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content/posts/scriptctf2025/index.md
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@@ -10,9 +10,7 @@ tags = ["ctf", "rev", "web", "forensics"]
# ScriptCTF 2025 – Challenge Writeup
![][image1]
Over the weekend, I participated in **ScriptCTF**, a capture-the-flag competition packed with diverse challenges spanning cryptography, forensics, reverse engineering, and web exploitation.
Our team managed position \_\_\_\_\_\_ out of \_\_\_ teams with non zero points.
Over the weekend, I participated in ScriptCTF, a capture-the-flag competition packed with diverse challenges spanning cryptography, forensics, reverse engineering, and web exploitation.
In this write-up, I’ll walk through some of the problems I solved, breaking down my approach, the tools I used, and the reasoning behind each step. Rather than just dropping final answers, my goal is to document the problem-solving process in a way that’s reproducible and useful for others looking to sharpen their cybersecurity skills.
@@ -23,97 +21,97 @@ In this write-up, I’ll walk through some of the problems I solved, breaking do
This is the first web challenge; it launches an instance, and the source code is provided for manual code review. There are three important files: two Jinja templates and a Python file.
upload.html
\`\`\`html
\<\!DOCTYPE html\>
\<html\>
\<head\>
\<title\>Upload Image\</title\>
\</head\>
\<body\>
\<h1\>Upload Images\</h1\>
\<p\>This free to use website allows you to render your images\!\<p\>
\<form method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data"\>
\<input type="file" name="file" accept=".png,.jpg,.jpeg,.svg" required\>
\<input type="submit" value="Upload"\>
\</form\>
\</body\>
\</html\>
\`\`\`
```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Upload Image</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Upload Images</h1>
<p>This free to use website allows you to render your images!<p>
<form method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<input type="file" name="file" accept=".png,.jpg,.jpeg,.svg" required>
<input type="submit" value="Upload">
</form>
</body>
</html>
```
display.html
\`\`\`html
\<\!DOCTYPE html\>
\<html\>
\<head\>
\<title\>View Image\</title\>
\<style\>
```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>View Image</title>
<style>
iframe {
max-width: 600px;
max-height: 600px;
border: hidden;
overflow: none
}
\</style\>
\</head\>
\<body\>
\<h1\>Uploaded Image\</h1\>
\<iframe src="{{'/static/uploads/' \+ filename }}" alt="Uploaded Image"\>\</iframe\>
\<p\>\<a href="/"\>Upload another image\</a\>\</p\>
\</body\>
\</html\>
\`\`\`
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Uploaded Image</h1>
<iframe src="{{'/static/uploads/' + filename }}" alt="Uploaded Image"></iframe>
<p><a href="/">Upload another image</a></p>
</body>
</html>
```
\`[app.py](http://app.py)\`
`[app.py](http://app.py)`
\`\`\`python
from flask import Flask, request, redirect, render\_template, make\_response, url\_for
app \= Flask(\_\_name\_\_)
```python
from flask import Flask, request, redirect, render_template, make_response, url_for
app = Flask(__name__)
from hashlib import sha256
import os
def allowed(name):
if name.split('.')\[1\] in \['jpg','jpeg','png','svg'\]:
if name.split('.')[1] in ['jpg','jpeg','png','svg']:
return True
return False
@app.route('/',methods=\['GET','POST'\])
@app.route('/',methods=['GET','POST'])
def upload():
if request.method \== 'POST':
if request.method == 'POST':
if 'file' not in request.files:
return redirect(request.url)
file \= request.files\['file'\]
if file.filename \== '':
file = request.files['file']
if file.filename == '':
return redirect(request.url)
if file and allowed(file.filename):
filename \= file.filename
hash \= sha256(os.urandom(32)).hexdigest()
filepath \= f'./static/uploads/{hash}.{filename.split(".")\[1\]}'
filename = file.filename
hash = sha256(os.urandom(32)).hexdigest()
filepath = f'./static/uploads/{hash}.{filename.split(".")[1]}'
file.save(filepath)
return redirect(f'/render/{hash}.{filename.split(".")\[1\]}')
return render\_template('upload.html')
return redirect(f'/render/{hash}.{filename.split(".")[1]}')
return render_template('upload.html')
@app.route('/render/\<path:filename\>')
@app.route('/render/<path:filename>')
def render(filename):
return render\_template('display.html', filename=filename)
return render_template('display.html', filename=filename)
@app.route('/developer')
def developer():
cookie \= request.cookies.get("developer\_secret\_cookie")
correct \= open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret\_cookie.txt').read()
if correct \== '':
c \= open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret\_cookie.txt','w')
cookie = request.cookies.get("developer_secret_cookie")
correct = open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret_cookie.txt').read()
if correct == '':
c = open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret_cookie.txt','w')
c.write(sha256(os.urandom(16)).hexdigest())
c.close()
correct \= open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret\_cookie.txt').read()
if cookie \== correct:
c \= open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret\_cookie.txt','w')
correct = open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret_cookie.txt').read()
if cookie == correct:
c = open('./static/uploads/secrets/secret_cookie.txt','w')
c.write(sha256(os.urandom(16)).hexdigest())
c.close()
return f"Welcome\! There is currently 1 unread message: {open('flag.txt').read()}"
return f"Welcome! There is currently 1 unread message: {open('flag.txt').read()}"
else:
return "You are not a developer\!"
return "You are not a developer!"
if \_\_name\_\_ \== '\_\_main\_\_':
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=1337)
\`\`\`
```
From the files, we can see that this is an app built using Flask. What the app does:
@@ -139,12 +137,12 @@ Key Observations
1. File upload: Only the extension is checked; there is no content verification. So you can upload anything with .jpg, .png, etc.
