* feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard
Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides
whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified
primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for
onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check.
This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which
is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the
remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment
addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to
a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting
a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could
therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account
and then complete a login as the victim.
Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or
verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is
persisted.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment
verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any
session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form
without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a
second factor on a victim's account.
Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now
render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is
not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added
guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment
The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup
for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first
factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's
login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to
plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim.
Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit
enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or
an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before
BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also
bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a
credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code
(mail/onboarding) path is unchanged.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path
Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review
(Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based
passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover:
- The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button
and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link
(the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused).
- Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the
emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched.
- The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack.
Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack
surface:
- delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route
(keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page
for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep),
- make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only
the init-code path,
- drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl
template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup /
HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service
and the v2 passkey APIs).
A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid
code now falls through to the init-code path and fails.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
<!--
Please inform yourself about the contribution guidelines on submitting a
PR here:
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#submit-a-pull-request-pr.
Take note of how PR/commit titles should be written and replace the
template texts in the sections below. Don't remove any of the sections.
It is important that the commit history clearly shows what is changed
and why.
Important: By submitting a contribution you agree to the terms from our
Licensing Policy as described here:
https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/LICENSING.md#community-contributions.
-->
One-time recovery codes are a common multi-factor authentication (MFA)
backup method, letting users access their account if they lose other MFA
devices. Support for recovery codes can also reduce support burden for
users locked out of their accounts and provide a more secure and
reliable form of verification than security questions.
# Which Problems Are Solved
Zitadel currently lacks support for recovery codes.
# How the Problems Are Solved
This PR partially addresses recovery code support in Zitadel.
Importantly, it adds recovery codes as a new 2FA `Factor` and an
additional `Check` type for the Session API.
```
Example recovery code flow:
1. User generates N new recovery codes using `POST /v2/users/{user_id}/recovery_codes`
2. Zitadel hashes and stores these codes and returns the un-hashed codes in the response
3. User creates new session with an additional check: `recoveryCode`
4. Code is checked against hash and, if valid, cannot be used again
5. User attempts to adds N more codes using the same endpoint
6. If `remaining_codes + N <= RecoveryCodes->MaxCount` config value, then recovery codes are added in addition to original codes
7. User can remove all recovery codes using `DEL /v2/users/:userId/recovery_codes`
```
This PR adds:
- [x] Session recovery_code check support on `POST+PATCH /v2/sessions`
endpoints
- [x] Adds `mfa_recovery_code_checked_at` column (default null) to
`projections.sessions8` table
- [x] Support for `SECOND_FACTOR_TYPE_RECOVERY_CODES` as available 2FA
method on login policy
- [x] Support for importing recovery codes in /import code
Missing, will _not_ implement in this PR:
- [ ] Admin console support for displaying Recovery Code settings for
user(s)
- [ ] Zitadel Typescript login support for recovery codes
TODO:
- [x] Additional unit and integration tests
- [x] Error translations
# Additional Changes
None
# Additional Context
- Closes#6898
---------
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
Some OAuth2 and OIDC providers require the use of PKCE for all their
clients. While ZITADEL already recommended the same for its clients, it
did not yet support the option on the IdP configuration.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- A new boolean `use_pkce` is added to the add/update generic OAuth/OIDC
endpoints.
- A new checkbox is added to the generic OAuth and OIDC provider
templates.
- The `rp.WithPKCE` option is added to the provider if the use of PKCE
has been set.
- The `rp.WithCodeChallenge` and `rp.WithCodeVerifier` options are added
to the OIDC/Auth BeginAuth and CodeExchange function.
- Store verifier or any other persistent argument in the intent or auth
request.
- Create corresponding session object before creating the intent, to be
able to store the information.
- (refactored session structs to use a constructor for unified creation
and better overview of actual usage)
Here's a screenshot showing the URI including the PKCE params:
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
- Closes#6449
- This PR replaces the existing PR (#8228) of @doncicuto. The base he
did was cherry picked. Thank you very much for that!
---------
Co-authored-by: Miguel Cabrerizo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The current login will always prefer external authentication (through an
IdP) over local authentication. So as soon as either the user had
connected to an IdP or even when the login policy was just set up to
have an IdP allowed, users would be redirected to that IdP for
(re)authentication.
