* fix: block Login V2 auth for users in deactivated organizations
Enforce organization state on session creation, OIDC token issuance/refresh,
and SAML session creation so deactivated org users cannot authenticate.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: reject claim serving for users in deactivated organizations
Require an active resource-owner org in OIDC userinfo and SAML attribute
paths, and use distinct error IDs for inactive user vs inactive org at
token issuance.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: drop sessions and tokens when an organization is deactivated
Mirror OrgRemoved cleanup for OrgDeactivated in the V2 session projection
and V1 auth user_session, token, and refresh_token handlers. Also delete
V2 sessions on OrgRemoved, which does not emit per-user removal events.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: reject API tokens from deactivated organizations
Check the caller's resource-owner org state in authz middleware via a
cached OrgByID lookup, so already-issued tokens lose ZITADEL API access
when their organization is deactivated. Return unauthenticated (401).
Target org remains unrestricted so instance admins can still manage
deactivated orgs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: invalidate OIDC refresh tokens after org deactivation
Reject refresh exchange if the user's organization was deactivated
after the refresh token was issued, so grants stay dead after reactivate.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix: invalidate V2 access tokens after org deactivation
Treat OrgDeactivated after the token position as session termination in
ActiveAccessTokenByToken, so issued ATs stay dead after reactivation.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(command): enforce permission check when issuing passkey enrollment codes
addUserPasskeyCode - behind CreatePasskeyRegistrationLink via
AddUserPasskeyCode / AddUserPasskeyCodeURLTemplate / AddUserPasskeyCodeReturn -
issued a passkey enrollment code without any authorization check.
The RPC's auth annotation carries user.passkey.write with no org_field, so the
API interceptor only verifies the caller's permission in the org taken from the
caller-supplied x-zitadel-orgid header, never the org that owns the target user.
The gRPC handlers additionally pass an empty resourceOwner, and the write model
lookup is instance-wide, so the code was minted against the victim's aggregate
regardless of org. An org owner of one organization could therefore issue a
passkey enrollment code for a user in another organization, enroll an
attacker-controlled authenticator and take over the account.
Authorize against the target user's actual resource owner, resolved from the
write model, before pushing the code requested event.
The check uses user.passkey.write - the permission the RPC already declares -
rather than user.credential.write used by the sibling RegisterUserPasskey. This
narrows the organization the permission is evaluated in without narrowing the
set of roles that may call the endpoint: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds
user.passkey.write but not user.credential.write, and would otherwise lose the
endpoint instance-wide.
The enrollment code stays a bearer credential by design, so the unauthenticated
login flows redeeming it are unaffected; issuance is the only place this can be
enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(command): guard cross-org passkey enrollment code issuance
The existing AddUserPasskeyCode* tests all use an allowed permission check, so
none of them fails if the authorization is removed again.
Assert the denial path instead: with the caller passing an empty resourceOwner,
as the v2 gRPC handlers do, the check must receive the target user's real
resource owner resolved from the write model, and no event may be pushed.
Without the check in addUserPasskeyCode all three subtests fail, one of them on
an unexpected Push - a code would actually have been issued.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(user/v2): simulate cross-org passkey registration link attack
End-to-end reproduction against a live instance: an org owner of one
organization requests a passkey registration link, with the request-header org
pinned to its own org, for a user that lives in another organization. Uses the
return-code medium so a successful response would carry the plaintext code,
making a missing denial impossible to pass silently.
The second subtest pins the other half of the contract: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds
user.passkey.write instance-wide and must keep working across organizations, so
the fix cannot be tightened into user.credential.write without regressing it.
No equivalent test for user/v2beta: it shares the same internal/command layer
and is fixed by the same change, but the API is deprecated, so the duplicate is
deliberately omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* refactor(command): generate passkey code only after the permission check
Review feedback: the code ID and the passkey code - the latter costs an extra
eventstore filter for the secret generator config - were produced before the
permission check, so an unauthorized caller still paid for both.
The write model is now built with an empty code ID, which is equivalent for
the lookup: the ID only matches events of an already existing code, and a code
about to be created has none. It is assigned right after the check so the
pushed event is still appended to the write model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(command): enforce permission check on v1 passwordless init codes
The deprecated management RPCs AddPasswordlessRegistration and
SendPasswordlessRegistration accept an attacker-controlled user_id and pass the
caller's own organization to the command. That organization only scopes the
write model's read, not the write: for a user of another organization the read
matches nothing, the write model keeps the caller's organization, and on push
the eventstore re-owns the event to the target's real organization
(internal/eventstore/v3/sequence.go). An org admin could therefore mint a
passwordless enrollment link for a user of any other organization and, after
correcting the orgID in the returned link, take the account over.
Same class of flaw as the v2 CreatePasskeyRegistrationLink issue, but a
different command, so the earlier fix does not reach it. Copying that fix
verbatim would not close it either: authorizing against the write model's
resource owner would authorize against the attacker's own organization, where
they legitimately hold the permission. The check is instead handed an empty
resource owner, which makes it resolve the target's real owner from the
eventstore.