2. Render template: The render() route calls render\_template('display.html', filename=filename).
2. Render template: The render() route calls render_template('display.html', filename=filename).
3. Secrets: The /developer route requires knowing secret\_cookie.txt. We need a way to leak it.
3. Secrets: The /developer route requires knowing secret_cookie.txt. We need a way to leak it.
Navigating to the developer endpoint without the cookie returns this request.
\`\`\`
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.10.16
Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2025 11:51:49 GMT
@@ -152,37 +150,37 @@ Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 24
Connection: close
You are not a developer\!
\`\`\`
You are not a developer!
```
Now I tried some path traversal techniques, but I couldn't reach the cookie. I turned my focus on how the uploaded images were being rendered and saw that it was an inline iframe. Hmm… interesting, what if I could get code execution on this? I thought of uploading a malicious SVG.
Here is an innocent-looking SVG
\`\`\`
\<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100"\>
\<script type="text/javascript"\>
```svg
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<script type="text/javascript">
fetch('/developer', {credentials:'include'})
.then(res \=\> res.text())
.then(data \=\> alert(data));
\</script\>
\</svg\>
\`\`\`
.then(res => res.text())
.then(data => alert(data));
</script>
</svg>
```
And…
![][image3]
I didn't think that through. I can't make that request without the cookie. Another approach I tried was Local File Inclusion(LFI) using the SVG. Here is another not-so-evil one:
\`\`\`
\<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"\>
\<image href="/static/uploads/secrets/secret\_cookie.txt" /\>
\</svg\>
\`\`\`
The browser shows it as a broken image, but on opening it on another tab, I was able to leak the cookie \`5eb7b76fbb08895de572fbe6028a4ee4abe3663641416deb5b889e0127920c6e\`. I copied and pasted the direct URL on another browser tab, and I got straight to it. I might have over-engineered something so simple, but anyway, Do Hard Things\!\!
```svg
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<image href="/static/uploads/secrets/secret_cookie.txt" />
</svg>
```
The browser shows it as a broken image, but on opening it on another tab, I was able to leak the cookie `5eb7b76fbb08895de572fbe6028a4ee4abe3663641416deb5b889e0127920c6e`. I copied and pasted the direct URL on another browser tab, and I got straight to it. I might have over-engineered something so simple, but anyway, Do Hard Things!!
Retrieving the flag
\`\`\`
$ curl \-b "developer\_secret\_cookie=5eb7b76fbb08895de572fbe6028a4ee4abe3663641416deb5b889e0127920c6e" http://play.scriptsorcerers.xyz:10257/developer
```zsh
$ curl -b "developer_secret_cookie=5eb7b76fbb08895de572fbe6028a4ee4abe3663641416deb5b889e0127920c6e" http://play.scriptsorcerers.xyz:10257/developer
Welcome\! There is currently 1 unread message: scriptCTF{my\_c00k135\_4r3\_n0t\_s4f3\!\_601871f7aad5}
\`\`\`
Welcome! There is currently 1 unread message: scriptCTF{my_c00k135_4r3_n0t_s4f3!_601871f7aad5}
```
Flag: `scriptCTF{my_c00k135_4r3_n0t_s4f3!_601871f7aad5}`
@@ -190,34 +188,34 @@ Flag: `scriptCTF{my_c00k135_4r3_n0t_s4f3!_601871f7aad5}`
![][image4]
Here are the contents of the [chall.py](http://chall.py)
\`\`\`
```python
import os
import decimal
decimal.getcontext().prec \= 50
decimal.getcontext().prec = 50
secret \= int(os.urandom(16).hex(),16)
num \= input('Enter a number: ')
secret = int(os.urandom(16).hex(),16)
num = input('Enter a number: ')
if 'e' in num.lower():
print("Nice try...")
exit(0)
if len(num) \>= 10:
if len(num) >= 10:
print('Number too long...')
exit(0)
fl\_num \= decimal.Decimal(num)
div \= secret / fl\_num
fl_num = decimal.Decimal(num)
div = secret / fl_num
if div \== 0:
if div == 0:
print(open('flag.txt').read().strip())
else:
print('Try again...')
\`\`\`
```
Let’s break it down:
1. The server picks a **secret** — a random 128-bit integer (`os.urandom(16)` → 32 hex chars → huge number).
1. The server picks a secret — a random 128-bit integer (`os.urandom(16)` → 32 hex chars → huge number).
2. You input a number `num`.
@@ -225,25 +223,25 @@ Let’s break it down:
4. If your input is ≥ 10 characters, you get blocked.
5. It converts `num` to a `decimal.Decimal` with precision 50\.
5. It converts `num` to a `decimal.Decimal` with precision 50.
6. It computes `div = secret / fl_num`.
7. If `div == 0`, you get the flag.
**Key observation**
Key observation
* `secret` is positive and huge (on the order of `2**128`).
* `secret` is positive and huge (on the order of `2128`).
* Normally, `secret / something` won’t be 0\.
* Normally, `secret / something` won’t be 0.
* In Python `decimal.Decimal`, `div == 0` **only if** the result is *exactly* 0\. Decimal doesn’t overflow or underflow like float — it has arbitrary precision (set to 50).