This could lead to problems, where the IdP was not available or any
other error occurred in the process (such as secret expired for
EntraID).
Even when local authentication (passkeys or password) was allowed for
the corresponding user, they would always be redirected to the IdP
again, preventing any authentication. If admins were affected, they
might not even be able to update the client secret of the IdP.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Errors during the external IdP flow are handled in an
`externalAuthFailed` function, which will check if the organisation
allows local authentication and if the user has set up such.
If either password or passkeys is set up, the corresponding login page
will be presented to the user. As already with local auth passkeys is
preferred over password authentication.
The user is informed that the external login failed and fail back to
local auth as an error on the corresponding page in a focused mode. Any
interaction or after 5 second the focus mode is disabled.
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
closes#6466
* init auto linking
* prompt handling
* working
* translations
* console
* fixes
* unify
* custom texts
* fix tests
* linting
* fix check of existing user
* fix bg translation
* set unspecified as default in the form
* feat: migrate external id
* implement tests and some renaming
* fix projection
* cleanup
* i18n
* fix event type
* handle migration for new services as well
* typo
* begin init checks for projections
* first projection checks
* debug notification providers with query fixes
* more projections and first index
* more projections
* more projections
* finish projections
* fix tests (remove db name)
* create tables in setup
* fix logging / error handling
* add tenant to views
* rename tenant to instance_id
* add instance_id to all projections
* add instance_id to all queries
* correct instance_id on projections
* add instance_id to failed_events
* use separate context for instance
* implement features projection
* implement features projection
* remove unique constraint from setup when migration failed
* add error to failed setup event
* add instance_id to primary keys
* fix IAM projection
* remove old migrations folder
* fix keysFromYAML test
* feat(actions): begin api
* feat(actions): begin api
* api and projections
* fix: handle multiple statements for a single event in projections
* export func type
* fix test
* update to new reduce interface
* flows in login
* feat: jwt idp
* feat: command side
* feat: add tests
* actions and flows
* fill idp views with jwt idps and return apis
* add jwtEndpoint to jwt idp
* begin jwt request handling
* add feature
* merge
* merge
* handle jwt idp
* cleanup
* bug fixes
* autoregister
* get token from specific header name
* fix: proto
* fixes
* i18n
* begin tests
* fix and log http proxy
* remove docker cache
* fixes
* usergrants in actions api
* tests adn cleanup
* cleanup
* fix add user grant
* set login context
* i18n
Co-authored-by: fabi <[email protected]>
* faet: add tos checkbox to external login
* fix: add tos to external not found option
* fix: add tos to external not found option
* fix: show register external user overview
* fix: no init user mail on external register
* fix: custom login text
* add missing custom text tests on org
* add missing custom text tests on iam
* fix: custom login text external registration overview tests
* fix: back button on registration overview
* fix: add texts, change register form
* fix: external not found html
* fix: remove form validation
Co-authored-by: Livio Amstutz <[email protected]>
* begin pw less registration
* create pwless one time codes
* send pwless link
* separate send and add passwordless link
* separate send and add passwordless link events
* custom message text for passwordless registration
* begin custom login texts for passwordless
* i18n
* i18n message
* i18n message
* custom message text
* custom login text
* org design and texts
* create link in human import process
* fix import human tests
* begin passwordless init required step
* passwordless init
* passwordless init
* do not return link in mgmt api
* prompt
* passwordless init only (no additional prompt)
* cleanup
* cleanup
* add passwordless prompt to custom login text
* increase init code complexity
* fix grpc
* cleanup
* fix and add some cases for nextStep tests
* fix tests
* Update internal/notification/static/i18n/en.yaml
* Update internal/notification/static/i18n/de.yaml
* Update proto/zitadel/management.proto
* Update internal/ui/login/static/i18n/de.yaml
* Update internal/ui/login/static/i18n/de.yaml
* Update internal/ui/login/static/i18n/de.yaml
Co-authored-by: Fabi <[email protected]>
* fix: primary domain scope (overwrite by roles and rogue `:`)
* disable wrong users
* fix test
* show requested org name
* only show domain when selected
* fix: update client secret, skip passwordsteps only if login not if linking
* fix: global policy for register
* fix: scope handling
* fix: back after error
* fix: change org id scope to primary domain
* fix: check if primarydomain empty
* fix: local sh
* fix: disable buttons on org login policy