The check sits in the two exported commands rather than in the shared inner
function, for two reasons:
- the RPCs declare different permissions, user.credential.write and
user.write. Hardcoding one would either lock IAM_USER_MANAGER and
ORG_USER_MANAGER out of SendPasswordlessRegistration or widen
AddPasswordlessRegistration to them. Access is preserved exactly.
- the inner function is also called by importHuman while creating a user,
whose aggregate has no events yet and whose owner cannot be resolved.
Self management stays allowed, so the auth API's AddMyPasswordlessLink and
SendMyPasswordlessLink are unaffected, as is anonymous redemption of the code
through the login UI - the init code is a bearer credential by design and
issuance is the only place this can be enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(command): guard cross-org v1 passwordless init code issuance
Asserts the organization handed to checkPermission, not merely that a denial
happened. A caller acting in org1 targeting a user of org2 must be authorized
against org2; a test that only asserted PermissionDenied would pass against the
attacker's own organization, where they hold the permission - which is exactly
how a fix copied from the v2 command would fail.
Also pins the permission per command, so a later attempt to hoist the check
into the shared inner function shows up as roles gaining or losing access, and
asserts that self management still skips the check for the auth API.
Negative controls, both confirmed:
- authorizing against the caller-supplied resource owner: the two RPC
subtests fail on org1 != org2.
- dropping the check: they fail on an unexpected ID generation and an
unfulfilled resource owner lookup, i.e. a code would have been issued.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(management): simulate cross-org passwordless registration link attack
Reproduces the attack against a live instance through the deprecated v1
management API, and pins the two access guarantees the fix has to keep.
Verified by running the three builds against a real instance:
| build | cross-org denied | IAM_USER_MANAGER can send |
|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| no check | FAIL, link with | PASS |
| | plaintext code | |
| | returned | |
| user.credential.write for both | PASS | FAIL, AUTH-AWfge |
| per-RPC permissions (shipped) | PASS | PASS |
Row 1 is the vulnerability. Row 2 is why SendPasswordlessRegistration keeps
user.write: IAM_USER_MANAGER holds it instance wide, and instance memberships
resolve in every organization, so the stricter permission would take the
endpoint away from that role everywhere.
ORG_USER_MANAGER gets no separate case: it holds the same user.write through an
org-scoped membership, which the same-org subtest already covers. The auth API's
self-service equivalents have no integration test suite; they are covered by the
self-management unit test instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* chore: trigger checks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Expose impersonating actor to `preAccessToken` and `preUserinfo`
actions.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Provide the `actor` information already present in the OIDC session
model of JWT token to the relevant actions. Both goja-based actions "v1"
and webhook based execution targets carry the actor information now.
Actor remains null in case of non-impersonated tokens. Actor may contain
nested actors to display a delegation chain of impersonators.
# Additional Changes
- dba6261c8ed0dfd00ffde6193910b1405b17432f: refactor `userinfoFlows` to
reduce complexity, add test coverage and solve a couple of potential
bugs.
- `getClientId` in actions was previously undocumented. Added to
documentation.
- A skill that reproduces manual testing using webhook.site or a local
sink.
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12097
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Wim Van Laer <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
- Native iOS/Android passkeys need OS trust files on the ZITADEL domain;
without them, Associated Domains / App Links verification fails.
- Operators could not configure iOS Team ID + Bundle ID or Android
package name + SHA-256 fingerprints on OIDC apps.
- `/.well-known/apple-app-site-association` and
`/.well-known/assetlinks.json` were not served from application config.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Add iOS/Android app-link fields on OIDC app create/update (Application
API v2 + Management), with validation.
- Persist and project those fields; query active app-link configs
instance-wide.
- Serve AASA (`webcredentials`) and Digital Asset Links
(`get_login_creds`) from well-known paths, with configurable
`Cache-Control` and fingerprint normalization at serve time.
- Console UI to edit the fields, with links to the well-known endpoints.
- Operator docs for configuration, endpoints, caching, and verification.
# Additional Changes
- Document on API fields that well-known responses may be HTTP-cached
and platform verifiers may delay propagation.
- Runtime config: `WellKnown.AppLinksCacheControlMaxAge` (default `5m`;
`0` → `no-store`).
# Additional Context
- Closes#12497
- Implemented and reviewed as stack:
- #12531 API contract
- #12532 storage wiring
- #12536 well-known endpoints
- #12537 console
- #12547 docs
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
- The `uri` label of `http.server.request_count` and
`http.server.return_code_counter` holds the concrete request path, so
every object ID served over a REST path becomes its own metric series.
On our v4.16.2 instance `/debug/metrics` exposes 8,000 series, 4,467 of
which (56%) belong to `http_server_return_code_counter_total` alone,
spread over 4,390 distinct `uri` values such as
`/v2/sessions/385063742120926058`. The set only grows with the number of
objects the installation has served.
- Paths matching no route are recorded verbatim, so unauthenticated
scanner traffic (`/wp-json/`, `/login.php`, …) keeps adding series.