* In Python `decimal.Decimal`, `div == 0` only if the result is *exactly* 0. Decimal doesn’t overflow or underflow like float — it has arbitrary precision (set to 50).
So how do we get exactly zero?
* Decimal division only returns `0` if the numerator is `0` OR if the denominator is so huge that the quotient rounds down to 0 at the given precision.
* Precision is **50 significant digits**. That means if the result is smaller than `10^(-50)`, it will round to 0\.
* Precision is 50 significant digits. That means if the result is smaller than `10^(-50)`, it will round to 0.
We want
@@ -257,23 +255,23 @@ Since
we need
\`fl\_num \> (3.4 × 10^38) × 10^50 \= 3.4 × 10^88\`
`fl_num > (3.4 × 10^38) × 10^50 = 3.4 × 10^88`
But there’s a catch
We can’t use exponent notation (e), and the input length must be \< 10 characters.
We can’t use exponent notation (e), and the input length must be < 10 characters.
That means we can’t type a literal 100000... with 89 zeros, it’s too long.
But in Decimal, you can input a decimal point and make something big by making it a very small number and dividing 1 by it.
This is about **NaN / Infinity** in `decimal.Decimal`. If `fl_num` is `'Infinity'` (allowed, length 8), `secret / Infinity`
This is about NaN / Infinity in `decimal.Decimal`. If `fl_num` is `'Infinity'` (allowed, length 8), `secret / Infinity`
\`\`\`
```zsh
nc play.scriptsorcerers.xyz 10456
Enter a number: Infinity
scriptCTF{70\_1nf1n17y\_4nd\_b3y0nd\_20e422d293fc}
\`\`\`
Flag: \`scriptCTF{70\_1nf1n17y\_4nd\_b3y0nd\_20e422d293fc}\`
scriptCTF{70_1nf1n17y_4nd_b3y0nd_20e422d293fc}
```
Flag: `scriptCTF{70_1nf1n17y_4nd_b3y0nd_20e422d293fc}`
Some context
Python’s decimal.Decimal module implements IEEE 754 decimal floating-point arithmetic.
@@ -289,9 +287,9 @@ These are special constants, not parsed as normal numbers.
Under IEEE 754 rules:
- finite\_number / Infinity \= 0 exactly
- finite_number / Infinity = 0 exactly
- finite\_number / \-Infinity \= \-0 (also treated as zero)
- finite_number / -Infinity = -0 (also treated as zero)
Infinity represents a number so large that any finite numerator divided by it tends towards 0 exactly, with no rounding error.
@@ -299,112 +297,112 @@ Infinity represents a number so large that any finite numerator divided by it te
![][image5]
Out.txt has some symbols.
\`\`\`
```txt
🁳🁣🁲🁩🁰🁴🁃🁔🁆🁻🀳🁭🀰🁪🀱🁟🀳🁮🁣🀰🁤🀱🁮🁧🁟🀱🁳🁟🁷🀳🀱🁲🁤🁟🀴🁮🁤🁟🁦🁵🁮🀡🀱🁥🀴🀶🁤🁽
\`\`\`
```
The symbols are Unicode Domino Tiles (in the U+1F030–U+1F093 range). If you subtract 0x1F000 (the start of the Mahjong/Domino emoji area) from each character’s code point, you get plain ASCII bytes. You can learn more about Unicode here.
- [https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2003/10/08/the-absolute-minimum-every-software-developer-absolutely-positively-must-know-about-unicode-and-character-sets-no-excuses/](https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2003/10/08/the-absolute-minimum-every-software-developer-absolutely-positively-must-know-about-unicode-and-character-sets-no-excuses/)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominoes\#Dominoes\_in\_Unicode:\~:text=%5B38%5D-,Dominoes%20in%20Unicode,-%5Bedit%5D](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominoes#Dominoes_in_Unicode:~:text=%5B38%5D-,Dominoes%20in%20Unicode,-%5Bedit%5D)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominoes#Dominoes_in_Unicode:~:text=%5B38%5D-,Dominoes%20in%20Unicode,-%5Bedit%5D](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominoes#Dominoes_in_Unicode:~:text=%5B38%5D-,Dominoes%20in%20Unicode,-%5Bedit%5D)
- https://www.reedbeta.com/blog/programmers-intro-to-unicode/
Here is a Python script for that(old habits die hard)
\`\`\`
s \= "🁳🁣🁲🁩🁰🁴🁃🁔🁆🁻🀳🁭🀰🁪🀱🁟🀳🁮🁣🀰🁤🀱🁮🁧🁟🀱🁳🁟🁷🀳🀱🁲🁤🁟🀴🁮🁤🁟🁦🁵🁮🀡🀱🁥🀴🀶🁤🁽"
print(''.join(chr(ord(ch) \- 0x1F000) for ch in s))
\`\`\`
```python
s = "🁳🁣🁲🁩🁰🁴🁃🁔🁆🁻🀳🁭🀰🁪🀱🁟🀳🁮🁣🀰🁤🀱🁮🁧🁟🀱🁳🁟🁷🀳🀱🁲🁤🁟🀴🁮🁤🁟🁦🁵🁮🀡🀱🁥🀴🀶🁤🁽"
print(''.join(chr(ord(ch) - 0x1F000) for ch in s))
```
\`\`\`
$ python3 **solve.py**
scriptCTF{3m0j1\_3nc0d1ng\_1s\_w31rd\_4nd\_fun\!1e46d}
\`\`\`
```zsh
$ python3 solve.py
scriptCTF{3m0j1_3nc0d1ng_1s_w31rd_4nd_fun!1e46d}
```
Flag : `scriptCTF{3m0j1_3nc0d1ng_1s_w31rd_4nd_fun!1e46d}`
# Challenge: Enchant
![][image6]
After some Google search, I found out that’s the **Standard Galactic Alphabet**, the glyphs used by Minecraft’s enchantment table. The enchantment-table glyphs map one-to-one to letters in the Standard Galactic Alphabet (SGA). I used the SGA ↔ Latin mapping to translate each symbol into its English letter at [https://www.dcode.fr/standard-galactic-alphabet](https://www.dcode.fr/standard-galactic-alphabet). The result is MINECRAFTISFUN.
