* feat(login): add shared enrollment authorization guard
Introduce assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment, a single gate that decides
whether a session may enroll a new authenticator: it requires a verified
primary factor (password, passkey or IDP) on a non-expired session, or, for
onboarding, a user with no auth methods plus a prior user-verification check.
This mirrors the gate previously inlined only in registerPasskeyLink, which
is refactored to reuse the shared helper. It is the foundation for gating the
remaining credential-enrollment entry points (GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before WebAuthn/U2F enrollment
addU2F and verifyU2F registered a credential for any session that resolved to
a user id, including a bare identify-only session created by merely submitting
a login name. An unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's login name could
therefore attach an attacker-controlled authenticator to the victim's account
and then complete a login as the victim.
Both actions now run assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment before registering or
verifying, so an unauthenticated session is rejected and no credential is
persisted.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before TOTP/OTP enrollment
verifyTOTP and the otp/<method>/set page activated a TOTP/OTP factor for any
session with a user id, and the u2f/set page rendered the registration form
without an authorization check. An identify-only session could thus enroll a
second factor on a victim's account.
Gate all of them with assertSessionAuthorizedForEnrollment. The setup pages now
render the unknown-context/error state instead of enrolling when the session is
not authorized. Also guard the method value in the OTP set page, since the added
guard branch removes the control-flow narrowing the previous throw provided.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): require authentication before legacy (V1) passwordless enrollment
The V1 passwordless registration handlers began and verified passwordless setup
for any auth request that carried a user id, without checking that a first
factor had been verified. An unauthenticated attacker could submit a victim's
login name and then POST directly to the passwordless prompt/init endpoints to
plant an attacker-controlled passkey, then log in as the victim.
Add passwordlessSetupAllowed / CheckPasswordlessSetupAllowed, which permit
enrollment only for a legitimate onboarding user (PasswordlessInitRequired) or
an auth request whose first factor is already verified, and call it before
BeginPasswordlessSetup and VerifyPasswordlessSetup. The verify path is also
bound to authReq.UserID instead of the attacker-controllable form field, so a
credential cannot be redirected onto a different account. The init-code
(mail/onboarding) path is unchanged.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(login): remove never-active legacy (V1) authReq passwordless setup path
Supersedes the runtime gate added in the previous commit. Maintainer review
(Livio, the original author) and investigation confirmed the auth-request based
passwordless *setup* path in the legacy login was a never-active leftover:
- The passwordless prompt page (passwordless_prompt.html) has no submit button
and no script; it only tells the user to complete setup via the emailed link
(the PasswordlessButtonText/NextButtonText/SkipButtonText i18n keys are unused).
- Legitimate onboarding for a PasswordlessInitRequired user goes through the
emailed init-code flow (authReq == nil, BeginPasswordlessInitCodeSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessInitCodeSetup), which is untouched.
- The authReq branch (handlePasswordlessPrompt -> BeginPasswordlessSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessSetup) was reachable only by a crafted direct POST — the
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6 attack.
Rather than gate the dead path, remove it entirely, eliminating the attack
surface:
- delete handlePasswordlessPrompt and the POST /login/passwordless/prompt route
(keep renderPasswordlessPrompt: the informational "use your emailed link" page
for PasswordlessRegistrationPromptStep),
- make renderPasswordlessRegistration / checkPasswordlessRegistration use only
the init-code path,
- drop the now-unused AuthRequestRepo.BeginPasswordlessSetup /
VerifyPasswordlessSetup (and the interface decls) and the passwordlessPromptUrl
template helper; the underlying HumanAddPasswordlessSetup /
HumanHumanPasswordlessSetup commands remain (used by the auth-API self-service
and the v2 passkey APIs).
A crafted POST to /login/passwordless/init carrying an authRequestID but no valid
code now falls through to the init-code path and fails.
GHSA-45f2-5q3r-xgg6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* check for userverified true as well, cleanup return message
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Max Peintner <[email protected]>
# Which Problems Are Solved
The current login will always prefer external authentication (through an
IdP) over local authentication. So as soon as either the user had
connected to an IdP or even when the login policy was just set up to
have an IdP allowed, users would be redirected to that IdP for
(re)authentication.
This could lead to problems, where the IdP was not available or any
other error occurred in the process (such as secret expired for
EntraID).
Even when local authentication (passkeys or password) was allowed for
the corresponding user, they would always be redirected to the IdP
again, preventing any authentication. If admins were affected, they
might not even be able to update the client secret of the IdP.