- The grpc-gateway answers `405 Method Not Allowed` without going
through the configured `errorHandler`, so those responses never reported
a route pattern, not even before the regression.
This is a regression, first shipped in v4.11.0; v4.10.1 is unaffected.
#9286 introduced the mechanism, #9523 extended it to unknown paths, and
#11435 removed it while reorganising the middleware packages:
> Removed setting of URI to context in metric middleware. There were
only setters and no getters. (Unused value)
The getter was `*recorder.RequestURI` in `RegisterRequestCounter` /
`RegisterRequestCodeCounter`, which the same PR replaced with
`baseURI(r)`. Both ends went at once, so nothing failed.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- `metrics.WithRequestURIPattern` / `metrics.SetRequestURIPattern` are
back, and `metrics.RequestURI` is now the single place deciding what to
label with: the pattern a router reported, or the requested path if none
did. `UnknownPath` moved to the metrics package so every surface shares
one constant.
- The HTTP metrics middleware prepares the context before passing the
request on, which is the half that got dropped.
- `setRequestURIPattern` in the grpc-gateway reports the pattern to
metrics again, not only to tracing, and is now also called on the `405`
branch.
- Requests routed by chi (the OIDC endpoints) fall back to the pattern
chi matched. That covers the RFC 7592 client configuration routes added
in #12315 (`/oauth/v2/register/{client_id}`), which are templated on the
client ID, and collapses unknown paths below the OIDC prefixes to
`UNKNOWN_PATH` as well.
Against the metrics dump from our instance,
`http_server_return_code_counter_total` drops from 4,467 series to
roughly 35, and the endpoint as a whole from 8,000 to about 3,570.
# Additional Changes
- Regression tests, which were missing and are the reason the revert
went unnoticed:
- `metrics`: resolution of the `uri` label, including that a pattern set
on a derived context reaches the middleware.
- `gateway`: every way the gateway can answer — success, error,
unroutable path, wrong method.
- `middleware`: both routing styles, i.e. a router reporting its own
pattern and a chi routed request.
- A doc comment on `SetRequestURIPattern` explaining that it is written
by routers and read back by the middleware through the context, so it
does not read as an unused setter again.
# Additional Context
- Closes#12556
- Restores #9286 and #9523
- Regressed in #11435
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
ZITADEL cannot currently be used as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server by
clients that need to register themselves at runtime:
- There is no [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC
7591)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) endpoint, and no
`registration_endpoint` is advertised in the discovery document.
- This blocks [Model Context Protocol
(MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) clients (Claude Desktop,
claude.ai, Cursor, the MCP SDKs), whose OAuth 2.1 authorization profile
expects an Authorization Server that supports dynamic client
registration. They self-register before any user context exists and only
then start the authorization code + PKCE flow.
# How the Problems Are Solved
## Control plane: instance security settings
No feature flag and no runtime config. A
`DynamicClientRegistrationSettings` message is nested under the instance
`SecuritySettings` in `settings/v2`, next to `embedded_iframe` and
`enable_impersonation`:
| `enabled` | `allow_unauthenticated` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `false` (default) | — | `POST /oauth/v2/register` returns `404`,
`registration_endpoint` absent from discovery |
| `true` | `false` (default) | Token-gated registration, client homed in
the token's organization |
| `true` | `true` | Open registration for MCP hosts, client homed in the
instance default organization |
Both values are carried on `authz.Instance` and loaded with the
instance, exactly like `EnableImpersonation`, so the discovery document
and the endpoint read them per request without an extra query.
`allow_unauthenticated` implies `enabled` in both implementations, so a
single setting closes the endpoint.
Adding the two columns bumps the projection table to
`projections.security_policies3`, following what the impersonation
setting did for `security_policies2`.
## Authorization: a dedicated permission, not `project.app.write`
- New org-scoped permission **`project.app.register_dynamic`**, granted
by default to `ORG_OWNER`, `IAM_OWNER` and `IAM_ORG_MANAGER` — in both
`InternalAuthZ` and `SystemAuthZ`, mirroring where `project.app.write`
already lives.
- New built-in role **`ORG_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTRAR`** carrying only
that permission, so a service user can self-register clients without
gaining write access to the organization's existing applications.
- Open mode (`allow_unauthenticated = true`) requires no token and no
permission: that is the MCP self-register path.
- A valid token whose user lacks the permission is answered with **`403
insufficient_scope`** (RFC 6750 §3.1) rather than `401 invalid_token`,
so a caller can tell "your token is bad" from "your token may not do
this". `verifyAccessToken` also reports invalid tokens as permission
denied, so the authorization failure is marked explicitly to keep the
two apart.
The check runs once, at the endpoint, right after the token is verified
and before any state is created, so it also gates the auto-provisioning
of the organization's DCR project. The permission itself lives in the
command layer next to the others
(`Commands.CheckPermissionRegisterDynamicClient`). As the OIDC endpoints
are not behind the authorization interceptor, the caller identity is
derived from the verified token, the way token exchange does for the
impersonating actor.