After some Google search, I found out that’s the Standard Galactic Alphabet, the glyphs used by Minecraft’s enchantment table. The enchantment-table glyphs map one-to-one to letters in the Standard Galactic Alphabet (SGA). I used the SGA ↔ Latin mapping to translate each symbol into its English letter at [https://www.dcode.fr/standard-galactic-alphabet](https://www.dcode.fr/standard-galactic-alphabet). The result is MINECRAFTISFUN.
Flag: scriptCTF{MINECRAFTISFUN}
Flag: `scriptCTF{MINECRAFTISFUN}`
Challenge: diskchal
![][image7]
This was a forensics challenge; we were given a disk image, probably to recover some files, as the challenge description suggests.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ file **stick.img**
stick.img: DOS/MBR boot sector, code offset 0x58+2, OEM-ID "mkfs.fat", sectors 49152 (volumes \<=32 MB), Media descriptor 0xf8, sectors/track 32, heads 4, FAT (32 bit), sectors/FAT 378, reserved 0x1, serial num
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ file stick.img
stick.img: DOS/MBR boot sector, code offset 0x58+2, OEM-ID "mkfs.fat", sectors 49152 (volumes <=32 MB), Media descriptor 0xf8, sectors/track 32, heads 4, FAT (32 bit), sectors/FAT 378, reserved 0x1, serial num
ber 0x8caae860, unlabeled
\`\`\`
```
The file is a FAT32 filesystem image created with `mkfs.fat`.I try to mount the image and see what's inside.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ sudo mount **stick.img** **mnt/**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ sudo mount stick.img mnt/
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ ls **mnt**
**notes.txt** **random\_thoughts.txt**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ ls mnt
notes.txt random_thoughts.txt
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ cat **\*** **mnt/**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ cat * mnt/
cat: mnt: Is a directory
�X�mkfs.fat �� z�)\`誌NO NAME FAT32 �w|�"�t
�X�mkfs.fat �� z�)`誌NO NAME FAT32 �w|�"�t
V^2�����This is not a bootable disk. Please insert a bootable floppy and
press any key to try again ...
U�RRaArrAa��U��X�mkfs.fat �� z�)\`誌NO NAME FAT32 �w|�"�t
U�RRaArrAa��U��X�mkfs.fat �� z�)`誌NO NAME FAT32 �w|�"�t
V���^��2�����This is not a bootable disk. Please insert a bootable floppy and
press any key to try again ...
U�RRaArrAa��U�������������������������������Anotes�.txt������NOTES TXT Rk��Z\[k��ZLBts.tx\<t������������rando\<m\_thoughRANDOM\~1TXT Rk��Z\[k��Z8�collection.gz�secret\_magic\_�ECRET\~1GZ Sk��Z�Zk��Z\<Notes:
\- practice my zarrow shuffle
\- learn some false cuts
\- play some sts
U�RRaArrAa��U�������������������������������Anotes�.txt������NOTES TXT Rk��Z[k��ZLBts.tx<t������������rando<m_thoughRANDOM~1TXT Rk��Z[k��Z8�collection.gz�secret_magic_�ECRET~1GZ Sk��Z�Zk��Z<Notes:
- practice my zarrow shuffle
- learn some false cuts
- play some sts
i wonder where i put the flag. did i palm it somewhere?
�xyhflag.txt+N.�,(qq�6��1(3��513L�7/2L�6��
���cat: mnt/: Is a directory
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ cat **\***.txt **mnt/**
cat: '\*.txt': No such file or directory
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ cat *.txt mnt/
cat: '*.txt': No such file or directory
cat: mnt/: Is a directory
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ cd **mnt**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ cd mnt
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/mnt**$ ls \-lah
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/mnt$ ls -lah
total 5.5K
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 512 Jan 1 1970 **.**
drwxrwxr-x 3 mockingspectre mockingspectre 4.0K Aug 17 16:06 **..**
\-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 76 Jul 18 01:27 **notes.txt**
\-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 56 Jul 18 01:27 **random\_thoughts.txt**
\`\`\`
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 512 Jan 1 1970 .
