ZITADEL checks the allowed origins of an application and load its
projectID into the context on any API call.
Tokens from service accounts did not contain any clientID and therefore
never did that check.
But due to a change in https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/8580,
were the service user id was set as client_id in the OIDC session to fix
the introspection response
(https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8590).
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Check if the project and origin were retrieved and only then check the
origins
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
- closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8676
- relates to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/8580 (released on
2.62.0)
- relates to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8590
# Which Problems Are Solved
We identified the need of caching.
Currently we have a number of places where we use different ways of
caching, like go maps or LRU.
We might also want shared chaches in the future, like Redis-based or in
special SQL tables.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Define a generic Cache interface which allows different implementations.
- A noop implementation is provided and enabled as.
- An implementation using go maps is provided
- disabled in defaults.yaml
- enabled in integration tests
- Authz middleware instance objects are cached using the interface.
# Additional Changes
- Enabled integration test command raceflag
- Fix a race condition in the limits integration test client
- Fix a number of flaky integration tests. (Because zitadel is super
fast now!) 🎸🚀
# Additional Context
Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/8648
# Which Problems Are Solved
ZITADEL's user account deactivation mechanism did not work correctly
with service accounts. Deactivated service accounts retained the ability
to request tokens, which could lead to unauthorized access to
applications and resources.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Additionally to checking the user state on the session API and login UI,
the state is checked on all oidc session methods resulting in a new
token or when returning the user information (userinfo, introspection,
id_token / access_token and saml attributes)
# Which Problems Are Solved
In Zitadel, even after an organization is deactivated, associated
projects, respectively their applications remain active. Users across
other organizations can still log in and access through these
applications, leading to unauthorized access.
Additionally, if a project was deactivated access to applications was
also still possible.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Correctly check the status of the organization and related project.
(Corresponding functions have been renamed to `Active...`)
# Which Problems Are Solved
Use a single server instance for API integration tests. This optimizes
the time taken for the integration test pipeline,
because it allows running tests on multiple packages in parallel. Also,
it saves time by not start and stopping a zitadel server for every
package.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Build a binary with `go build -race -cover ....`
- Integration tests only construct clients. The server remains running
in the background.
- The integration package and tested packages now fully utilize the API.
No more direct database access trough `query` and `command` packages.
- Use Makefile recipes to setup, start and stop the server in the
background.
- The binary has the race detector enabled
- Init and setup jobs are configured to halt immediately on race
condition
- Because the server runs in the background, races are only logged. When
the server is stopped and race logs exist, the Makefile recipe will
throw an error and print the logs.
- Makefile recipes include logic to print logs and convert coverage
reports after the server is stopped.
- Some tests need a downstream HTTP server to make requests, like quota
and milestones. A new `integration/sink` package creates an HTTP server
and uses websockets to forward HTTP request back to the test packages.
The package API uses Go channels for abstraction and easy usage.
# Additional Changes
- Integration test files already used the `//go:build integration`
directive. In order to properly split integration from unit tests,
integration test files need to be in a `integration_test` subdirectory
of their package.
- `UseIsolatedInstance` used to overwrite the `Tester.Client` for each
instance. Now a `Instance` object is returned with a gRPC client that is
connected to the isolated instance's hostname.
- The `Tester` type is now `Instance`. The object is created for the
first instance, used by default in any test. Isolated instances are also
`Instance` objects and therefore benefit from the same methods and
values. The first instance and any other us capable of creating an
isolated instance over the system API.
- All test packages run in an Isolated instance by calling
`NewInstance()`
- Individual tests that use an isolated instance use `t.Parallel()`
# Additional Context
- Closes#6684
- https://go.dev/doc/articles/race_detector
- https://go.dev/doc/build-cover
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
jmaretteandGitHub
Gayathri VijayanandGitHub
Marco A.andGitHub
Stefan BenzandGitHub