## Registration itself
- **Registered clients are ordinary OIDC applications.** The endpoint
reuses the existing application-creation events
(`NewApplicationAddedEvent` and `NewOIDCConfigAddedEvent`), so the whole
token, authorization and introspection flow keeps working unchanged.
They are stored in a dedicated, auto-provisioned project named `ZITADEL
DCR` per organization (name lookup), so they do not pollute the
`IAMProject` or other projects.
- Input is validated with the existing `GetOIDCV1Compliance` rules;
`private_key_jwt` and `jwks`/`jwks_uri` are rejected with
`invalid_client_metadata`.
- **Endpoint wiring without forking the library.** `NewServer` calls
`op.RegisterServer` instead of `op.RegisterLegacyServer`, so the new
route can be added through the same `op.WithSetRouter` hook as the
authorize callback. `op.RegisterLegacyServer` appends a middleware after
the caller options, which chi forbids once a route has been registered;
`op.NewIssuerInterceptor` reproduces the issuer middleware it would
otherwise add. The `/oauth/v2` routing prefix is unchanged.
# Additional Changes
- **`application_type` inference for custom-scheme redirects** (last
commit, isolated). `application_type` is an OpenID Connect member; RFC
7591 does not define it, so clients that only implement RFC 7591 omit
it. Native MCP hosts doing so register custom-scheme redirect URIs,
which ZITADEL reserves for native applications, and the OIDC default of
`web` rejected them with `invalid_redirect_uri`. Inference is limited to
custom schemes and to an absent `application_type`, so every request
accepted today keeps its current application type and auth method — an
`http` loopback redirect still yields a web application. Happy to drop
this commit if you would rather keep it out of this PR.
- **Docs**: a Dynamic Client Registration integration guide, a
`registration_endpoint` section on the OpenID Connect endpoints page,
and the new role in the administrators table (plus its description in
the Console translations).
# Additional Context
- Part of #9810. This is **Phase 1 (DCR)**; #12315 adds RFC 7592 and
#12316 adds CIMD, both stacked on this branch and rebased once this
lands.
- Implements the control-plane and authorization model requested in the
review of this PR, itself a refinement of the direction in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/9810#issuecomment-4891176997.
- **Out of scope (deliberately)**: RFC 7592, CIMD, persisting free-form
metadata (`logo_uri`, `contacts`, and similar), and `private_key_jwt` /
`jwks_uri` (rejected cleanly). No new event types.
- Follow-ups explicitly left out, per the review: DCR client lifecycle
and richer audit, consent and custom scopes, JWT / `aud` (RFC 8707), and
RFC 8414 AS metadata (currently absent from both ZITADEL and
`zitadel/oidc`).
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR adds support for using a ZITADEL IdP provider in the login v1 UI
flow and conditionally grants a support-user instance membership based
on a ZITADEL-specific project-roles token claim.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Introduced ZITADEL IdP handling in the login v1 handler, including
extracting the `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles` claim and granting
`IAM_OWNER_VIEWER` instance membership when configured orgs match.
- Added a new `AddInstanceMemberFromLogin` to assign an instance
membership during the login v1 ZITADEL-IdP flow without permission
checks (as the authorization is established based on the project roles
in the token claim)
- Added unit tests
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12446
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR extends `StartIdentityProviderIntent` and
`RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent` for the new Zitadel provider.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added `domain.IDPTypeZitadel` cases to both the instance and org
switches in `NewAllIDPWriteModel` to return Zitadel provider when
`GetProvider` is called
- Added Zitadel provider to RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent's provider
type-switch
- Added new `zitadel.go` provider, an OIDC wrapper with forced PKCE
- Added unit/integration tests
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12050
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR extends the Settings Login API (v2 and v2beta) to include
ZITADEL IdP in the list of IdPs returned by `GetActiveIdentityProviders`
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added `IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` to Settings
IdentityProviderType enums (v2 and v2beta) and updated domain display
name handling.
- Updated Settings gRPC converters (v2 and v2beta) to map
`domain.IDPTypeZitadel` to the new proto enum value
- Added unit/integration tests
# Additional Changes
Correctly map `domain.IDPTypeApple` to
`IdentityProviderType_IDENTITY_PROVIDER_TYPE_APPLE` in v2beta instead of
unspecified.
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12401
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR extends `DeleteProvider` to include Zitadel provider enabling
the deletion of Zitadel IdP.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Extend org/instance IDP remove write models to include
`ZitadelIDPAddedEvent` in event appends and queries.
- Extend command-side IDP reduction/type handling for Zitadel IDP add
events.
- Add management/admin integration tests for deleting Zitadel providers
- Add error translation key in all language locales for org-level “IDP
config not existing”.
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context.
Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12397
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR extends the functionality of `GetProviderByID`, `ListProviders`
v1 endpoints and `GetIDPByID` v2 endpoint to also return Zitadel IdP
when queried.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Add `PROVIDER_TYPE_ZITADEL` and a `ZitadelConfig` to
`zitadel.idp.v1.ProviderConfig` (v1 APIs).