drwxrwxr-x 3 mockingspectre mockingspectre 4.0K Aug 17 16:06 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 76 Jul 18 01:27 notes.txt
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 56 Jul 18 01:27 random_thoughts.txt
```
Nothing particularly juicy or interesting. Running binwalk brings up some info.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ binwalk **stick.img**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ binwalk stick.img
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
\--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
404992 0x62E00 gzip compressed data, has original file name: "flag.txt", from Unix, last modified: 2025-07-17 22:27:22
\`\`\`
```
Let me extract everything with `dd.`
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal**$ binwalk \--dd='.\*' **stick.img**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal$ binwalk --dd='.*' stick.img
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
\--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
404992 0x62E00 gzip compressed data, has original file name: "flag.txt", from Unix, last modified: 2025-07-17 22:27:22
\`\`\`
```
After some bashfu, the flag is revealed.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/\_stick.img.extracted**$ ls
flag.txt **flag.txt.gz**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/_stick.img.extracted$ ls
flag.txt flag.txt.gz
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/\_stick.img.extracted**$ cat **flag.txt**
scriptCTF{1\_l0v3\_m461c\_7r1ck5}
\`\`\`
Flag: scriptCTF{1\_l0v3\_m461c\_7r1ck5}
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/diskchal/_stick.img.extracted$ cat flag.txt
scriptCTF{1_l0v3_m461c_7r1ck5}
```
Flag: scriptCTF{1_l0v3_m461c_7r1ck5}
# Challenge: pdf
@@ -413,42 +411,42 @@ Opening the PDF was just a trol
![][image9]
Running strings on it made me think I had a quick win.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf**$ strings **challenge.pdf** **|** grep \-i ctf
script**CTF**{this\_is\_def\_the\_flag\_trust}
\`\`\`
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf$ strings challenge.pdf | grep -i ctf
scriptCTF{this_is_def_the_flag_trust}
```
Hmm.. quite easy. Or is it? Turns out this was the site-wide fake flag. Let's continue.
Running binwalk gives us.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf**$ binwalk **challenge.pdf**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf$ binwalk challenge.pdf
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
\--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0x0 PDF document, version: "1.4"
283 0x11B Zlib compressed data, default compression
1521 0x5F1 Copyright string: "copyright/ordfeminine 172/logicalnot/.notdef/registered/macron/degree/plusminus/twosuperior/threesuperior/acute/mu 183/periodcen"
\`\`\`
```
binwalk found a zlib chunk at offset 0x11B (decimal 283). Extracting
\`\`\`
binwalk \-eM challenge.pdf
ls \-la \_challenge.pdf.extracted
\`\`\`
```zsh
binwalk -eM challenge.pdf
ls -la _challenge.pdf.extracted
```
We get the flag
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf/\_challenge.pdf.extracted**$ file **\***
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf/_challenge.pdf.extracted$ file *
11B: ASCII text, with no line terminators
11B.zlib: zlib compressed data
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf/\_challenge.pdf.extracted**$ cat **11B**
scriptCTF{pdf\_s7r34m5\_0v3r\_7w17ch\_5tr34ms}
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/pdf/_challenge.pdf.extracted$ cat 11B
scriptCTF{pdf_s7r34m5_0v3r_7w17ch_5tr34ms}
\`\`\`
```
Flag: \`scriptCTF{pdf\_s7r34m5\_0v3r\_7w17ch\_5tr34ms}\`
Flag: `scriptCTF{pdf_s7r34m5_0v3r_7w17ch_5tr34ms}`
# Challenge: Just Some Avocado
@@ -456,13 +454,13 @@ Flag: \`scriptCTF{pdf\_s7r34m5\_0v3r\_7w17ch\_5tr34ms}\`
This is another forensics challenge; we are given a JPEG file with an image of an avocado. Preliminary investigations reveal some interesting objects.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ file **avocado.jpg**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ file avocado.jpg
avocado.jpg: JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01, aspect ratio, density 1x1, segment length 16, baseline, precision 8, 1280x1280, components 3
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ strings \-4 **avocado.jpg** **|** grep \-i script
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ strings -4 avocado.jpg | grep -i script
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ exiftool **avocado.jpg**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ exiftool avocado.jpg
ExifTool Version Number : 13.25
File Name : avocado.jpg
Directory : .
@@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ File Size : 509 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2025:08:14 03:40:32+03:00
File Access Date/Time : 2025:08:16 17:15:16+03:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2025:08:16 17:15:11+03:00
File Permissions : \-rw-rw-r--
File Permissions : -rw-rw-r--
File Type : JPEG
File Type Extension : jpg
MIME Type : image/jpeg
@@ -483,72 +481,72 @@ Image Height : 1280
Encoding Process : Baseline DCT, Huffman coding
Bits Per Sample : 8
Color Components : 3
Y Cb Cr Sub Sampling : YCbCr4:2:0 (2 2\)
Y Cb Cr Sub Sampling : YCbCr4:2:0 (2 2)
Image Size : 1280x1280
Megapixels : 1.6
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ binwalk **avocado.jpg**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ binwalk avocado.jpg
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
\--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0x0 JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
100599 0x188F7 Zip archive data, encrypted at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 234, uncompressed size: 222, name: justsomezip.zip
100922 0x18A3A Zip archive data, encrypted at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 408140, uncompressed size: 437908, name: staticnoise.wav
509321 0x7C589 End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
\`\`\`
```
Embedded within the image are two files, a zip file \`justsomezip.zip\` and a wav audio file staticnoise.wav . Extracting the files
Embedded within the image are two files, a zip file `justsomezip.zip` and a wav audio file staticnoise.wav . Extracting the files
\`\`\`
mockingspectre@kali:\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ dd if=avocado.jpg of=justsomezip.zip bs=1 skip=100599
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ dd if=avocado.jpg of=justsomezip.zip bs=1 skip=100599
408744+0 records in
408744+0 records out
408744 bytes (409 kB, 399 KiB) copied, 0.713391 s, 573 kB/s
mockingspectre@kali:\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ dd if=avocado.jpg of=staticnoise.wav bs=1 skip=100922
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ dd if=avocado.jpg of=staticnoise.wav bs=1 skip=100922
408421+0 records in
408421+0 records out
408421 bytes (408 kB, 399 KiB) copied, 0.725639 s, 563 kB/s
mockingspectre@kali:\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ ls
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ ls
avocado.jpg justsomezip.zip staticnoise.wav
\`\`\`
```
The zip file is password-protected. I'll try using John to crack it.