# How the Problems Are Solved
Errors during the external IdP flow are handled in an
`externalAuthFailed` function, which will check if the organisation
allows local authentication and if the user has set up such.
If either password or passkeys is set up, the corresponding login page
will be presented to the user. As already with local auth passkeys is
preferred over password authentication.
The user is informed that the external login failed and fail back to
local auth as an error on the corresponding page in a focused mode. Any
interaction or after 5 second the focus mode is disabled.
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
closes#6466
# Which Problems Are Solved
We identified some parts in the code, which could panic with a nil
pointer when accessed without auth request.
Additionally, if a GRPC method was called with an unmapped HTTP method,
e.g. POST instead of GET a 501 instead of a 405 was returned.
# How the Problems Are Solved
- Additional checks for existing authRequest
- custom http status code mapper for gateway
# Additional Changes
None.
# Additional Context
- noted internally in OPS
* feat: return 404 or 409 if org reg disallowed
* fix: system limit permissions
* feat: add iam limits api
* feat: disallow public org registrations on default instance
* add integration test
* test: integration
* fix test
* docs: describe public org registrations
* avoid updating docs deps
* fix system limits integration test
* silence integration tests
* fix linting
* ignore strange linter complaints
* review
* improve reset properties naming
* redefine the api
* use restrictions aggregate
* test query
* simplify and test projection
* test commands
* fix unit tests
* move integration test
* support restrictions on default instance
* also test GetRestrictions
* self review
* lint
* abstract away resource owner
* fix tests
* configure supported languages
* fix allowed languages
* fix tests
* default lang must not be restricted
* preferred language must be allowed
* change preferred languages
* check languages everywhere
* lint
* test command side
* lint
* add integration test
* add integration test
* restrict supported ui locales
* lint
* lint
* cleanup
* lint
* allow undefined preferred language
* fix integration tests
* update main
* fix env var
* ignore linter
* ignore linter
* improve integration test config
* reduce cognitive complexity
* compile
* check for duplicates
* remove useless restriction checks
* review
* revert restriction renaming
* fix language restrictions
* lint
* generate
* allow custom texts for supported langs for now
* fix tests
* cleanup
* cleanup
* cleanup
* lint
* unsupported preferred lang is allowed
* fix integration test
* finish reverting to old property name
* finish reverting to old property name
* load languages
* refactor(i18n): centralize translators and fs
* lint
* amplify no validations on preferred languages
* fix integration test
* lint
* fix resetting allowed languages
* test unchanged restrictions
* feat(command): remove org
* refactor: imports, unused code, error handling
* reduce org removed in action
* add org deletion to projections
* add org removal to projections
* add org removal to projections
* org removed projection
* lint import
* projections
* fix: table names in tests
* fix: table names in tests
* logging
* add org state
* fix(domain): add Owner removed to object details
* feat(ListQuery): add with owner removed
* fix(org-delete): add bool to functions to select with owner removed
* fix(org-delete): add bools to user grants with events to determine if dependencies lost owner
* fix(org-delete): add unit tests for owner removed and org removed events
* fix(org-delete): add handling of org remove for grants and members
* fix(org-delete): correction of unit tests for owner removed
* fix(org-delete): update projections, unit tests and get functions
* fix(org-delete): add change date to authnkeys and owner removed to org metadata
* fix(org-delete): include owner removed for login names
* fix(org-delete): some column fixes in projections and build for queries with owner removed
* indexes
* fix(org-delete): include review changes
* fix(org-delete): change user projection name after merge
* fix(org-delete): include review changes for project grant where no project owner is necessary
* fix(org-delete): include auth and adminapi tables with owner removed information
* fix(org-delete): cleanup username and orgdomain uniqueconstraints when org is removed
* fix(org-delete): add permissions for org.remove
* remove unnecessary unique constraints
* fix column order in primary keys
* fix(org-delete): include review changes
* fix(org-delete): add owner removed indexes and chang setup step to create tables
* fix(org-delete): move PK order of instance_id and change added user_grant from review
* fix(org-delete): no params for prepareUserQuery
* change to step 6
* merge main
* fix(org-delete): OldUserName rename to private
* fix linting
* cleanup
* fix: remove org test
* create prerelease
* chore: delete org-delete as prerelease
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Livio Spring <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Fabi <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Stefan Benz <[email protected]>
* fix(login): translate init password correctly
* refactor: no error return params
* fix(login): custom texts for pages called directly form mail link
* fix custom text on registration pages
Co-authored-by: adlerhurst <[email protected]>
Livio SpringandGitHub
Elio BischofandGitHub