- Add `IDP_TYPE_ZITADEL`, `ZitadelConfig`, `InstanceRolesInfo` in v2
`idp.proto`
- Extend internal/query IDP template querying to include a
`ZitadelIDPTemplate` (incl. issuer, client credentials, scopes, instance
roles info).
- Add/extend integration tests for updating + fetching providers by ID
and listing providers.
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/12051
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* Use slices.Contains over custom function
* Correctly remove roles from granted roles
* fix(setup): repair user grants with stale roles (GHSA-v859-c572-qh5p)
Add setup step 73 that reconciles existing user grants whose roles were
left too broad by the buggy cascade removal in removeRoleFromUserGrant.
The corruption lives in the eventstore event payloads, so the step pushes
a corrective user.grant.cascade.changed event per affected grant (roles
intersected with the currently valid set) and re-triggers the user grant
projection. Runs in the second setup slice, after the projection tables
it reads have been created.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(setup): scope GHSA-v859-c572-qh5p repair to grant-based user grants
Direct user grants can never be hit by this bug (only ChangeProjectGrant's
multi-role cascade to grant-based grants can trigger it), so drop the
direct-grant branch from the finder query to avoid stripping unrelated,
legitimate roles that merely mismatch for other reasons (e.g. stale
role_key drift). Also exclude removed instances from the migration scope,
and log the number of grants fixed per instance.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Zitadel exposes the secrets generator configuration through its admin
api. This allows instance admins to manage them on their own and they
can create overwrite the system / runtime defaults (incl. expiration).
This very much needed in multi-instance scenarios such as zitadel.cloud.
Currently the invite code configuration was not manageable through the
API, but only runtime config.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- added the `invite_code` type to the API allowing it to be set and
retrieved.
- added the type to console's management list
- added the type to be stored on instance setup
- change the `GetSecretGenerator` endpoint to fall back to the runtime
config if no config is stored on the instance itself
- ensure the `length` and at least one charset is enabled, return an
error otherwise
- expiry is not enforced, so 0 allows codes with no expiry (current
state)
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10474
# Which Problems Are Solved
- Upgrading to `zitadel/passwap` v0.12.1 introduced new encoded-hash
validation paths that still had review feedback open.
- Secret hasher defaults were internally inconsistent (`Hasher.Cost: 4`
vs `Limits.Bcrypt.MinCost: 10`), which could reject hashes created by
the configured hasher.
- New validation error IDs/messages and test coverage needed to be
aligned with project conventions and expected behavior branches.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Kept the dependency upgrade to `zitadel/passwap` v0.12.1 and completed
the validation integration.
- Updated `ValidateEncodedHash` error handling in
`internal/crypto/passwap.go` to:
- use unique random-style error IDs,
- return `Errors.Hash.NotSupported` for no-verifier cases,
- keep invalid-hash branches mapped to invalid argument errors.
- Expanded `TestHasher_ValidateEncodedHash` in
`internal/crypto/passwap_test.go` to cover and assert:
- bounds error branch,
- no-verifier branch,
- generic invalid-hash branch,
- expected ZITADEL error IDs/messages.
- Restored lost inline verifier-context comments for argon2 and md5plain
verifier entries.
# Additional Changes
- Added the missing explanatory `Limits` comment for `SecretHasher` in
`cmd/defaults.yaml`.
- Corrected `SecretHasher.Limits.Bcrypt.MinCost` from `10` to `4` to
match the configured default bcrypt cost and avoid configuration
footguns.
# Additional Context
- Follow-up for PR review feedback in
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12179#pullrequestreview-4313121965
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
- Removed redundant relational instance handling in integration tests
for adding and removing custom domains.
- Simplified test cases by consolidating instance creation and context
management.
- Enhanced clarity and maintainability of test logic by reducing
complexity in test structures.
# Which Problems Are Solved
`backed/v3` tests are flaky, but the code is not productive. Development
is paused for the moment. Disabling flaky tests helps us to maintain the
product easier.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Removed redundant relational instance handling in integration tests
for adding and removing custom domains.
- Simplified test cases by consolidating instance creation and context
management.
- Enhanced clarity and maintainability of test logic by reducing
complexity in test structures.newly introduced terms).
# Additional Context
- related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12241
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR introduces the possibility of using the relational DB when
calling the ListSession gRPC endpoint.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Implement the Querier interface for ListSession:
- Create a `domain` model for the Session object to be able to map the
gRPC session into it.
- Match the permission filters on ES side to be sure the same sessions
are returned
- Implement converter methods to go from `gRPC` to `domain` models (both
ways)
- Fix the session sql relational migration: rework the trigger to update
the `expiration` field to perform the update only when the input
`lifetime` has a non-zero value.
- Link the Querier implementation with the gRPC endpoint
- Run the same integration tests against the relational DB, making sure
the outcome is the same. ⚠️ Due to missing permission checks, some
divergence is expected. Hence, specific code to circumvent the
differences has been put in place
# Additional Context
- Closes#11039
# Which Problems Are Solved
Users exporting larger orgsanizations were facing grpc message size
limits of 4 MiB, while trying to export 6.3 MiB of data. Other export
methods like S3 aren't implemented.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Set MaxSendMsgSize to 10 MiB (allow some overhead). This is not a
long-term solution and we should investigate better ways of export.