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ zip2john **justsomezip.zip** **\>** hash.txt
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ zip2john justsomezip.zip > hash.txt
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado**$ john \--format=PKZIP **hash.txt** \--wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado$ john --format=PKZIP hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP \[32/64\])
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
impassive3428 (justsomezip.zip)
1g 0:00:00:01 DONE (2025-08-17 17:16) 0.7633g/s 5609Kp/s 5609Kc/s 5609KC/s in4nd0keren..imissdesi
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
\`\`\`
After a few seconds, the password is revealed to be \`impassive3428\`. Inside the zip were two files with the same name as before
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ tree
**.**
├── **justsomezip.zip**
```
After a few seconds, the password is revealed to be `impassive3428`. Inside the zip were two files with the same name as before
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ tree
.
├── justsomezip.zip
└── staticnoise.wav
1 directory, 2 files
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ file **\***
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ file *
justsomezip.zip: Zip archive data, made by v3.0 UNIX, extract using at least v1.0, last modified Jun 24 2025 19:12:42, uncompressed size 28, method=store
staticnoise.wav: RIFF (little-endian) data, WAVE audio, Microsoft PCM, 16 bit, stereo 22050 Hz
\`\`\`
```
I tried brute-forcing the password again, but there were no positive results, so I shifted my focus onto the WAV file. Running exiftool on it showed a telling comment. The password couldn't be brute-forced
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ exiftool **staticnoise.wav**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ exiftool staticnoise.wav
ExifTool Version Number : 13.25
File Name : staticnoise.wav
Directory : .
@@ -556,7 +554,7 @@ File Size : 438 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2025:06:25 13:38:40+03:00
File Access Date/Time : 2025:08:17 17:18:23+03:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2025:08:17 17:18:17+03:00
File Permissions : \-rw-r--r--
File Permissions : -rw-r--r--
File Type : WAV
File Type Extension : wav
MIME Type : audio/x-wav
@@ -569,7 +567,7 @@ Comment : What if my password isn't on rockyou.txt
Software : Lavf61.7.100
Duration : 4.96 s
\`\`\`
```
I opened the file in Sonic Visualizer and applied a spectrogram view. Here is what shows
![][image11]
@@ -578,22 +576,22 @@ It looks like some embedded text, but it's clipped. I redid the same process in
![][image12]
I can make out the first three characters, d41, and the fifth \`3\`. We can use John's mask mode to generate the possible combinations.
I can make out the first three characters, d41, and the fifth `3`. We can use John's mask mode to generate the possible combinations.
\`\`
john \--mask='d41?1?1?1?1?1' \--1='?l?d' \--format=PKZIP hash.txt
\`\`\`
```zsh
john --mask='d41?1?1?1?1?1' --1='?l?d' --format=PKZIP hash.txt
```
* d41 \= known prefix
* ?1?1?1?1?1 \= 5 unknown characters
* \--1='?l?d' \= defines ?1 as “lowercase letters or digits”
* \--format=PKZIP \= tells John it’s a ZIP hash
* d41 = known prefix
* ?1?1?1?1?1 = 5 unknown characters
* --1='?l?d' = defines ?1 as “lowercase letters or digits”
* --format=PKZIP = tells John it’s a ZIP hash
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ john \--mask='d41?1?1?1?1?1' \--1='?l?d' \--format=PKZIP **hash.txt**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ john --mask='d41?1?1?1?1?1' --1='?l?d' --format=PKZIP hash.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP \[32/64\])
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
d41v3ron (justsomezip.zip/flag.txt)
@@ -601,59 +599,59 @@ d41v3ron (justsomezip.zip/flag.txt)
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ unzip **justsomezip.zip**
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ unzip justsomezip.zip
Archive: justsomezip.zip
\[justsomezip.zip\] flag.txt password:
[justsomezip.zip] flag.txt password:
extracting: flag.txt
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip**$ cat **flag.txt**
scriptCTF{1\_l0ve\_d41\_v3r0n}
\`\`\`
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/forensics/justsome-avocado/justsomezip$ cat flag.txt
scriptCTF{1_l0ve_d41_v3r0n}
```
Flag: \`scriptCTF{1\_l0ve\_d41\_v3r0n}\`
Flag: `scriptCTF{1_l0ve_d41_v3r0n}`
# Challenge: RSA-1
![][image13]
The attachment out.txt has
\`\`\`