# Additional Changes
- none
# Additional Context
- Support ticket
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR adds implementation to add a Zitadel IdP at the
organization-level.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added handling/converters for the `AddZitadelProvider` endpoint in
`ManagementService` in the server layer
- Registered a new `org.idp.zitadel.added` event for org-level Zitadel
providers
- Added `AddOrgZitadelProvider` command to validate the request and push
`org.idp.zitadel.added` event to the eventstore
- Added the `org.idp.zitadel.added` event to the projection reducer
- Added unit and integration tests
# Additional Changes
added more tests for the ZitadelProvider in AdminService
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11823
- Follow-up for PRs https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12018,
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12020,
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12055
This update introduces a new table for managing administrator role
permissions, along with the necessary repository and projection logic to
handle adding and removing permissions. It also includes tests to ensure
the correct functionality of the permission management system.
closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/10219
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco Ardizzone <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR contains the command-layer implementation to add an instance IDP
of the type `ZitadelProvider`
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Implementing `AddZitadelProvider` in AdminService
- Adding the command-layer to create a `ZitadelProvider` and push
`ZitadelIDPAddedEvent`
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11823
- Follow-up for PR https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/12018
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Opaque tokens now use authenticated encryption.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Upgrade zitadel/oidc to v3.47
- Copy crypto implementation for refresh and session tokens (internal to
zitadel)
- Added config that allows validating old tokens for gradual roll-out
# Additional Changes
- Set NX cache for `integration-test-build` to `false`, working on a
seperate fix.
# Additional Context
- closes#11315
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
As part of https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11917 we want to
introduce error slugs so (API) clients can rely on stable,
machine-readable errors and act accordingly.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added a `NewSlug` helper function in the domain package.
- Added `ErrorDetails` to the `ZitadelError`
- Added an `zitadel.error.v2.ErrorDetail` proto message
- Updated the connectRPC error interceptor to map new slug based errors
to the new `ErrorDetail`
- Defined some common slugs and error functions like internal errors
- Defined (session) specific slugs used in the `DeleteSession` and
`CheckUser` functions and replaced old implementations
- Updated integration tests to check specific errors if the relation
database feature is enabled
- Updated doc and guideline to reflect the latest changes and decisions
- Updated DeleteSession endpoint API to list possible slugs
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- closes#11957
---------
Co-authored-by: Wim Van Laer <[email protected]>
Fixes#11730
The v1 gRPC middleware can return native gRPC status errors such as
`codes.Unauthenticated` when the auth header is missing.
Those errors were being passed through the generic gRPC error converter,
which only handled ZITADEL errors and downgraded raw gRPC statuses to
`codes.Unknown`.
Through grpc-gateway that caused `/auth/v1/users/me` to return HTTP 500
instead of HTTP 401.
So this change preserves native gRPC status errors in
`ZITADELToGRPCError`, keeps `ExtractZITADELError` aligned with those
transport codes for activity reporting, and adds regression coverage for
the converter, middleware, and gateway HTTP behavior.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gayathri Vijayan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
#11975 introduces new APIs to `SettingsService`, however,
`settingsconnect.SettingsServiceHandler` wasn't updated to satisfy the
interface containing the new APIs.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By adding a dummy implementation of new RPC methods to the
SettingsService Server.
# Additional Changes
n/a
# Additional Context
n/a
# Which Problems Are Solved
- Recovery codes added via `GenerateRecoveryCodes` were never listed as
active authentication methods by `ListAuthenticationMethodTypes`. The
`user_auth_method` projection reducer (`reduceInitAuthMethod`) set the
state to `MFAStateNotReady`, expecting a subsequent verification event
to transition it to `MFAStateReady`. Unlike TOTP, U2F, and Passwordless
— which all have distinct verification events — recovery codes have no
such event, so they were permanently stuck in `NotReady`.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Introduced a dedicated `reduceAddRecoveryCodes` reducer for
`HumanRecoveryCodesAddedEvent` that sets `MFAStateReady` immediately,
since recovery codes are usable as soon as they are generated.
- Uses `NewUpsertStatement` (instead of `NewCreateStatement`) so that
regenerating recovery codes for the same user updates the existing row
rather than failing on a duplicate key conflict.
- Removed the `HumanRecoveryCodesAddedEvent` case from
`reduceInitAuthMethod`.
# Additional Changes
- Added `UserAuthMethodTypeRecoveryCode` mapping in `authMethodTypeToPb`
unit test.
- Added integration tests for `ListAuthenticationMethodTypes` covering
both the "recovery codes present" and "recovery codes removed" cases.