out.txt has: n1 \= 156503881374173899106040027210320626006530930815116631795516553916547375688556673985142242828597628615920973708595994675661662789752600109906259326160805121029243681236938272723595463141696217880136400102526509149966767717309801293569923237158596968679754520209177602882862180528522927242280121868961697240587 c1 \= 77845730447898247683281609913423107803974192483879771538601656664815266655476695261695401337124553851404038028413156487834500306455909128563474382527072827288203275942719998719612346322196694263967769165807133288612193509523277795556658877046100866328789163922952483990512216199556692553605487824176112568965 n2 \= 81176790394812943895417667822424503891538103661290067749746811244149927293880771403600643202454602366489650358459283710738177024118857784526124643798095463427793912529729517724613501628957072457149015941596656959113353794192041220905793823162933257702459236541137457227898063370534472564804125139395000655909 c2 \= 40787486105407063933087059717827107329565540104154871338902977389136976706405321232356479461501507502072366720712449240185342528262578445532244098369654742284814175079411915848114327880144883620517336793165329893295685773515696260299308407612535992098605156822281687718904414533480149775329948085800726089284 n3 \= 140612513823906625290578950857303904693579488575072876654320011261621692347864140784716666929156719735696270348892475443744858844360080415632704363751274666498790051438616664967359811895773995052063222050631573888071188619609300034534118393135291537302821893141204544943440866238800133993600817014789308510399 c3 \= 100744134973371882529524399965586539315832009564780881084353677824875367744381226140488591354751113977457961062275480984708865578896869353244823264759044617432862876208706282555040444253921290103354489356742706959370396360754029015494871561563778937571686573716714202098622688982817598258563381656498389039630 e \= 3
\`\`\`
```txt
out.txt has: n1 = 156503881374173899106040027210320626006530930815116631795516553916547375688556673985142242828597628615920973708595994675661662789752600109906259326160805121029243681236938272723595463141696217880136400102526509149966767717309801293569923237158596968679754520209177602882862180528522927242280121868961697240587 c1 = 77845730447898247683281609913423107803974192483879771538601656664815266655476695261695401337124553851404038028413156487834500306455909128563474382527072827288203275942719998719612346322196694263967769165807133288612193509523277795556658877046100866328789163922952483990512216199556692553605487824176112568965 n2 = 81176790394812943895417667822424503891538103661290067749746811244149927293880771403600643202454602366489650358459283710738177024118857784526124643798095463427793912529729517724613501628957072457149015941596656959113353794192041220905793823162933257702459236541137457227898063370534472564804125139395000655909 c2 = 40787486105407063933087059717827107329565540104154871338902977389136976706405321232356479461501507502072366720712449240185342528262578445532244098369654742284814175079411915848114327880144883620517336793165329893295685773515696260299308407612535992098605156822281687718904414533480149775329948085800726089284 n3 = 140612513823906625290578950857303904693579488575072876654320011261621692347864140784716666929156719735696270348892475443744858844360080415632704363751274666498790051438616664967359811895773995052063222050631573888071188619609300034534118393135291537302821893141204544943440866238800133993600817014789308510399 c3 = 100744134973371882529524399965586539315832009564780881084353677824875367744381226140488591354751113977457961062275480984708865578896869353244823264759044617432862876208706282555040444253921290103354489356742706959370396360754029015494871561563778937571686573716714202098622688982817598258563381656498389039630 e = 3
```
this is the classic low-exponent (e \= 3\) broadcast attack. To crack it:
this is the classic low-exponent (e = 3) broadcast attack. To crack it:
1. Use the three ciphertexts c1,c2,c3c\_1,c\_2,c\_3c1​,c2​,c3​ and moduli n1,n2,n3n\_1,n\_2,n\_3n1​,n2​,n3​.
1. Use the three ciphertexts c1,c2,c3c_1,c_2,c_3c1​,c2​,c3​ and moduli n1,n2,n3n_1,n_2,n_3n1​,n2​,n3​.
2. Combine them with the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reconstruct M=m3 mod NM \= m^3 \\bmod NM=m3modN where N=n1n2n3N \= n\_1 n\_2 n\_3N=n1​n2​n3​. Because the original message mmm is smaller than each modulus and m3\<Nm^3 \< Nm3\<N, CRT yields the actual integer m3m^3m3.
2. Combine them with the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reconstruct M=m3 mod NM = m^3 bmod NM=m3modN where N=n1n2n3N = n_1 n_2 n_3N=n1​n2​n3​. Because the original message mmm is smaller than each modulus and m3<Nm^3 < Nm3<N, CRT yields the actual integer m3m^3m3.
3. Take the integer cube root of MMM to get mmm.
4. Decode mmm to bytes — the result contained PKCS\#7-style padding (0x12 repeated), so stripping that reveals the flag.
4. Decode mmm to bytes — the result contained PKCS#7-style padding (0x12 repeated), so stripping that reveals the flag.
This calls for the good old Python script:
\`\`\`
```python
def egcd(a,b):
if b \== 0:
if b == 0:
return (1, 0, a)
x,y,g \= egcd(b, a % b)
return (y, x \- (a // b) \* y, g)
x,y,g = egcd(b, a % b)
return (y, x - (a // b) * y, g)
def invmod(a,m):
x,y,g \= egcd(a,m)
if g \!= 1:
x,y,g = egcd(a,m)
if g != 1:
raise Exception("no inverse")
return x % m
def iroot(k, n):
low, high \= 0, 1 \<\< ((n.bit\_length()+k-1)//k \+ 1\)
while low \< high:
mid \= (low+high)//2
if mid\*\*k \< n:
low \= mid+1
low, high = 0, 1 << ((n.bit_length()+k-1)//k + 1)
while low < high:
mid = (low+high)//2
if midk < n:
low = mid+1
else:
high \= mid
high = mid
return low-1
n1=156503881374173899106040027210320626006530930815116631795516553916547375688556673985142242828597628615920973708595994675661662789752600109906259326160805121029243681236938272723595463141696217880136400102526509149966767717309801293569923237158596968679754520209177602882862180528522927242280121868961697240587
@@ -668,83 +666,84 @@ n3=14061251382390662529057895085730390469357948857507287665432001126162169234786
c3=100744134973371882529524399965586539315832009564780881084353677824875367744381226140488591354751113977457961062275480984708865578896869353244823264759044617432862876208706282555040444253921290103354489356742706959370396360754029015494871561563778937571686573716714202098622688982817598258563381656498389039630
e \= 3
e = 3
\# CRT combine
N \= n1 \* n2 \* n3
m1 \= N // n1
m2 \= N // n2
m3 \= N // n3
C \= (m1\*invmod(m1,n1)\*c1 \+ m2\*invmod(m2,n2)\*c2 \+ m3\*invmod(m3,n3)\*c3) % N
# CRT combine
N = n1 * n2 * n3
m1 = N // n1
m2 = N // n2
m3 = N // n3
C = (m1*invmod(m1,n1)*c1 + m2*invmod(m2,n2)*c2 + m3*invmod(m3,n3)*c3) % N
\# integer cube root
m \= iroot(e, C)
mb \= m.to\_bytes((m.bit\_length()+7)//8, 'big')
# integer cube root
m = iroot(e, C)
mb = m.to_bytes((m.bit_length()+7)//8, 'big')
\# strip PKCS\#7 padding
pad \= mb\[-1\]
flag \= mb\[:-pad\].decode()
# strip PKCS#7 padding
pad = mb[-1]
flag = mb[:-pad].decode()
print(flag)
\`\`\`
```
Running this, we get the flag:
\`\`\`
**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/crypto/RSA-1**$ python3 **solve.py**
scriptCTF{y0u\_f0und\_mr\_yu's\_s3cr3t\_m3g\_12a4e4}
\`\`\`
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/crypto/RSA-1$ python3 solve.py
scriptCTF{y0u_f0und_mr_yu's_s3cr3t_m3g_12a4e4}
```
Flag: \`scriptCTF{y0u\_f0und\_mr\_yu's\_s3cr3t\_m3g\_12a4e4}\`
Flag: `scriptCTF{y0u_f0und_mr_yu's_s3cr3t_m3g_12a4e4}`
# Challenge: Secure-Server
![][image14]
The provided files are a network capture(pcap) and a Python file. The contents of the Python file are
\`\`\`
```python
import os
from pwn import xor
print("With the Secure Server, sharing secrets is safer than ever\!")
enc \= bytes.fromhex(input("Enter the secret, XORed by your key (in hex): ").strip())
key \= os.urandom(32)
enc2 \= xor(enc,key).hex()
print("With the Secure Server, sharing secrets is safer than ever!")
enc = bytes.fromhex(input("Enter the secret, XORed by your key (in hex): ").strip())
key = os.urandom(32)
enc2 = xor(enc,key).hex()
print(f"Double encrypted secret (in hex): {enc2}")
dec \= bytes.fromhex(input("XOR the above with your key again (in hex): ").strip())
secret \= xor(dec,key)
print("Secret received\!")
\`\`\`
dec = bytes.fromhex(input("XOR the above with your key again (in hex): ").strip())
secret = xor(dec,key)
print("Secret received!")
```
Opening the pcap file in Wireshark, we get some TCP streams that we follow and see.
![][image15]
To decrypt it
\`\`\`
```python
from binascii import unhexlify
def xor\_bytes(a, b):
def xor_bytes(a, b):
return bytes(x ^ y for x, y in zip(a, b))
\# Variables from the captured session
enc \= bytes.fromhex("151e71ce4addf692d5bac83bb87911a20c39b71da3fa5e7ff05a2b2b0a83ba03")
enc2 \= bytes.fromhex("e1930164280e44386b389f7e3bc02b707188ea70d9617e3ced989f15d8a10d70")
dec \= bytes.fromhex("87ee02c312a7f1fef8f92f75f1e60ba122df321925e8132068b0871ff303960e")
# Variables from the captured session
enc = bytes.fromhex("151e71ce4addf692d5bac83bb87911a20c39b71da3fa5e7ff05a2b2b0a83ba03")
enc2 = bytes.fromhex("e1930164280e44386b389f7e3bc02b707188ea70d9617e3ced989f15d8a10d70")
dec = bytes.fromhex("87ee02c312a7f1fef8f92f75f1e60ba122df321925e8132068b0871ff303960e")
\# Recover the key
key \= xor\_bytes(enc, enc2)
# Recover the key
key = xor_bytes(enc, enc2)
\# Recover the secret
secret \= xor\_bytes(dec, key)
# Recover the secret
secret = xor_bytes(dec, key)
print("Recovered key:", key.hex())
print("Recovered secret:", secret.decode())
\`\`\`
```
Running this, we get the flag in plaintext.
\`\`\`**mockingspectre@kali**:**\~/ctf/scriptctf2025/crypto/Secure-Server**$ python3 **solve.py**
```zsh
mockingspectre@kali:~/ctf/scriptctf2025/crypto/Secure-Server$ python3 solve.py
Recovered key: f48d70aa62d3b2aabe82574583b93ad27db15d6d7a9b20431dc2b43ed222b773
Recovered secret: scriptCTF{x0r\_1s\_not\_s3cur3\!\!\!\!}
\`\`\`
Recovered secret: scriptCTF{x0r_1s_not_s3cur3!!!!}
```
The server prints `enc2` (which leaks `enc XOR key`) while also sending/receiving the original `enc` and the follow-up `dec`. With both `enc` and `enc2,` an eavesdropper can derive the session key (`enc XOR enc2`) and then decrypt whatever the client sends later (`dec XOR key`) — so the server ends up leaking secrets it was supposed to protect.
Flag: `scriptCTF{x0r_1s_not_s3cur3!!!!}`