# Additional Context
* https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11317
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
As part of moving the session API to the relational database, this PR
adds the functionality to delete sessions through the session API v2 and
the OIDC end_session endpoint.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- added `SessionDeleteCommand` in domain package
- added possibility to pass the session token verifier to the domain
package
- use feature flag to switch API and OIDC usage from CQRS to relation
table
- added a `permissionCheck` condition to let permissions be checked
directly in the repository / sql
- part of it is still a placeholder until actual permission tables are
done
- added a `session_deleted` table to store (recently) deleted sessions
to handle necessary checks / cases like delete my own session, which
needs to be idempotent
# Additional Changes
Fixed `Matches` function of `existsCondition` (as missing an
implementation)
# Additional Context
- closes#11037
---------
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
In the "new" structured logging, request details were added in different
middlewares, such as request, instance and user IDs. This meant the the
upstream request logging middleware did not have access to metadata that
got added later, resulting in incomplete logs. Furthermore it was not
possible to correlate an API error response to log output.
# How the Problems Are Solved
A mutable request details object is added to the context early on. When
the api authz function run, the instance and user IDs are added to this
object as they become available. Every logline emitted after this
(time-wise) will then all contain these details under the `request` log
group.
<details>
<summary>example output in JSON</summary>
```json
{
"time": "2026-03-13T19:21:20.890428806Z",
"level": "INFO",
"source": {
"function": "github.com/zitadel/zitadel/internal/api/grpc/server/connect_middleware.LogHandler.func1.1",
"file": "/workspaces/zitadel/internal/api/grpc/server/connect_middleware/log_interceptor.go",
"line": 34
},
"msg": "request served",
"request": {
"id": "d6q67c04vtjmi77cbbpg",
"instance_host": "localhost:8080",
"instance_id": "362349751439458307",
"user_id": "362349751440048131"
},
"TraceID": "a9e0fee3522224f3583bbdcda737f4b4",
"SpanID": "a563056eee36920a",
"stream": "request",
"version": "2026-03-13T19:20:59Z",
"protocol": "connect",
"service": "zitadel.user.v2.UserService",
"http_method": "POST",
"path": "/zitadel.user.v2.UserService/ListUsers",
"code": "code_0",
"duration": 12254350
}
```
</details>
Request IDs are now also returned with a response header or metadata.
Depending on the protocol:
- HTTP calls always return the request ID as header, regardless of
status
- gRPC calls always return the request ID as header, even if there was
an error
- connect RPC calls returns the request ID as header on success, trailer
in case of error. This is because header must be set on the response
object, which is nil in case of error. When there is an error, metadata
can be added which are then sent as trailers.
# Additional Changes
- Use the existing call duration middleware for both request ID and
logging for a consistent request start timestamp in all layers.
- Upgrade sloggcp for some fixes (notably TraceID)
- Modify the NoCache middleware so it uses `SetHeaders` instead of
`SendHeaders`. The latter prevented any other handler from setting
headers, including the new request ID middleware.
# Additional Context
Follow up on demo of:
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11159
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11435
- backport to v4
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: muhlemmer <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
* fix: add `Scopes` to `Request` interface so that scopes can be validated on all requests
* feat: assert org from scope exists when authorizing requests
* fix: check all scopes
* comments
* check org on callback creation
* fix tests
* clarifications
* fix scope marshaling
* fix: enfore organization for authrequest in initiation
* fix: filter sessions on the accounts page by organization scope
* add integration tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
We found multiple cases where potentially a panic occurred or could
occur:
- when de/encrypting certain information
- returning apps without any configuration type (?)
- apple IdPs without a proper private key
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Added nil checks
- Check private key format for apple IdPs
- Added necessary helper function
# Additional Changes
Fixed i18n yaml where the IDP errors were indented under `org` instead
of directly under `errors`.
# Additional Context
- requires backport to v4.x
---------
Co-authored-by: Marco A. <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
It was possible to create a user with an imaginary org.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Check whether org exists before creating the user.
# Additional Changes
# Additional Context
- Closes#11532
# Which Problems Are Solved
Adds support for returning CreateUser/UpdateUser action payloads from
RetrieveIdentityProviderIntent so Actions v2 can update user metadata
(and other fields) using the v2 user APIs, ensuring parity with user
creation using Actions v2.
# How the Problems Are Solved
By:
- deprecating `AddHumanUser` and `UpdateHumanUser` fields in
`RetrieveIdentityProviderIntentResponse`
- adding a oneof field called `UserAction` with `CreateUser` and
`UpdateUser` fields to support user creation/update
- setting `UserAction` in the `RetrieveIdentityProviderIntentResponse`
for user creation/update
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11369
- Follow-up for PRs https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11719,
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/pull/11747
- Actions V2 example docs will be updated in a follow-up PR
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
In #11239 , the helper function for matrix tests (without the relational
tables enabled) was changed, but the feature was never enabled in the
matrix. Some integration tests currently can't even succeed because of
missing implementations.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR correctly enables the feature where intended and returns the
state into the matrix.
This allows returning early for some tests which cannot succeed yet.
Corresponding todos have been re-added as well.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- relates to #11239
- requires backport to v4.x
# Which Problems Are Solved
Panics may cause a service discruption by unexpectedly closing an
request's connection. Or in the case of gRPC completely killing the
service.
Allthough panics are still individual bugs that need to be solved, this
PR makes sure a panic is gracefully handled and an understandable error
is returned to the client.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Recover in the middleware interceptors for the 3 API protocols (HTTP,
gRPC, connect).
- HTTP middleware uses formatted responses for:
- OIDC errors (JSON formatted response)
- UI (error page rendering)
- SCIM
- Upon recovery an alert level log is printed (ERROR+4 for stdlib log
handlers)
# Additional Context
- internal observation
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Renaming of:
- Resource Owner
- OrgID
- OrganizationID
- Organization Id
# How the Problems Are Solved
Find & Replace, evalue entries, is resource owner referring to an
organization ? If so, do change
# Additional Context
- Closes#11305
# Which Problems Are Solved
Currently, metadata can be set/updated only for human users, but it
should be available also for service accounts (machine users).
# How the Problems Are Solved
This is achieved by:
- adding a metadata field at the root level in `CreateUserRequest`,
which makes it available for both `human` and `machine` user types
- returning an error when both the root level and human-level `metadata`
fields are set in the `CreateUserRequest`
- setting `human` and `machine` metadata from the root `metadata` field
in the server layer
- pushing `user.metadata.set` event during machine user creation in the
command layer
- adding integration tests
# Additional Changes
N/A
# Additional Context
- Related to https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11369
---------
Co-authored-by: Vitor Bari Buccianti <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Silvan <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
1. `nx run @zitadel/api:test-unit` panics in
`TestCommandSide_ChangeUserHuman` due to two test cases (added in
0261536) missing the required `loginPaths` field. Since the field type
is `func(*testing.T) LoginPaths`, its zero value is `nil`, and calling
it causes a SIGSEGV.
2. Three targets in `apps/api/project.json` (`test-unit`, `build`,
`build-linux`) were silently non-cacheable because NX does not merge
`cache: true` from `targetDefaults` when a project-level target
overrides other properties like `dependsOn` or `inputs`.
3. `TestServer_AuthorizeOrDenyDeviceAuthorization` integration test is
flaky — it uses hardcoded `5*time.Second` timeouts for `EventuallyWithT`
polling, while the rest of the file uses
`WaitForAndTickWithMaxDuration(ctx, time.Minute)`. Under CI load, 5
seconds is insufficient and the empty ID cascades into a validation
error.
# How the Problems Are Solved
**Test panic fix:**
- Added missing `loginPaths: expectLoginPathsNoCall` to both broken test
cases ("change human email verified (self-management), not allowed" and
"change human phone verified (self-management), not allowed").
**NX cache fix:**
- Added explicit `"cache": true` to `test-unit`, `build`, and
`build-linux` targets in `apps/api/project.json`.
- Verified with `pnpm nx show project @zitadel/api --json` that all
three targets now resolve with `cache: true`.
**Integration test flakiness fix:**
- Replaced all 6 hardcoded `assert.EventuallyWithT(t, ...,
5*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)` calls in
`TestServer_AuthorizeOrDenyDeviceAuthorization` with
`require.EventuallyWithT(t, ..., retryDuration, tick)` using
`integration.WaitForAndTickWithMaxDuration(CTXLoginClient,
time.Minute)`.
- Changed from `assert` (non-fatal) to `require` (fatal) so timeout
failures stop the test immediately instead of cascading with empty IDs.
# Additional Context
- The broken unit test landed on main because CI skips `lint_test_build`
on pushes to main (`if: github.ref != 'refs/heads/main'`). A follow-up
issue was created: #11696.
- The integration test flakiness was missed by the previous fix in
#10752.
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
This PR adds support for storing and retrieving refresh tokens from
external identity providers during the IDP intent flow.
# How the Problems Are Solved
* Updated `idp.proto` (v2 and v2beta): added an optional `refresh_token`
field to `IDPOAuthAccessInformation`, which, in turn, is used in
`RetrieveIdentityProviderIntentResponse`
* Added the `IDPRefreshToken` field to the IDP intent `SucceededEvent`
struct, and updated the corresponding constructor to set the refresh
token
* Added the `IDPRefreshToken` field to `IDPIntentWriteModel`, and
updated `reduceOAuthSucceededEvent` to populate refresh token from
events
* Updated `tokensForSucceededIDPIntent` function to extract and encrypt
the refresh token from IDP session, if set
* Updated `idpOAuthTokensToPb` function to decrypt refresh token before
returning to clients
* Updated unit and integration tests
# Additional Changes
Updated the link to the JWT IDP docs linked in the Console
# Additional Context
- Closes https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/issues/11047
# Which Problems Are Solved
The user service v2 didn't allow the specify or change the access token
type for users of type machine and referred to using the management API,
which in return was already deprecated and linked to the user service.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Added a possibility to specify the access token type in the creation and
update request.
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- closes#10850
- requires backport to v4.x
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
Livio SpringandGitHub
jmaretteandGitHub
gayathriandGitHub
Vitor Bari BucciantiandGitHub
Mridang AgarwallaandGitHub
